Opinion
CV 00-835-AS
November 1, 2000
Diane Wiscarson Portland, Oregon Attorney for Plaintiffs.
Andrea L. Hungerford Richard G. Cohn-Lee West Linn, Oregon Attorneys for Defendants.
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION
matter before the court is defendant's partial motion to dismiss plaintiffs' amended appeal and complaint (doc. 10). Defendant moves to dismiss plaintiffs' first claim for relief for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Defendant moves to dismiss plaintiffs' second and third claims for relief as an exercise of the court's discretion to decline supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims. For the reasons discussed below, I recommend that defendant's motion be granted as to all three claims for relief.
UAL BACKGROUND
intiffs Therese Steward and Sean Steward are the parents of Morgan Steward, a minor child who is blind and autistic.
May 7, 1998, plaintiffs entered into a settlement agreement with defendant regarding the educational needs of Morgan. The court has not been provided a copy of the settlement agreement, but the hearing officer's decision attached to plaintiffs' complaint indicates that the agreement provided in relevant part that:
(1) Defendant would provide Morgan with Assistive Technology (AT) services for a three-year period;
(2) Morgan's parents would unilaterally place Morgan in home school placement for a three-year period, with defendant not responsible for payments for any services other than the AT; and
(3) Because Morgan was to be home-schooled, defendant would not be required to re-evaluate Morgan or hold any Individual Education Plan (IEP) meetings to reconsider the IEP or placement during the three-year period, except that defendant would do an assessment and IEP covering Morgan's AT needs.
The parties met on December 14, 1999 to develop Morgan's yearly IEP covering his AT needs. Plaintiffs allege that, at that time, defendant refused to provide an IEP, instead offering a service plan that constituted a reduction in services and a deviation from the terms of the settlement agreement.
Plaintiffs further allege that pursuant to the settlement agreement, on December 15, 1999, they requested a due process hearing from the Hearing Officer Panel for the Department of Human Services at the Oregon Department of Education (ODE). On December 31, 2000, defendant filed a motion to dismiss the hearing request, arguing that plaintiffs lacked standing to request a due process hearing because they unilaterally placed their son in a private school, and that disputes relating to enforcement of settlement agreements are outside the jurisdiction of the hearing officer. Plaintiffs responded on January 18, 2000, and defendant replied on January 26, 2000.
Thereafter, on February 18, 2000, the ODE hearing officer filed a written ruling dismissing plaintiff's due process hearing request and notifying the plaintiffs of their right to bring a civil action in federal court challenging the dismissal. The hearing officer agreed with defendant that plaintiffs did not have standing to request a due process hearing and that, to the extent the due process hearing was to enforce the settlement agreement, the hearing officer did not have jurisdiction to hear plaintiffs' claims.
The hearing officer also found that Morgan had been unilaterally placed in a private school by his parents. The hearing officer relied on 34 C.F.R. § 300.457 for the conclusion that complaints regarding services to private school children must be resolved through the state complaint procedures in 34 C.F.R. § 300.600-300.662, and not the due process hearing procedures in 34 C.F.R. § 300.504-300.515.
On June 16, plaintiffs filed a complaint in this court. On July 7, 2000, plaintiffs filed the amended appeal and complaint that is the subject of defendant's motion to dismiss.
PLAINTIFFS' AMENDED APPEAL AND COMPLAINT
Plaintiffs' amended appeal and complaint appeals the hearing officer's ruling dismissing plaintiffs' request for a due process hearing, and seeks orders declaring that the ODE has jurisdiction to hear the dispute between the parties and remanding the matter to the ODE for a determination on the merits. Plaintiffs also seek attorney fees and costs.
In addition to the appeal of the hearing officer's decision, plaintiffs' amended appeal and complaint alleges:
(1) First Claim for Relief: That defendant violated the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) by failing to provide services that it agreed to provide and by denying a free and appropriate public education to Morgan. Plaintiffs seek injunctive and declaratory relief, together with compensatory damages, attorney fees, and costs.
(2) Second Claim for Relief: That defendant breached the settlement agreement. Plaintiffs seek injunctive, equitable, and declaratory relief and compensatory damages.
(3) Third Claim for Relief: That defendant breached the settlement agreement with respect to Morgan, the third-party beneficiary of that agreement. Plaintiffs seek compensatory damages.
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS
Defendant does not dispute that plaintiffs' appeal from the hearing officer's decision is properly before this court, but moves for dismissal of plaintiffs' first, second and third claims for relief.Supplemental Jurisdiction
Defendant argues that the court should not exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiffs' second and third claims for relief (which are claims for breach of the settlement agreement) because (1) plaintiffs' complaint impermissibly mixes an appeal from a hearing officer's denial of a due process hearing under the IDEA with new claims of violation of state law; and (2) plaintiffs' state law breach of contract claims are simply reformulations of the IDEA issue that is the subject of their administrative appeal.
Plaintiffs argue that the court's exercise of supplemental jurisdiction is proper, that their state law claims are properly before the court because they are all part of the same case or controversy as plaintiffs' federal claims, and that they have permissibly joined independent and alternate claims. Plaintiffs argue that, since all their claims relate to the settlement agreement and involve the same parties, they are all properly before this court.
I agree with defendant that plaintiffs' state law claims for breach of contract should be dismissed, but I find the dismissal would be predicated upon a failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
In their second and third claims for relief, plaintiffs seek to enforce the settlement agreement and be awarded, among other things, compensatory damages for its breach. This court cannot consider such a claim until it has been presented through a due process hearing or the state complaint procedures (which process is appropriate is, of course, the subject of plaintiffs' appeal of the hearing officer's decision to dismiss the request for a due process hearing). Plaintiffs' claim that the settlement agreement that has been breached by the school district is a "complaint" which, under the IDEA and its regulations, must first be presented to the appropriate administrative body. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b); 34 C.F.R. § 300.457.
The exhaustion requirements under the IDEA serve the procedural aims embodied in the Act and its regulations. Exhaustion permits full development of the technical issues and factual record on IDEA claims prior to a court review of the claims, and avoids unnecessary judicial decisions by giving the appropriate administrative body the first opportunity to correct any error. Currently, this court is without an administrative record to determine what claims were settled by the settlement agreement, what the actual and specific provisions of the settlement agreement were, and what actions were taken in accordance with or in breach of the settlement agreement. And, of course, even plaintiffs admit that the issue of whether a breach occurred is the same issue for which a due process hearing was requested and on which the appeal to this court is based.
With respect to plaintiffs' second and third claims for relief, I find that this court does not have before it currently viable and exhausted IDEA claims, and I recommend that the claims be dismissed.
Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies
Defendant argues that plaintiffs have not exhausted their administrative remedies with respect to their first claim for relief (which is a claim for substantive violations of the IDEA). Defendant's position is that it is proper in this action for plaintiffs to seek to have their request for a due process hearing on alleged violations of the IDEA remanded to the hearing officer with instructions to consider the merits of those allegations. However, defendant argues that should the court hear the merits of plaintiffs' first claim for relief, the court essentially eliminates the administrative hearing stage and vacates the hearing officer's dismissal without ever reviewing the dismissal under the appropriate standard. Thus, plaintiffs cannot, at the same time and in a separate claim for relief, ask the court to rule on the merits of whether a due process hearing was required and the merits of the allegations of violations of the IDEA. Plaintiffs must first exhaust their administrative remedies before seeking to have this court consider the merits of the IDEA allegations.
Plaintiffs argue that their first claim for relief is proper because "[d]efendant's failure to comply with the Settlement Agreement violates the IDEA." Pl. Resp., p. 8. Plaintiffs argue that "[b]ecause [they] were denied a due process hearing, they have no recourse but to seek judicial relief, and have also exhausted their administrative remedies as a matter of law." Id.
I agree with defendant. Plaintiffs have not yet exhausted their administrative remedies, and have made no argument that exhaustion would be futile. The appeal of the denial of the due process hearing is properly before this court, but plaintiffs may not bring a separate claim for violation of the IDEA while the merits of the allegations for which a due process hearing is sought remain unresolved by the administrative agency. I recommend that plaintiffs' first claim for relief for violation of the IDEA be dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
CONCLUSION
I recommend that defendant's partial motion (# 10) to dismiss plaintiffs' amended appeal and complaint be GRANTED, and that plaintiffs' first, second and third claims for relief be DISMISSED without prejudice. Plaintiffs' appeal of the dismissal of the request for a due process hearing should remain before the court.
SCHEDULING ORDER
The above Findings and Recommendation will be referred to a United States District Judge for review. Objections, if any, are due November 16, 2000. If no objections are filed, review of the Findings and Recommendation will go under advisement on that date.
If objections are filed, a response to the objections is due November 30, 2000, and the review of the Findings and Recommendation will go under advisement on that date.