Opinion
2020 CA 0851
03-29-2021
James W. STEWART v. CITY OF HAMMOND, Louisiana
Ron S. Macaluso, Hammond, Louisiana, Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant James W. Stewart Andre G. Coudrain, Hammond, Louisiana, M. Nan Alessandra, New Orleans, Louisiana, Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee City of Hammond, Louisiana
Ron S. Macaluso, Hammond, Louisiana, Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant James W. Stewart
Andre G. Coudrain, Hammond, Louisiana, M. Nan Alessandra, New Orleans, Louisiana, Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee City of Hammond, Louisiana
BEFORE: McDONALD, HOLDRIDGE, AND PENZATO, JJ.
HOLDRIDGE, J. Plaintiff appeals the dismissal of his wrongful termination suit following the granting of defendant's peremptory exceptions raising the objections of no cause of action and res judicata. Defendant answers the appeal to contest the assessment of costs against each party. For the following reasons, we amend the judgment in part, affirm the judgment in part, reverse the judgment in part, and remand this matter.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
James W. Stewart ("Plaintiff") filed this wrongful termination suit against his former employer, City of Hammond, Louisiana ("Defendant"), in state district court on February 19, 2019. The facts, as alleged by Plaintiff's petition, are as follows. Plaintiff was employed as chief of police by Defendant beginning on August 1, 2016. Plaintiff was appointed by the chief executive officer of Hammond, Mayor Pete Panepinto ("the Mayor"), and confirmed by the Hammond City Council as required by Defendant's Home Rule Charter ("the Charter"). On January 3, 2019, Plaintiff alleged the Mayor said that he was " ‘not happy with the direction’ of the police department and that he ... was going to ‘make a change’ and ‘replace’ [Plaintiff]." The Mayor terminated Plaintiff's employment, effective on January 4, 2019. According to Plaintiff, the Mayor told him that the termination was due to " ‘philosophical differences.’ " Plaintiff had not been subject to any disciplinary action during his tenure as chief of police.
Section 4.04(A) of the Charter states, "The head of the Police Department shall be the police chief who shall be appointed by the mayor, subject to confirmation by the council, in accordance with applicable state law."
Plaintiff alleged his termination violated the Charter; the Code of Ordinances, City of Hammond, Louisiana ("the Code"); the Louisiana statutory Police Officer's Bill of Rights ( La. R.S. 40:2531 ); the Hammond Police Department General Orders; and his constitutional rights as set forth in Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 105 S.Ct. 1487, 84 L.Ed.2d 494 (1985). Plaintiff alleged that there was no factual or legal basis for his termination, and that therefore it was without just cause. He sought to recover lost compensation and related benefits, attorney's fees, and costs.
Employees with a constitutionally protected property interest in their positions must be afforded due process before being terminated pursuant to Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 538, 105 S.Ct. 1487, 84 L.Ed.2d 494 (1985), which requires notice and an opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case.
On March 19, 2019, Defendant removed the matter to federal district court, urging that it had subject matter jurisdiction based on Plaintiff's allegations in the petition of a violation of Loudermill . See Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 538, 105 S.Ct. 1487 ; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1331. In federal district court, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss all of Plaintiff's claims for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Stewart v. City of Hammond, Louisiana, No. CV 19-2439, 2019 WL 3574291, at *1 (E.D. La. 8/5/19). The federal district court granted the motion in part to dismiss with prejudice Plaintiff's federal constitutional claims, declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims, and remanded the matter to the state district court to determine any remaining state law claims. Id. at *3-4.
The federal district court initially dismissed all of Plaintiff's claims based upon his failure to comply with the appeals process set forth in La. R.S. 33:2501(A) as part of the Municipal Fire and Police Civil Service Law. Stewart v. City of Hammond, Louisiana, No. CV 19-2439, 2019 WL 3574291, at *1 (E.D. La. 8/5/19). However, on Plaintiff's motion for reconsideration, the federal district court determined that Defendant's chief of police was not a classified employee and therefore not subject to the appeal process under La. R.S. 33:2501(A). Id. at *2. The federal district court then granted the motion for reconsideration in part. Id.
We note that the federal district court opinion was filed into the record in this case when the federal district court remanded the case to state district court.
After the matter was remanded, Defendant filed a peremptory exception raising the objection of no cause of action based upon Plaintiff's failure to allege any basis under state law that created a property interest in his unclassified employment. Defendant later filed a peremptory exception raising the objection of res judicata based upon the federal district court ruling. The state district court held a hearing and granted the exceptions. On June 8, 2020, the state district court signed a judgment granting the peremptory exceptions raising the objections of no cause of action and res judicata, dismissing Plaintiff's suit with prejudice, and ordering each party to bear its own costs. From this judgment, Plaintiff appeals, and Defendant answers the appeal.
We note that attached to Defendant's exception is an amending complaint that Plaintiff may have filed in federal district court wherein he alternatively sought to be reinstated to his position of chief of police. The attachment has no file-stamp, and the record in the state district court suit does not contain any amending petition.
LAW AND DISCUSSION
On appeal, Plaintiff raises as error the state district court's granting of Defendant's peremptory exceptions raising the objections of no cause of action and res judicata.
We will first discuss Defendant's peremptory exception raising the objection of res judicata. The federal law of res judicata must be applied when a state court is required to determine the preclusive effects of a judgment rendered by a federal court exercising federal question jurisdiction. Reeder v. Succession of Palmer, 623 So.2d 1268, 1271 (La. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1165, 114 S.Ct. 1191, 127 L.Ed.2d 541 (1994) ; Webb v. Morelia, 2016-1153 (La. App. 1 Cir. 6/21/17), 224 So.3d 406, 409 ; Samour v. Louisiana Casino Cruises, Inc., 2001-0831 (La. App. 1 Cir. 2/27/02), 818 So.2d 171, 174. Under federal law, the phrase "res judicata" includes both claim preclusion (res judicata) and issue preclusion (collateral estoppel). Webb, 224 So.3d at 409.
Federal appellate courts reviewing the res judicata effect of a prior judgment apply the de novo standard of review. See Test Masters Educational Services, Inc. v. Singh, 428 F.3d 559, 571 (5th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1055, 126 S.Ct. 1662, 164 L.Ed.2d 397 (2006). This court has applied that same standard in reviewing the res judicata effect of a prior federal judgment. Raj v. Louisiana State University, 2014-0140 (La. App. 1 Cir. 4/24/15), 167 So.3d 1023, 1029. Thus, we apply the de novo standard here.
First, under federal precepts, claim preclusion or "true res judicata" treats a judgment, once rendered, as the full measure of relief to be accorded between the same parties on the same "claim" or "cause of action." Reeder, 623 So.2d at 1271 ; Webb, 224 So.3d at 409. The aim of claim preclusion is to avoid multiple suits on identical entitlements or obligations between the same parties, accompanied, as they would be, by the redetermination of identical issues. Reeder, 623 So.2d at 1271. Therefore, claim preclusion will apply to bar a subsequent action on res judicata principles where parties or their privies have previously litigated the same claim to a valid final judgment. Id.
Second, under federal law, the doctrine of collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, bars the relitigation of issues actually litigated and necessarily decided in an earlier case between the same parties. Webb , 224 So.3d at 410. Under collateral estoppel, once an issue of ultimate fact is actually and necessarily determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, that determination is conclusive in subsequent suits based on a different cause of action involving a party to the prior litigation. Id. Thus, under the federal issue preclusion doctrine, plaintiffs are barred from relitigating a claim in a subsequent lawsuit where three elements are present: (1) the issue at stake must be identical to the one involved in the prior action; (2) the issue must have been actually litigated in the prior action; and (3) the determination of the issue in the prior action must have been a necessary part of the judgment in that action. See Id.
In this case, the federal district court considered Defendant's Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss and had to determine whether, in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the complaint stated a valid claim for relief. Stewart, 2019 WL 3574291 at *2. In determining whether Plaintiff's constitutional due process rights under Loudermill were violated, the federal district court initially stated that to show a due process violation in a public employment context, Plaintiff had to show he had a legally recognized property interest at stake. Stewart, 2019 WL 3574291 at *3 ; see also 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To determine whether a property interest existed, the federal district court considered state law. Stewart, 2019 WL 3574291 at *3. The court noted that, under Louisiana law, a public employee plaintiff could only establish a property interest in his job if the employer contracted with the employee to fire him only for cause, or the employee was a permanent classified employee under the Louisiana civil service system. Id. Otherwise, the Louisiana Civil Code provides a general rule that employment is "at will" and an employer may dismiss an employee without cause. See Id., citing La. C.C. art. 2747. Any ambiguity should be construed in favor of employment at will. Id. The federal district court stated that under La. R.S. 33:2481(B)(6), the chief of police of the City of Hammond is designated as an unclassified employee; therefore, it determined that the only manner in which Plaintiff could establish a property interest in his job was through an employment contract. Id.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 states, in pertinent part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress....
Louisiana Civil Code article 2747 provides, "A man is at liberty to dismiss a hired servant attached to his person or family, without assigning any reason for so doing. The servant is also free to depart without assigning any cause."
The federal district court then considered Plaintiff's allegations in his petition that the Mayor violated his substantive property rights based on the Charter and the Code. Stewart , 2019 WL 3574291 at *3. Pursuant to the Charter, Plaintiff alleged that the chief of police was an appointed position in accordance with applicable state law. Id.; see also footnote 1. Plaintiff then alleged that his position was supervised by the Mayor, whose authority was set out in the Charter as follows, in pertinent part:
Section 3-07. - Powers and duties of the mayor.
A. [...] The mayor, as chief executive officer of the City, shall have the following powers and duties:
...
(2) Appoint and suspend or remove for just cause all City employees and appointive administrative officers provided for, by or under this charter, except as otherwise provided by law, this charter, civil service or other personnel rules adopted pursuant to this charter ....
Id.
Plaintiff further alleged that Sections 4-02, 4-03, 4-06, 4-07, 4-08, and 4-09 in the Charter set forth other mayor-appointed positions which "shall serve at the pleasure of the mayor." See Id. Because Section 4.04, the provision referring to the chief of police, did not state that he or she "serve[d] at the pleasure of the mayor," Plaintiff alleged that the Mayor was required to have just cause to terminate him under Section 3-07. See Id. Lastly, Plaintiff alleged that Defendant failed to comply with La. R.S. 40:2531 as also codified in the Police Officer's Bill of Rights. Id.
These Sections cover the city attorney (4-02(A)), the head of the Department of Administration (4-03(A)), the head of the Public Works Department (4-06(A)), the head of the Utilities Department (4-07(A)), the head of the Recreation Department (4-08(A)), and the head of the Personnel Department (4-09(A)).
The federal district court held that these ordinances and the statute did not establish a property right for Plaintiff as chief of police, stating:
[Plaintiff] can properly allege a property interest in his employment by showing that he has a contract for a definite term or that the mayor contracted with him to fire him only for cause. [ Wallace v. Shreve Memorial Library, 79 F.3d 427, 430 (5th Cir. 1996) ]. Plaintiff's opposition to the motion to dismiss acknowledges that the parties did not enter into an employment contract but rather the Charter and ordinances established for cause employment. ... An ordinance "merely conditioning an employee's removal on compliance with certain specified procedures" does not grant a property interest in an employment. Cobb v. City of Harahan, 516 Fed.Appx. 337, 341 (5th Cir. 2013) (quoting Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 345, 96 S.Ct. 2074, 48 L.Ed.2d 684 (1976) ). "By contrast, we have found a property interest in continued employment where some source, such as a contract, guaranteed employment for a specific length of time or provided that the employee could be discharged only for specific reasons." Id.
Stewart, 2019 WL 3574291 at *3.
In granting the motion to dismiss Plaintiff's federal claims, the federal district court concluded:
Louisiana law is clear on establishing a protected property right in employment for unclassified employees; Plaintiff must show there was a contract. The various provisions cited by Plaintiff in
the Petition fail to state with any particularity the conditions of his employment as the chief of police. The provisions do not provide requisite details pursuant to Louisiana law such as whether his employment shall span for a specific length of time or if the chief of police can be discharged only for specific reasons. Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiff fails to state a federal claim upon which relief can be granted because Plaintiff fails to sufficiently plead a property interest in his employment.
Stewart, 2019 WL 3574291 at *3.
The federal district court dismissed with prejudice Plaintiff's federal constitutional claims and declined to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction as to the remaining state law claims, remanding the matter to the state district court to determine any state law claims. Stewart , 2019 WL 3574291 at *4.
At the hearing on the exceptions in state district court, in oral reasons, the state court considered the federal district court's ruling that Plaintiff was an at will employee. The state district court then held that issue preclusion applied in this case and granted Defendant's peremptory exception raising the objection of res judicata. The state district court also found that the petition did not state a cause of action and granted the peremptory exception raising the objection of no cause of action.
As stated earlier, the federal law of res judicata must be applied to determine the preclusive effects of a judgment rendered by a federal court. Raj , 167 So.3d at 1029. Plaintiff argues that because the federal district court declined to exercise its supplemental or pendent jurisdiction over his state law claims, the state district court erred in finding that the federal district court judgment could be used to dismiss the state law claims. We disagree. Under the doctrine of issue preclusion or collateral estoppel, a federal district court's remand of state court claims does not bar the use of issue preclusion. See Webb , 224 So.3d at 410. In Webb, the federal district court dismissed the plaintiff's federal suit against defendants based on allegedly fabricated drug test results and declined to exercise supplemental or pendent jurisdiction over the plaintiff's remaining state law claims. Id. at 409. In the subsequent state court litigation, this court held that collateral estoppel barred relitigation of the state law claims based upon the same factual issues that the federal district court ruled upon in considering the defendant's motion to dismiss. Id. at 411.
In this case, the judgment in the federal district court held that Plaintiff was an at will employee. This ruling is dispositive of Plaintiff's claim that he was entitled to pretermination notice and a hearing under Loudermill . Since the federal district court determined that Plaintiff did not have a protected property interest in his employment under state law because his employment was at will, this issue is precluded by res judicata (issue preclusion) from being re-litigated in state court. Therefore, the state district court was correct in granting the premptory exception raising the objection of res judicata as to Plaintiff's status as an at will employee.
However, our review does not end at affirming the granting of the peremptory exception raising the objection of res judicata. We must also consider whether the state district court was correct in granting the peremptory exception raising the objection of no cause of action as to Plaintiff's allegations that his termination violated the Charter, the Code, the Police Officer's Bill of Rights ( La. R.S. 40:2531 ), and the Hammond Police Department General Orders. Plaintiff contends on appeal that the state district court erred in finding that he did not state a cause of action regarding those claims. The question raised by Plaintiff is whether the state district court erred in granting the peremptory exception raising the objection of no cause of action when he alleged that the Mayor exceeded his authority in terminating him under the applicable ordinances and statute.
The function of the peremptory exception raising the objection of no cause of action is to test the legal sufficiency of the petition by determining whether the law affords a remedy on the facts alleged in the pleading. Reyer v. Milton Homes, LLC, 2018-0580 (La. App. 1 Cir. 2/25/19), 272 So.3d 604, 607. The burden of demonstrating that the petition states no cause of action is upon the mover. Id. Peremptory exceptions raising the objection of no cause of action present legal questions, which are reviewed using the de novo standard of review. Id. The court reviews the petition and accepts well-pled allegations of fact as true. Id. Notably, however, conclusions of law asserted as facts are not considered well-pled allegations of fact, and the correctness of those conclusions is not conceded. Hooks v. Treasurer, 2006-0541 (La. App. 1 Cir. 5/4/07), 961 So.2d 425, 429, writ denied, 2007-1788 (La. 11/9/07), 967 So.2d 507. No evidence may be introduced at any time to support or controvert the objection that the petition fails to state a cause of action. La. C.C.P. art. 931.
In this case, Plaintiff in his petition referred to the provisions of the Charter, Code, and Hammond Police Department General Order 108. The ordinances referred to in the Charter and Code and the General Order were not attached to the petition, and therefore, were not part of the petition. See La. C.C.P. art. 853. However, judicial notice can be taken of ordinances, pursuant to La. C.E. art. 202(B)(1)(c). In accordance with the article, Plaintiff asked for the state district court to take judicial notice of the ordinances and Hammond Police Department General Orders 108 and 111 and filed a copy of the items into the record. Defendant also requested that the state district court take judicial notice of certain ordinances, including City of Hammond Ordinance 04-3023, which enacted the Personnel Policies and Procedures Manual for City Employees. Defendant filed these items into the record. Thus, the ordinances are properly reviewable in determining the peremptory exception raising the objection of no cause of action since the state district court must determine if there is a legal basis for plaintiff to seek relief from the factual allegations contained in the petition. Bayou Liberty Association, Inc. v. St. Tammany Parish Council, 2005-1228 (La. App. 1 Cir. 6/9/06), 938 So.2d 724, 729.
A petition should not be dismissed for failure to state a cause of action unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff cannot prove any set of facts in support of any claim which would entitle him to relief; the question therefore is whether, in the light most favorable to plaintiff, and with every doubt resolved in his behalf, the petition states any valid cause of action for relief. Collins v. State ex rel. Department of Natural Resources, 2012-1031 (La. App. 1 Cir. 5/30/13), 118 So.3d 43, 46.
In his petition, Plaintiff did not allege that his employer-employee relationship with Defendant was based on an employment contract with specific terms or that he was hired for a specific time period. Instead, Plaintiff relies on the Charter, particularly the absence of the provision "at the pleasure of the mayor" as to Plaintiff's position as chief of police, in contrast to several other administrative positions which do contain this provision, to mean that just cause was required for his termination under Section 3-07. However, Section 3-07 clearly provides that the mayor's power to remove for just cause was "except as otherwise provided by law, this charter, civil service or other personnel rules adopted pursuant to this charter...." In his petition, Plaintiff refers to the requirement that the Mayor comply with the personnel rules adopted pursuant to the Charter and to the Code's provision establishing a personnel policy manual for the city. However, all of the ordinances and rules in question clearly provide that all employees are employed at will. See City of Hammond Ordinance 04-3023 (Personnel Policies and Procedures Manual for City Employees) (Rule I-11 provides, in pertinent part, "No employee of the City of Hammond shall be employed except as employment at will." Additionally, Rule VI-13 provides, in pertinent part, "Employment with the City of Hammond is employment at will.")
Plaintiff argues that because the Charter did not provide that the chief of police's employment was "at the pleasure of the mayor," the provision stating that the mayor had the power to remove him only for just cause applied.
In Mederos v. St. Tammany Parish Government, 2015-1602 (La. App. 1 Cir. 7/11/16), 199 So.3d 30, 33-36, this court upheld the state district court's dismissal of a former parish employee's suit against the parish on the grant of the parish's motion for summary judgment based on her at will employment. In language similar to that in the case at bar, St. Tammany Parish's home rule charter provided that the parish president had the power to remove for just cause all parish government employees, except as otherwise provided by the charter or other personnel rules adopted pursuant to the charter. Id. at 35. Additionally, Mederos had signed a receipt and acknowledgement form stating that she understood that the employment relationship was at will and could be terminated by her or St. Tammany Parish at any time. Id. This court rejected Mederos' argument that the at will language in the receipt conflicted with the just cause language in the charter because the charter clearly provided that the president's rights to remove parish employees for just cause could be amended by personnel rules adopted pursuant to the charter. Id. at 36. Similarly, Plaintiff cannot rely on the Charter here to require the Mayor to have just cause for his termination because the personnel rules state that City employment is at will.
Plaintiff contends that he has a cause of action for Defendant's breach of its charter based on his allegations that the Mayor exceeded his authority in terminating him, relying on Kelly v. City of Leesville, 897 F.2d 172, 174-75, 177 (5th Cir. 1990). In Kelly, the federal court found that a city inspector had a breach of contract claim against the city because the mayor who fired him did not have the authority to do so under the city charter and ordinances. Id. However, Kelly is distinguishable from this case because Plaintiff's allegations that the Mayor exceeded his authority under the Charter and Code cannot be supported when the provisions of the personnel manual providing for at will employment are considered.
Plaintiff also argues that Mederos is distinguishable because that suit was dismissed on a motion for summary judgment, not on a peremptory exception raising the objection of no cause of action. This contention lacks merit because this case does not present factual issues, but rather the legal issue of whether the facts alleged by Plaintiff in support of his wrongful termination claim entitle him to relief. In considering Plaintiff's allegations that his termination violated the applicable ordinances and personnel rules which provide for at will employment, we find that Plaintiff has not set forth a valid cause of action in his petition since he alleges no facts which provide any legal basis that he was other than an at will employee who could be dismissed at any time.
Plaintiff also alleged that the Mayor's actions violated statutory law, in that he did not comply with La. R.S. 40:2531 and Hammond Police Department General Order 108. However, Plaintiff specifically alleged that he was not the subject of any disciplinary action, nor does he allege he was under investigation. General Order 108 concerns disciplinary actions against Hammond Police Department employees and La. R.S. 40:2531 applies to police employees and law enforcement officers who are under investigation. Therefore, Plaintiff's allegations do not state a cause of action for violating La. R.S. 40:2531 and General Order 108.
Louisiana Revised Statutes 40:2531(B) provides, in pertinent part, "Whenever a police employee or law enforcement officer is under investigation, the following minimum standards shall apply...."
We note that at the hearing on the exceptions, when the court asked Plaintiff's counsel if he was raising the argument that Plaintiff's termination was wrongful because the City Council was not involved, he replied negatively. Moreover, Plaintiff did not allege in his petition that the Mayor exceeded his authority by terminating Plaintiff without approval of the City Council, as was required to appoint him to his position. Although Plaintiff contends in his brief that only the City Council had the authority to terminate him, he cannot raise this issue for the first time on appeal. See Walston v. Lakeview Regional Medical Center, 1999-1920 (La. App. 1 Cir. 9/22/00), 768 So.2d 238, 242-43, writ denied, 2000-2936 (La. 12/15/00), 777 So.2d 1229.
After a thorough review of the petition and Plaintiff's contentions on appeal, we do not find that the state district court erred in granting the peremptory exceptions raising the objections of no cause of action and res judicata. Plaintiff's allegations in his petition do not give rise to his right to assert an action for wrongful termination against Defendant. Plaintiff's main allegation that Defendant terminated him without just cause, when considered in light of the applicable Charter, Code, and personnel manual provisions, does not set forth a valid claim for breach of contract or wrongful termination. Therefore, Plaintiff's assignments of error have no merit.
However, pursuant to La. C.C.P. art. 934, if a petition fails to state a cognizable cause of action and the grounds for the objection can be removed by amendment, the plaintiff should be allowed to amend his demand. On the other hand, where the grounds for the objection cannot be removed by amendment, the state district court is not required to allow amendment. La. C.C.P. art. 934. The decision to allow amendment is within the sound discretion of the state district court. Didier v. Simmons, 2019-1100 (La. App. 1 Cir. 5/11/20), 312 So.3d 279, ––––, writ denied, 2020-00700 (La. 9/29/20), 301 So.3d 1162. In this case, the state district court did not provide Plaintiff an opportunity to amend his petition. We are unable to say whether the objection pleaded by Defendant's peremptory exception raising the objection of no cause of action may be removed by an amendment. Therefore, the portion of the judgment dismissing Plaintiff's suit with prejudice is reversed and this matter is remanded to allow Plaintiff the opportunity to amend his petition in accordance with La. C.C.P. art. 934.
In its answer to the appeal, Defendant contends that the state district court abused its discretion in assessing costs equally between the parties. It contends Plaintiff should have been cast for all costs since judgment was rendered against him.
While it is a general rule the party cast in judgment should be taxed with costs, the state district court may assess costs of a suit in any equitable manner. La. C.C.P. art. 1920 ; Hoagboon v. Cannon, 2010-0909 (La. App. 1 Cir. 12/29/10), 54 So.3d 802, 807-08. Upon review, a state district court's assessment of costs can be reversed by this court only upon a showing of an abuse of discretion. Polk Chevrolet, Inc. v. Webb, 572 So.2d 1112, 1116 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1990), writ denied, 575 So.2d 394 (La. 1991). When a prevailing party is taxed with the costs of litigation, it is usually because that party in some way incurred additional costs pointlessly or engaged in other conduct which justified an assessment of costs against it. Reynolds v. Louisiana Department of Transportation, 2015-1304 (La. App. 1 Cir. 4/13/16), 194 So.3d 56, 59.
In this case, the state district court did not specify the reasons upon which it based its cost assessment. However, there is no showing in the record that Defendant caused costs to be incurred pointlessly or engaged in other conduct justifying the assessment of costs against it. Accordingly, we find the state district court abused its discretion in assessing costs equally between the parties. All costs should have been assessed against Plaintiff. See Hoagboon, 54 So.3d at 807 ; Polk Chevrolet, 572 So.2d at 1116. The answer to the appeal has merit.
CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, the June 8, 2020 judgment is affirmed insofar as it grants the peremptory exceptions raising the objections of no cause of action and res judicata. That part of the judgment dismissing James W. Stewart's suit against City of Hammond, Louisiana, with prejudice is reversed, and this matter is remanded to the state district court to allow Mr. Stewart an opportunity to amend his petition, if possible, to state a cause of action for wrongful termination against City of Hammond, Louisiana, and for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We amend that part of the judgment as to costs, assessing Mr. Stewart with all state district court costs. We also assess Mr. Stewart with the costs of this appeal.