Due to defendant's complete disregard for the discovery process and the court's orders, we conclude the circuit court's order barring him from introducing any and all evidence denying his disclosure of plaintiffs' confidential information (counts I and II) was an appropriate sanction. See Stevens v. International Farm Systems, Inc., 56 Ill. App. 3d 717, 720 (1978). Despite defendant's contention, this sanction is not tantamount to default, as defendant continued to put on a strenuous defense in spite of the sanction.
The record reflects counsel's efforts, albeit unsatisfactorily, to work with defense counsels to move this case forward in that way. Although the fact that the conduct leading to a discovery violation is attributable to the attorney is not a bar to sanctions, the fact that the initial failure to provide deposition dates was due solely to counsel's tactics is a factor the court should have considered. Stevens v. International Farm Systems, Inc., 56 Ill. App. 3d 717, 720-21 (1978) (finding sanction barring defendant from defending one count in complaint "quite drastic considering that it was the conduct of the defendant's attorney which led to the imposition of the sanctions"). The trial court only issued one order to conduct a deposition by a date certain.
• 4, 5 A default judgment for failure to comply with discovery should be imposed only as a last resort. ( Stevens v. International Farm Systems, Inc. (1978), 56 Ill. App.3d 717, 327 N.E.2d 424.) Normally, a court should impose other sanctions, retaining flexibility to impose progressively harsher sanctions to force compliance with discovery. ( Jaffe v. Fogelson (1985), 137 Ill. App.3d 961, 485 N.E.2d 531.)
In my view certain lesser sanctions were clearly warranted in this case, but not that which was imposed. The entry of a default judgment for failure to comply with discovery is to be used only as a last resort ( Stevens v. International Farm Systems, Inc. (1978), 56 Ill. App.3d 717), and is only proper where the actions of a party show a deliberate, contumacious, or unwarranted disregard for the court's authority. ( Peoples Gas, Light Coke Co. v. Chicago Black Improvement Association (1986), 148 Ill. App.3d 1093, 1096.)
( Humboldt-Armitage Corp. v. Illinois Fair Plan Association (1980), 86 Ill. App.3d 888, 890.) The Illinois courts have determined that dismissal with prejudice is: (1) a drastic punishment which the courts are reluctant to impose ( In re Estate of Fado (1976), 43 Ill. App.3d 759, 763); (2) to be employed only as a last resort in order to enforce the rule of discovery ( Humboldt-Armitage Corp. v. Illinois Fair Plan Association (1980), 86 Ill. App.3d 888, 891); (3) an inappropriate sanction where a trial on the merits can be had without hardship or prejudice ( White v. Henrotin Hospital Corp. (1979), 78 Ill. App.3d 1025, 1029; Stevens v. International Farm Systems, Inc. (1978), 56 Ill. App.3d 717, 720). • 5 Plaintiff contends there will be no surprise evidence used against a defendant, no hardship or prejudice to defendant for the nonproduction of the documents which have been stolen.
The entry of default judgment for failure to comply with discovery should be imposed only as a last resort. Stevens v. International Farm Systems, Inc. (1978), 56 Ill. App.3d 717, 327 N.E.2d 424. Under our interpretation of the line of cases cited above, the trial court should normally impose a less severe sanction than summary judgment for failure to comply with discovery. Thereby, the court retains flexibility to impose progressively harsher sanctions to force compliance with discovery.
We believe the cases cited by the plaintiff to support the sanctions it seeks are factually different. In each of those cases the noncompliance was vexacious ( e.g., Savitch v. Allman (1975), 25 Ill. App.3d 864, 323 N.E.2d 435) or an unreasonable and continued disobedience and disregard for the court's authority and the discovery rule or orders ( e.g., Stevens v. International Farm Systems, Inc. (1978), 56 Ill. App.3d 717, 372 N.E.2d 424; Williams; 612 North Michigan Avenue Building Corp. v. Factsystem, Inc. (1975), 34 Ill. App.3d 922, 340 N.E.2d 678). See Humboldt-Armitage Corp.; Johnston, Some Observations on the New Rules, 48 Chi. B. Rec. 117, 118 (1967).
" • 3, 4 Sanction orders under Rule 219(c) are to be imposed only when the noncompliance is unreasonable and the order is just. ( Stevens v. International Farm Systems, Inc. (1978), 56 Ill. App.3d 717, 372 N.E.2d 424; Sanchez v. Phillips (1977), 46 Ill. App.3d 430, 361 N.E.2d 36; 612 North Michigan Avenue Building Corp. v. Factsystem, Inc. (1975), 34 Ill. App.3d 922, 340 N.E.2d 678.) The record before us clearly reflects that plaintiff was not prepared to answer interrogatories until August 4, 1977, the date upon which the section 72 petition was filed.