Opinion
No. CV 03 0004193
May 24, 2006
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
On October 9, 2003, the petitioner, Curtis Stevens, filed a pro se petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus, which was amended for the second and final time on January 21, 2005. The amended petition challenges the petitioner's 1989 convictions for one count of murder in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54a and five counts of robbery in the first degree in violation of § 53a-134(a)(4). The amended petition raises three claims; however, two of these claims were previously denied by this Court on January 13, 2005, and November 4, 2005, during a habeas trial on the merits of the petitioner's case. The third claim, at issue here, alleges that the petitioner is being unjustly denied consideration for parole eligibility; something to which he believes he is entitled under the plain language of General Statutes § 54-125a(b)(1). During the habeas trial, six postsentence judgment mittimuses, one mittimus indicating the imposed sentence for each of the petitioner's six convictions, were received into evidence.
The first claim alleged that the petitioner was denied the effective assistance of trial defense counsel and the second claim alleged actual innocence.
The other documents received into evidence during the habeas trial were not necessary for a determination of the claim presently before this Court.
For the reasons set forth more fully below, this Court finds that the petitioner has failed in meeting his burden of proof and the petition shall be denied.
Findings of Fact
Based on a review of the evidence, this Court makes the following findings of fact:
1. The petitioner was the defendant in a criminal case in the Judicial District of Hartford entitled State v. Stevens. Attorney Christopher Cosgrove represented the petitioner throughout the criminal proceedings.
CT Page 9599
2. On June 28, 1989, the petitioner pleaded guilty under the Alford doctrine to one count of murder in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54a, under Docket Number 55340, and five counts of robbery in the first degree in violation of § 53a-134(a)(4), under Docket Numbers 55210, 55270, 55271, 55272 and 55273. A total effective sentence of sixty years incarceration, suspended after forty years was imposed by the trial court (Norko, J.) on August 10, 1989.
Under North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37-38, 91 S.Ct. 160, 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970), a criminal defendant has the right to plead guilty without admitting that he committed the crimes with which he is charged. A defendant may exercise this right "to take advantage of a plea bargain, to avoid the risk of conviction and possibly a more severe sentence after a trial." Smith v. Commissioner of Correction, 86 Conn.App. 163, 164 n. 1, 860 A.2d 295 (2004), cert. denied, 272 Conn. 918, CT Page 9604 866 A.2d 1288 (2005).
3. The petitioner did not challenge his convictions on direct appeal.
4. The evidence reflects the following concerning the petitioner's sentence. Four of the petitioner's sentences for robbery run consecutively to each other, comprising the controlling sentence that totals sixty years, suspended after forty years. The sentences for the remaining robbery conviction and the murder conviction run concurrently to those four sentences.
5. The petitioner received a sentence of twenty-five years incarceration for his murder conviction. He will finish serving that sentence on November 15, 2006; however, the discharge date for the robbery sentences that control his total effective sentence is February 9, 2021.
6. Additional facts shall be discussed as necessary.
Discussion of Law
It is important to note at the outset the basic elements underlying the "special and extraordinary legal remedy for illegal detention [that is offered by the Writ of Habeas Corpus] . . . The deprivation of legal rights is essential before the writ may be issued . . . Questions which do not concern the lawfulness of the detention cannot properly be reviewed on habeas corpus . . . When a habeas petition is properly before a court, the remedies it may award depend on the constitutional rights being vindicated . . . Further, any remedy must be commensurate with the scope of the constitutional violations that have been established." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Johnson v. Commissioner of Correction, 258 Conn. 804, 815, 786 A.2d 1091 (2002).
The petitioner asserts in his amended habeas petition that the department of correction and board of pardons and paroles are unjustly refusing to consider him for parole eligibility status in contravention of General Statues § 54-125a(b)(1). The threshold question, therefore, is whether this Court has subject matter jurisdiction over the petitioner's habeas petition based on the claimed illegal detention. Although it is not yet fully settled law, the Connecticut Appellate Court has recognized a liberty interest in parole eligibility status. Baker v. Commissioner of Correction, 91 Conn.App. 855, 882 A.2d 1238, cert. granted, 276 Conn. 927, 889 A.2d 816 (2005). Thus, in reviewing the merits of the petitioner's claim, this Court proceeds within its presently acknowledged jurisdiction.
This case presents an issue of statutory interpretation. "When construing a statute, [the] fundamental objective is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature . . . In other words, [the Court] seek[s] to determine, in a reasoned manner, the meaning of the statutory language as applied to the facts of [the] case, including the question of whether the language actually does apply . . . In seeking to determine that meaning, General Statutes § 1-2z directs [the Court] first to consider the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes. If, after examining such text and considering such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be considered." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Cogan v. Chase Manhattan Auto Financial Corp., 276 Conn. 1, 7, 882 A.2d 597 (2005). The meaning of a statute cannot be considered "plain and unambiguous" if its text permits more than one plausible meaning. State v. Miranda, 274 Conn. 727, 738-39, 878 A.2d. 1118 (2005).
In accordance with § 1-2z, this Court looks first to the language of the statute to determine its meaning. The petitioner was convicted of murder under General Statues § 53a-54a. Based on that conviction, he is statutorily ineligible for parole by virtue of § 54-125a(b)(1), which provides: "No person convicted of any of the following offenses, which was committed on or after July 1, 1981, shall be eligible for parole under subsection (a) of this section: Capital felony, as provided in section 53a-54b, felony murder, as provided in section 53a-54a, arson murder, as provided in section 53a-54d, murder, as provided in section 53a-54a . . ." (Emphasis added.)
The petitioner does not dispute that under the language of § 54-125a(b)(1), he is ineligible for parole while serving his sentence for the murder conviction. He argues instead that once discharged from his murder sentence on November 15, 2006, he is no longer "convicted of" murder under the terms of that statue and should therefore be considered eligible for parole based on the remaining sentences for his robbery convictions. The respondent contends, however, that § 54-125a(b)(1) denies eligibility for parole during the petitioner's entire effective sentence of sixty years, suspended after forty years. According to the respondent, the statute explicitly states that no person "convicted of" murder is eligible for parole, regardless of when, or if, such person discharges from the sentence for that conviction.
What is at issue here, in essence, is the meaning of the phrase "convicted of" as provided by the language of § 54-125a(b)(1). It is clear that, on the face of the statute, there are no words surrounding the phrase that serve to modify it or indicate the extent of its scope. Thus, because the plain language of § 54-125a(b)(1) does not by itself offer any clarity concerning the meaning of the phrase, pursuant to § 1-2z, the next step in the inquiry is to consider the text in relation to other statutes.
In doing so, this Court looks first to the other provisions of § 54-125a. As with subsection (b)(1), the phrase "convicted of" is also contained in subsections (a) and (b)(2) of § 54-125a. In the statute, subsections (a) and (b)(2) allow prisoners to acquire parole eligibility status after completion of a specified percentage of the imposed definite sentence. Specifically, subsection (b)(2) provides: "A person convicted of an offense, other than an offense specified in subdivision (1) of this subsection, where the underlying facts and circumstances of the offense involve the use, attempted use or threatened use of physical force against another person shall be ineligible for parole under subsection (a) of this section until such person has served not less than eighty-five percent of the definite sentence imposed." (Emphasis added.)
Section 54-125a(a) provides, in relevant part: "A person convicted of one or more crimes who is incarcerated on or after October 1, 1990, who received a definite sentence or aggregate sentence of more than two years, and who has been confined under such sentence or sentences for not less then one-half of the aggregate sentence or one-half of the most recent sentence imposed by the court whichever is greater, may be allowed to go at large on parole . . ." (Emphasis added.)
Although not directly addressing the interpretation of the subsection at issue in the present case, interpretive guidance can be gleaned from the Connecticut Supreme Court's decision in CT Page 9602 Johnson v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 258 Conn. 804. In Johnson, the Court analyzed § 54-125a to determine whether the 85 percent requirement of subsection (b)(2) applies retroactively. In examining the relationship between subdivisions (1) and (2) of subsection (b), the Court reasoned that "[a]lthough subdivision (2) does refer to subdivision (1) . . . that reference exists simply to ensure that a person who has committed an especially serious offense that is enumerated in subdivision (1) is not eligible for parole at any time rather than upon completion of 85 percent of his or her sentence." (Emphasis in original.) Johnson v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 823. Thus, it is apparent to this Court that the parole ineligibility established by § 54-125a(b)(1) has at least been recognized by the Connecticut Supreme Court to extend throughout the duration of an inmate's incarceration.
The Court held that § 54-125a(b)(2) does not have retroactive application.
The Supreme Court also touched on the meaning of the term "convicted" in its examination of § 54-125a in the Johnson case. Analyzing the text of subsection (b)(2), the Court stated that the statute "applies to persons `convicted of an offense' . . . [T]hat language serves merely to identify those offenders who, by virtue of the violent nature of their offenses, are ineligible for parole until they have completed 85 percent of their sentence. There simply is no indication that the legislature's use of the term `convicted' was intended to have any broader implication." Id., 822. In subsections (b)(1) and (b)(2) of the statute, the phrase "convicted of" is used in exactly the same manner. It would therefore be inconsistent to construe the phrase used in (b)(1) to have any purpose other than to identify exactly who is ineligible for parole under the terms of the statute. Indeed, "[i]t is a well-settled principle of [statutory] construction that . . . [courts] are obligated . . . to read statutes together when they relate to the same subject matter . . . This is because of the presumption that the legislature intended to create a harmonious body of law." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Barber, 64 Conn.App. 659, 676, 781 A.2d 464, cert. denied, 258 Conn. 925, 783 A.2d 1030 (2001).
Support for the interpretation that the phrase "convicted of" means exactly what it says and nothing more is found elsewhere in the General Statutes. Section 53a-40(a) provides in relevant part: "A persistent dangerous felony offender is a person who (1) stands convicted of [an offense] . . . and (2) has been, prior to the commission of the present crime, CT Page 9603 convicted of and imprisoned under a sentence to a term of imprisonment of more than one year or of death . . . of any of the following crimes . . ." (Emphasis added.) With the addition of the single word, "stands," the legislature makes a clear distinction between a person who is presently convicted of a crime; See State v. Davis, 51 Conn.App. 171, 179, 721 A.2d 146 (1998); and a person who is identified as having been "convicted of" a crime at some point in time. In cases of statutory interpretation, the "focus is properly on the meaning of what the legislature did say, rather than what it meant to say . . . [Courts] ordinarily decline to read into statutes provisions not clearly stated . . ." (Citations omitted.) Mitchell v. Commissioner of Correction, 94 Conn.App. 210, 215-16, 893 A.2d 445 (2006). Had the legislature intended the scope of § 54-125a(b)(1) to include as ineligible for parole only those offenders who are presently convicted or currently serving a sentence for murder, it could have so provided by use of the term "stands convicted of."
It was Humpty Dumpty who said to Alice: "When I use a word, it means just what I choose it to mean — neither more nor less." Through the Looking-Glass, Lewis Carroll (1832-1898), first published 1871.
Based on the foregoing, it is clear to this Court that the language of § 54-125a(b)(1) is plain and unambiguous. Thus, this Court finds that the petitioner's murder conviction denies him eligibility for parole during, at the very least, the entirety of his effective sentence of sixty years, suspended after forty years. Accordingly, the Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus is denied.
Arguably, if a person has once been convicted of murder, such person is forever ineligible for parole, even if a sentence is totally discharged, the person is released into society and later re-confined on completely independent sentences. That issue is not, however, before this Court at present.