Stevens v. Horne

19 Citing cases

  1. Baron Oil Co. v. Nationwide Mut. Fire

    470 So. 2d 810 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985)   Cited 150 times   4 Legal Analyses
    Finding that all doubts and ambiguities as to whether a duty to defend exists must be resolved against the insurer and in favor of the insured

    The duty to defend is distinct from and broader than the duty to indemnify the insured against damages assessed, and if the complaint alleges facts showing two or more grounds for liability, one being within the insurance coverage and the other not, the insurer is obligated to defend the entire suit. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Universal Atlas Cement Co., 406 So.2d 1184; Florida Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co. v. Rice, 393 So.2d 552 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980); Tropical Park, Inc. v. United States Fidelity Guaranty Co., 357 So.2d 253 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978); Stevens v. Horne, 325 So.2d 459 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976); Garden Sanctuary, Inc. v. Insurance Company of North America, 292 So.2d 75 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974). Hence, the duty to defend continues even though it is ultimately determined that the alleged cause of action is groundless and no liability is found within the policy provisions defining coverage. New Amsterdam Casualty Co. v. Knowles, 95 So.2d 413; Logozzo v. Kent Insurance Co., 464 So.2d 605 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985); Accredited Bond Agencies, Inc. v. Gulf Insurance Co., 352 So.2d 1252 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978); State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Universal Atlas Cement Co., 406 So.2d 1184; Stevens v. Horne, 325 So.2d 459; Garden Sanctuary, Inc. v. Insurance Company of North America, 292 So.2d 75; 7C Appleman, Insurance Law Practice, ยง 4683.01, p. 65 (Berdal Ed. 1979). If the allegations of the complaint leave any doubt regarding the duty to defend, the question must be resolved in favor of the insured requiring the insurer to defend.

  2. United Services Automobile Ass'n v. Selz

    637 So. 2d 320 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994)   Cited 10 times
    Holding that collateral estoppel could not be raised on motion to dismiss where the defense did not appear from the face of the complaint

    In Florida, "an insurer's duty to defend an action against its insured by a third person is determined by the allegations of the complaint." Stevens v. Horne, 325 So.2d 459, 461 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975); see also Federal Ins. Co. v. Applestein, 377 So.2d 229 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979). "[S]o long as one count of the complaint against [the insured] [is] within the scope of liability coverage, [the insurer] [has] a duty to defend, at least until such time as the covered portion of the claim [is] eliminated from the suit." Employers Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Kottmeier, 323 So.2d 605, 607 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975) (citation omitted).

  3. Vanguard Ins. Co. v. Townsend

    544 So. 2d 1153 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989)   Cited 10 times
    In Vanguard we held that Chapter 86 can only be used to "settle the meaning of ambiguous language or clauses in an insurance policy."... This interpretation limits Chapter 86 to little more than a codification of the parol evidence rule.

    31 Fla.Jur.2d Insurance ยง 824 (1981). 31 Fla.Jur.2d Insurance ยง 822; Klaesen Brothers, Inc. v. Harbor Insurance Co., 410 So.2d 611 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982); Stevens v. Horne, 325 So.2d 459 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975); Dochod v. Central Mutual Insurance Co., 81 Mich. App. 63, 264 N.W.2d 122 (Mich. App. 1978); Coblentz v. American Surety Company of New York, 416 F.2d 1059 (5th Cir. 1969). With regard to Vanguard's motion to intervene and file its declaratory complaint, we think the trial court was correct in denying it for the given reason, and for two other more fundamental ones.

  4. Aetna Insurance v. Waco Scaffold & Shoring Co.

    370 So. 2d 1149 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978)   Cited 15 times
    In Aetna, the court was faced with a dispute between an additional insured, a scaffolding company found liable for product liability, and the insurance carriers of the underlying products liability insurance policy.

    First, it is evident that Mason charged Waco with some theories of liability which were covered by appellants' policies and some theories of liability which were not covered thereby. Hence, based upon those allegations of Mason's complaint, appellants were obligated to defend Waco. Stevens v. Horne, 325 So.2d 459 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976). However, the fact that appellants had a duty to defend under these circumstances does not necessarily mean that they were obligated to pay any judgment recovered.

  5. The Cincinnati Specialty Underwriters Ins. Co. v. KNS Grp.

    No. 21-13628 (11th Cir. Oct. 6, 2022)   Cited 4 times

    , the insurer must provide a defense on the entire suit."); see also Stevens v. Horne, 325 So.2d 459, 461 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975). Further, if any of GM&P's claims against KNS could have been brought in the absence of a contract between the parties, that claim would not fall within the breach-of-contract exclusion.

  6. Sanderson v. Zurich American Insurance Company

    CASE NO.: 8:09-cv-1755-T-23AEP (M.D. Fla. Dec. 11, 2009)   Cited 1 times

    Aetna Ins. Co. v. Waco Scaffold Shoring Co., Inc., 370 So. 2d 1149, 1151-52 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978). "`Florida law is clear that an insurer's duty to defend an action against its insured by a third person is determined by the allegations of the complaint [against the insured].'" 370 So. 2d at 1151-52 (quotingStevens v. Horne, 325 So. 2d 459, 461-62 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976)). If "`only portions of a complaint fall within the coverage of the insurance policy and other portions fall outside the policy, the insurer has a duty to defend the entire suit. . . .'" 370 So. 2d at 1151-52.

  7. Bensalem Township v. Western World Insurance

    609 F. Supp. 1343 (E.D. Pa. 1985)   Cited 36 times
    Holding that neither a letter from the EEOC nor an attached charge of age discrimination qualified as a claim under a claims-made policy because the documents failed to request money or other relief, and only served to put the plaintiff on notice that a demand for relief may subsequently follow

    Like Hassinger, these cases involve conduct which cannot sensibly be said to have been both intentional and in good faith. Stevens v. Horne, 325 So.2d 459 (Fla.Ct.App. 1975) (union members hung likeness of non-union employee in effigy; court denied coverage); Travelers Indem. Co. v. Nieman, 563 S.W.2d 724 (Ky.Ct.App. 1977) (pharmacist repeatedly sold amphetamines to customer without prescription; coverage denied); Applewhite v. City of Baton Rouge, 380 So.2d 119 (La.Ct.App. 1979) (police officers sexually assaulted citizen; coverage denied); American Home Assurance Co. v. Diamond Tours Travel, Inc., 78 A.D.2d 801, 433 N.Y.S.2d 116 (App.Div. 1980) (insurer not bound to defend travel agency against civil action for fraud). Cf. Fireman's Ins. Co., 41 N.Y.2d 947, 363 N.E.2d 356, 394 N.Y.S.2d 632 (1977) (Mem.) (insurer was bound to defend pharmacist from malpractice action where pharmacist was alleged to have refilled prescriptions without a doctor's authorization; court stressed presence of negligence allegations).

  8. Board of Trustees v. State ex rel

    604 P.2d 778 (Mont. 1979)   Cited 1 times

    We note in passing that in resolving this issue, we are dealing with a lawful strike. Union activities that become violent and threaten the public safety are not protected by the constitutional right to free speech or provisions for collective bargaining. 51A C.J.S. ยง 289, p. 67; Clark v. State (Okla.Cr.App. 1962), 370 P.2d 46; Smith v. Grady (5th Cir. 1969), 411 F.2d 181; Stevens v. Horne (Fla.App. 1976), 325 So.2d 459. See also, Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Local G.F.L. of I.A. of M. (D.Mont. 1922), 283 F. 557.

  9. Donohoe-Kelly Banking Co. v. Southern Pacific Co.

    138 Cal. 183 (Cal. 1902)   Cited 16 times
    In Donohoe-Kelly Banking Co. v. Southern Pacific Co., 138 Cal. 190, [94 Am. St. Rep. 28, 71 P. 93], it is said: "Turning to the view of the question presented by appellants, we find the cases quite numerous holding that an order, check or bill of exchange drawn for a part of a fund, does not operate as an assignment of that part or give a lien as against the drawee, unless he consent to the appropriation by an acceptance of the draft."

    The contention of respondent is, that such was the effect of the checks, and that they worked an equitable assignment pro tanto; that the attaching creditor can only acquire such rights to the property attached as the debtor had at the time the attachment was served; and as the debtor's authority over the fund ceased after he had given checks for its withdrawal, the creditor gets nothing by his attachment. In support of his contention respondent cites Hassie v. God Is WithUs Cong., 35 Cal. 378; Grain v. Aldrich, 28 Cal. 514;Redondo B.Co. v. California etc. Co., 101 Cal. 322; Oppenheimer v. First Nat. Bank, 20 Mont. 192; Schuler v. Israel, 120 U.S. 506; Horne v. Stevens, 79 Me. 262; Dillman v. Carlin, 105 Wis. 14;Skobis v. Ferge, 102 Wis. 122; Fornner v. Smith, 31 Neb. 107;Pease v. Landauer, 63 Wis. 20; Rood on Garnishment, sec. 71, and cases in note 101; Bank ofAmerica v. Indiana Banking Co., 114 Ill. 484, and two other Illinois cases there cited. We have examined these authorities with some care, but, with the exception of the Illinois cases, they do not support the position of respondent.

  10. Ranger Insurance Co. v. Bal Harbour Club, Inc.

    509 So. 2d 940 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985)   Cited 4 times
    Finding a duty to defend against charges of discrimination in housing

    Although Ranger questioned its obligation to provide coverage, it proceeded to defend the Club in the action under a reservation of rights. See Stevens v. Horne, 325 So.2d 459, 462-63 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975); Midland National Insurance Co. v. Watson, 188 So.2d 403 (Fla. 3d DCA 1966). The lawsuit was ultimately settled with the advice and consent of Ranger by the Club paying $25,000 to the Skolniks., Ranger then instituted this declaratory action seeking a determination that there was no coverage under the policy issued to the Club.