See ORS 656.262(6). The dissent reaches an issue that is not framed by SAIF's assignment of error; moreover, SAIF does not make the argument on which the dissent relies to hold that there was no acceptance. Also, the dissent's analysis is wrong. It relies on Johnson v. Spectra Physics, 303 Or. 49, 733 P.2d 1367 (1987), Stevenson v. Blue Cross of Oregon, 108 Or. App. 247, 251, 814 P.2d 185 (1991), and EBI Ins. Co. v. CNA Insurance, 95 Or. App. 448, 451, 769 P.2d 789 (1989), in support of its position. In Johnson, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that Bauman v. SAIF, supra, applies only to "specifically" or "officially" accepted claims.

But we will not review the merits of that issue when the board did not decide it. See Stevenson v. Blue Cross of Oregon , 108 Or. App. 247, 252, 814 P.2d 185 (1991). We also reject insurer’s request for plain-error review.

At that time, the Board had the discretion to consider a remand to DIF, but it was not required to do so. Stevenson v. Blue Cross of Oregon, 108 Or. App. 247, 252, 814 P.2d 185 (1991); Larsen v. Taylor Company, 56 Or. App. 404, 406 n 1, 642 P.2d 317 (1982). Affirmed.

The Board found that employer had accepted claimant's "psychiatric problems." That is a finding of fact, see Stevenson v. Blue Cross of Oregon, 108 Or. App. 247, 250, 814 P.2d 185 (1991), and employer does not challenge it. We conclude that, like the "sore back" in Piwowar, employer's acceptance of claimant's "psychiatric problems" was not limited to a specific diagnosis, such as dysthymic disorder.