Opinion
00 Civ. 3285 (GEL) (HBP)
August 1, 2002
OPINION AND ORDER
By a motion dated November 26, 2001, petitioner moves for pro bono counsel. For the reasons set forth below, the motion is denied.
The factors to be considered in ruling on a motion for pro bono counsel are well settled and include "the merits of [petitioner's] case, the [petitioner's] ability to pay for private counsel, [petitioner's] efforts to obtain a lawyer, the availability of counsel, and the [petitioner's] ability to gather the facts and deal with the issues if unassisted by counsel." Cooper v. A. Sargenti Co., 877 F.2d 170, 172 (2d Cir. 1986). Of these, "[t]he factor which command[s] the most attention [is] the merits." Id. Accord Odom v. Sielaff, 90 Civ. 7659 (DAB), 1996 WL 208203 (S.D.N.Y. April 26, 1996). As noted fifteen years ago by the Court of Appeals:
Courts do not perform a useful service if they appoint a volunteer lawyer to a case which a private lawyer would not take if it were brought to his or her attention. Nor do courts perform a socially justified function when they request the services of a volunteer lawyer for a meritless case that no lawyer would take were the plaintiff not indigent.
Cooper v. A. Sargenti Co., supra, 877 F.2d at 174. See also Hendricks v. Coughlin, 114 F.3d 390, 392 (2d Cir. 1997) ("`In deciding whether to appoint counsel . . . the district judge should first determine whether the indigent's position seems likely to be of substance.'").
Assuming, without deciding, that petitioner has satisfied all the other factors for appointment of counsel, he cannot establish that his case is sufficiently meritorious to warrant appointment of counsel. As explained in my Report and Recommendation dated July 31, 2002, none of petitioner's claims have any merit whatsoever.
Accordingly, plaintiff's application for appointment of counsel is denied.