Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Super. Ct. No. CV020730
HULL , Acting P.J.Plaintiff Winfried Stevenson filed a complaint against his employer, defendant California Security Consultants, Inc., for alleged nonpayment of overtime compensation. He sought to certify his lawsuit as a class action but the trial court denied that motion. Plaintiff appeals, challenging both this ruling and a related discovery matter.
We conclude that the court erred in ruling that there was an insufficient community of interest among the security guards who worked for defendant to warrant class certification. This conclusion compels reversal, obviating the need to resolve the discovery issue.
Facts and Proceedings
Plaintiff worked for defendant as a security guard. In his complaint, plaintiff alleged that defendant failed to pay overtime and failed to provide related itemized wage statements as statutorily required. He also alleged that these violations constituted unlawful and unfair business practices, and he sought injunctive and declaratory relief as well as an accounting. Plaintiff’s complaint included class action allegations, defining the proposed class as “all individuals who worked for the Defendants from April 1999 to the time of trial . . . as security guards, and who were not compensated for overtime hours worked as required by law, and/or who were not given itemized wage statements in the manner required by law.”
Plaintiff sought the names and contact information of other security guards who had worked for defendant during the relevant time period. Although the court initially granted this motion, defendant later submitted declarations from some of its employees objecting to the release of this information, and the court reversed its order.
Plaintiff subsequently moved for class certification, and submitted evidence in support of this motion, including declarations, time records and pay statements from former employees. Defendant objected, asserting there was no community of interest among the proposed class and questioning whether plaintiff was a proper class representative. Defendant also asserted that plaintiff had not demonstrated that class treatment was a superior method for handling the case.
The trial court denied the motion for class certification, finding plaintiff had not met the community-of-interest requirement. It ruled: “The court finds that the plaintiff’s claims are unique to each individual in the purported class. There is simply no predominating question of law or fact which is common to all of their claims. Weaver v. Pasadena Tournament of Roses Association (1948) 32 Cal.2d 833 [(Weaver)] . . . is on point.
“As in Weaver, ‘The causes of action of the several plaintiffs and the other unnamed aggrieved individuals are separate and distinct.’ [Citation.] To paraphrase Weaver, as to each individual plaintiff, the questions will need to be answered whether he was an employee eligible to earn overtime, whether he worked overtime; whether he was compensated for any overtime worked; whether any overtime worked was paid at the appropriate rate; whether he was paid in cash or by check; and whether he received an itemized statement which complied with applicable laws.
“As in Weaver, ‘a decision favorable or adverse to these plaintiffs--or any one of them--could not determine the rights of any of the unnamed parties whom plaintiffs purport to represent.’ [Citation.] The court therefore finds that there is insufficient community of interest to justify class certification. (City of San Jose v. Superior Court (1974) 12 Cal.3d 447 [(City of San Jose)].)” (Fns. & italics omitted.)
This appeal followed. (See Richmond v. Dart Industries, Inc. (1981) 29 Cal.3d 462, 470.)
Discussion
I
Class Certification
Plaintiff contends the trial court erred in concluding that there was an insufficient community of interest to warrant class certification. We agree.
Code of Civil Procedure section 382 provides that a class action may be maintained “when the question is one of a common or general interest, of many persons, or, when the parties are numerous, and it is impracticable to bring them all before the court . . . .” “The party seeking certification has the burden to establish the existence of both an ascertainable class and a well-defined community of interest among class members. [Citations.] The ‘community of interest’ requirement embodies three factors: (1) predominant common questions of law or fact; (2) class representatives with claims or defenses typical of the class; and (3) class representatives who can adequately represent the class.” (Sav-On Drug Stores, Inc. v. Superior Court (2004) 34 Cal.4th 319, 326 (Sav-On).)
“Because trial courts are ideally situated to evaluate the efficiencies and practicalities of permitting group action, they are afforded great discretion in granting or denying certification. The denial of certification to an entire class is an appealable order [citations], but in the absence of other error, a trial court ruling supported by substantial evidence generally will not be disturbed ‘unless (1) improper criteria were used [citation]; or (2) erroneous legal assumptions were made [citation].’ [Citation.] Under this standard, an order based upon improper criteria or incorrect assumptions calls for reversal ‘“even though there may be substantial evidence to support the court’s order.”’ [Citations.] Accordingly, we must examine the trial court’s reasons for denying class certification. ‘Any valid pertinent reason stated will be sufficient to uphold the order.’ [Citation.]” (Linder v. Thrifty Oil Co. (2000) 23 Cal.4th 429, 435-436.)
Here, the trial court focused exclusively on the first community-of-interest factor in denying class certification, and determined that common questions of law or fact did not predominate. Specifically, the court found that each class member would have to establish (1) whether he was eligible to earn overtime, (2) whether he worked overtime, (3) whether he was compensated for any overtime worked, (4) whether any overtime was paid at the appropriate rate, (5) whether the employee was paid by cash or check, and (6) whether he received an itemized wage statement. The trial court misperceived the nature of the common question requirement, especially as it relates to the proposed class.
“To establish the requisite community of interest, the proponent of certification must show, inter alia, that the questions of law or fact common to the class predominate over the questions affecting the individual members . . . . [Citation.] In essence, this means ‘each member must not be required to individually litigate numerous and substantial questions to determine his [or her] right to recover following the class judgment; and the issues which may be jointly tried, when compared with those requiring separate adjudication, must be sufficiently numerous and substantial to make the class action advantageous to the judicial process and to the litigants.’ [Citation.]” (Washington Mutual Bank v. Superior Court (2001) 24 Cal.4th 906, 913-914.)
Plaintiff proposed a class composed of individuals who worked for defendant as security guards during a defined period of time and “who were not compensated for overtime hours worked as required by law, and/or who were not given itemized wage statements in the manner required by law.”
Given this definition, some of the trial court’s concerns were irrelevant. In deciding that separate questions of law or fact for each individual class member predominated, the court relied in part on the thought that each class member would have to establish that he was eligible to work overtime, he worked overtime, and he was not compensated for that work. However, the proposed class included only those individuals who “were not compensated for overtime hours worked as required by law.” Individuals who were not entitled to overtime compensation or who received overtime payments were to be excluded from the class by definition.
The court found that individual questions also predominated on the issue of whether defendant paid particular employees in cash or by check. The method of payment is irrelevant. The issue was whether defendant paid overtime to its employees as required by law, not how that overtime might have been paid. The distinction between cash and check payment was relevant only in that plaintiff alleged that cash payments to employees were not made at the proper rate and were not accompanied by an itemized wage statement.
The trial court was concerned that two other individual questions would predominate at trial, namely whether a particular employee received overtime at the appropriate rate and whether a particular employee received the required wage statement. Neither of these issues precludes class certification. Plaintiff’s complaint centers on an allegedly illegal policy of defendant, namely, the systematic failure to pay overtime and provide the required wage statements. These are precisely the types of issues that lend themselves to class action treatment.
As one court noted, “Significantly, wage and hour disputes (and others in the same general class) routinely proceed as class actions.” (Prince v. CLS Transportation, Inc. (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 1320, 1328.) The Prince court noted that other courts had “reached the same result in wage and hour cases.” (Id. at p. 1328.) For example, in Madera Police Officers Assn. v. City of Madera (1984) 36 Cal.3d 403, police officers sought payment of overtime wages, an accounting, and declaratory relief through a class action. Similarly, in Bell v. Farmers Ins. Exchange (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 805 and Parris v. Superior Court (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 285, employees brought class actions to recover for the alleged nonpayment of overtime compensation. (See Prince v. CLS Transportation, Inc., supra, at p. 1328.)
In Sav-On, supra, 34 Cal.4th 319, the California Supreme Court also approved the use of a class action to recover unpaid overtime compensation. The court rejected defendant’s claim that a class action would “‘degenerate into a multitude of mini-trials.’” (Id. at p. 332.) “As alleged, each class member’s claim to unpaid overtime depends on whether he or she worked for defendant during the relevant period in a position that was misclassified either deliberately . . . or circumstantially . . . . That calculation of individual damages may at some point be required does not foreclose the possibility of taking common evidence on the misclassification questions. [Citations.] In any event, ‘a class action is not inappropriate simply because each member of the class may at some point be required to make an individual showing as to his or her eligibility for recovery or as to the amount of his or her damages.’ [Citation.]” (Id. at pp. 332-333.)
The court continued, “We long ago recognized ‘that each class member might be required ultimately to justify an individual claim does not necessarily preclude maintenance of a class action.’ [Citation.] Predominance is a comparative concept, and ‘the necessity for class members to individually establish eligibility and damages does not mean individual fact questions predominate.’ [Citations.] Individual issues do not render class certification inappropriate so long as such issues may effectively be managed. [Citations.]” (Sav-On, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 334.)
The Sav-On court emphasized that class actions may be particularly appropriate in wage and hour disputes, given the clear public policy favoring enforcement of minimum wage and overtime disputes for the benefit of workers. “California’s overtime laws are remedial and are to be construed so as to promote employee protection. [Citation.] And, as we have recognized, ‘this state has a public policy which encourages the use of the class action device.’ [Citation.] ‘“By establishing a technique whereby the claims of many individuals can be resolved at the same time, the class suit both eliminates the possibility of repetitious litigation and provides small claimants with a method of obtaining redress for claims which would otherwise be too small to warrant individual litigation.”’ [Citation.]” (Sav-On, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 340.)
Sav-On is particularly applicable here. The central thrust of plaintiff’s complaint is that defendant failed to pay overtime to its employees as required by law. The fact that individual class members would have to prove their damages does not mean that individual questions predominate.
This case contrasts with Weaver, supra, 32 Cal.2d 833 and City of San Jose, supra, 12 Cal.3d 447, cases relied upon by the trial court. Weaver involved the claims of individuals who tried to buy Rose Bowl tickets and were alleged to have been wrongfully denied admission. The court found individual questions predominated because each person would have to demonstrate that “he, in reliance upon the advertised sale, stood in line, received an identification stub, was denied tickets before the promised 7,500 had been sold, presented himself at the Rose Bowl as a ‘sober, moral person,’ demanded admission, tendered the price, and was refused . . . .” (Weaver, supra, at p. 839.)
Similarly, in City of San Jose, supra, 12 Cal.3d 447, property owners situated in an airport flight path sought class certification in an action for nuisance and inverse condemnation. Noting that the “the development, character, and uses of the geographic region of this proposed class are diverse” (id. at p. 461), the court concluded that claims for nuisance and inverse condemnation were predicated “on facts peculiar to each prospective plaintiff. An approaching or departing aircraft may or may not give rise to actionable nuisance or inverse condemnation depending on a myriad of individualized evidentiary factors. While landing or departure may be a fact common to all, liability can be established only after extensive examination of the circumstances surrounding each party. Development, use, topography, zoning, physical condition, and relative location are among the many important criteria to be considered. No one factor, not even noise level, will be determinative as to all parcels.” (Ibid., fn. omitted.)
Both Weaver and City of San Jose involved situations in which individual questions far outnumbered common questions of fact or law. That is not the case here. The proposed class members in the present case share the community of interest: they all allegedly worked overtime but were not paid as legally required for that work. The trial court erred in concluding plaintiff had not met the community-of-interest requirement for class certification.
II
Discovery of Contact Information
Plaintiff sought the names and contact information for all employees who had worked for defendant during the relevant time frame. He asserted this information was necessary to develop sufficient evidence to file a motion for class certification. The trial court initially granted this motion, but reversed that decision after defendant introduced evidence from employees who did not want this information released. On appeal, plaintiff contends the court erred in refusing to require defendant disclose this information.
Because we have concluded that the trial court erred in denying class certification, this claim is moot. Matters related to the precertification disclosure of information are no longer relevant.
Disposition
The judgment (order) is reversed, and the trial court is directed to enter an order certifying the class. Plaintiff is awarded his costs on appeal.
We concur: ROBIE , J., CANTIL-SAKAUYE , J.