Opinion
3:21-CV-01767
09-12-2022
STEVEN LOVE LUNDY TRUST, Plaintiff, v. KENNETH LENNING, et al., Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Susan E. Schwab United States Magistrate Judge
I. Introduction.
This case comes before the Court for a statutorily mandated screening review of plaintiff's amended complaint. The plaintiff, Steven Love Lundy Trust, (“Lundy” or “the Trust”), filed his amended complaint based on his arrest and subsequent attachment of property by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. After screening the complaint, we conclude that the amended complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. As such, we recommend dismissal of Lundy's amended complaint with prejudice, and closing the case.
II. Background and Procedural History.
Lundy commenced this action pro se on October 18, 2021, by filing a complaint. Doc. 1. We instructed Lundy to either file a petition to proceed in forma pauperis, or to tender payment for the filing fee for his complaint. Doc. 4. After Lundy paid the filing fee, his complaint was deemed filed on October 27, 2021. Doc. 5. Following the filing of his complaint, Lundy filed a number of documents, reiterating his demands seeking injunctive relief, payment, and other requests. See docs. 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, 14, 17. On May 16, 2022, we issued a screening order pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, and granted Lundy leave to amend his complaint within 28 days of the order. Doc. 10 at 15. We subsequently granted Lundy's motion for an extension of time to file his amended complaint and ordered him to file an amended complaint on or before June 30, 2022. Doc. 20. Lundy complied with our order and filed his amended complaint on June 22, 2022. Doc. 21. Lundy also filed a motion for attorney's fees on June 3, 2022. See doc. 18.
In his amended complaint, Lundy names as defendant only the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. Doc. 21 at 1. He brings his claims only as an action in replevin (claim and delivery), with reference to U.C.C. 2-711(2)(b) and U.C.C. 2-716(3). Id. Lundy is seeking as a remedy declaratory and injunctive relief, and “money damages under Federal Tort Claims for conversion.” Id.
The facts underlying this claim, according to Lundy, were that agents, actors, and representatives of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania served a presentment on a representative of the Trust. Id. at 2. This presentment was signed and accepted by Lundy's representative. Id. Lundy filed several state claims relating to these facts, demanding rescission of the presentment contract and restitution. Id. at 2-3. Lundy named the “Attorney General for the [C]ommonwealth of Pennsylvania, Josh Shapiro,” as an officer of the Commonwealth, and served several complaints in various actions on him in his official capacity. Id. at 5. Lundy states that the lawsuit was filed “for conversion, return of personal property, and restitution in the amount of $ 500,000,000.00.” Id. at 6. For the reasons discussed below, we conclude that the amended complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
III. Screening of In Forma Pauperis Complaints-Standard of Review.
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the court shall dismiss a complaint brought in forma pauperis if it determines that certain specified conditions are met. This is true “Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). More specifically, the court must dismiss a complaint that “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). This statutory text mirrors the language of Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides that a complaint should be dismissed for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6).
When determining whether a complaint states a claim upon which relief can be granted, “[w]e must accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true, construe the complaint in the light favorable to the plaintiff, and ultimately determine whether plaintiff may be entitled to relief under any reasonable reading of the complaint.” Mayer v. Belichick, 605 F.3d 223, 229 (3d Cir. 2010). In making that determination, we “consider only the complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint, matters of public record, as well as undisputedly authentic documents if the [plaintiff's] claims are based upon these documents.” Id. at 230.
“Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a pleading must contain a ‘short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-78 (2009) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2)). The statement required by Rule 8(a)(2) must give the defendant fair notice of the nature of the plaintiff's claim and of the grounds upon which the claim rests. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but more is required than “labels,” “conclusions,” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). “In other words, a complaint must do more than allege the plaintiff's entitlement to relief.” Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 211 (3d Cir. 2009). “A complaint has to ‘show' such an entitlement with its facts.” Id.
In considering whether a complaint states a claim upon which relief can be granted, the court “‘must accept all facts alleged in the complaint as true and construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.'” Krieger v. Bank of Am., N.A., 890 F.3d 429, 437 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting Flora v. Cty. of Luzerne, 776 F.3d 169, 175 (3d Cir. 2015)). But a court “need not credit a complaint's bald assertions or legal conclusions.” Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997). A court also need not “assume that a . . . plaintiff can prove facts that the . . . plaintiff has not alleged.” Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal. v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983).
Following Twombly and Iqbal, a well-pleaded complaint must contain more than mere legal labels and conclusions. Rather, it must recite factual allegations sufficient to raise the plaintiff's claimed right to relief beyond the level of mere speculation. In practice, consideration of the legal sufficiency of a complaint entails a three-step analysis:
First, the court must “tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim.” Second, the court should identify allegations that, “because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Finally, “where there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief.”Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010) (footnote and citations omitted) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 675, 679).
Complaints brought pro se are afforded more leeway than those drafted by attorneys. In determining whether to dismiss a complaint brought by a pro se litigant, a federal district court is “required to interpret the pro se complaint liberally.” Sause v. Bauer, 138 S.Ct. 2561, 2563 (2018). A complaint filed by a pro se litigant is to be liberally construed and “‘however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.'” Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94 (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). Nevertheless, “pro se litigants still must allege sufficient facts in their complaints to support a claim.” Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013).
IV. Discussion.
A. The amended complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
Lundy' amended complaint is not clear. It does not comply with the pleading requirements of Fed.R.Civ.P. 8. This is so, even given the liberal standard of review that “[p]leadings must be construed so as to do justice.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(e). “This already liberal standard is ‘even more pronounced' where a plaintiff files the complaint without the assistance of counsel.” Garrett v. Wexford Health, 938 F.3d 69, 92 (3d Cir. 2019) (quoting Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94). “[A] court must make reasonable allowances to protect pro se litigants from the inadvertent forfeiture of important rights due merely to their lack of legal training.” Id. Thus, “[c]ourts are more forgiving of pro se litigants for filing relatively unorganized or somewhat lengthy complaints.” Id.
Even liberally construing Lundy's amended complaint, we nevertheless conclude that it fails to comply with Fed.R.Civ.P. 8, which requires, among other things, that a claim for relief must contain “a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court's jurisdiction” and “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” and that “[e]ach allegation must be simple, concise, and direct.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(1), 8(a)(2), 8(d)(1). Lundy's amended complaint does contain a short and plain statement of the court's jurisdiction, but it does not contain a short and plain statement of his claims. “Fundamentally, Rule 8 requires that a complaint provide fair notice of ‘what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Garrett, 938 F.3d at 92 (quoting Erickson, 551 U.S. at 93). Here, the amended complaint does not provide fair notice of what Lundy's claims are. In fact, it is not entirely clear who Lundy is naming as a defendant; the only named defendant is the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, but Lundy's amended complaint is rife with assertions against unnamed individuals, not specifying whether these individuals were acting in their personal or official capacities.
Further, Lundy's claim itself is brought under a theory of replevin. See doc. 21 at 1. Under that theory of recovery, in Pennsylvania a plaintiff must make a showing that (1) the recording constituted a property interest subject to replevin, and (2) he had title and exclusive right to possess the property. See Commonwealth v. Dean, 369 A.2d 423, 425 (Pa. Super. 1976) (discussing types of property interest limitations subject to replevin); Int'l Elecs. Co. v. N.S.T. Metal Prod. Co., 88 A.2d 40, 42-43 (Pa. 1952) (requiring the elements of title and exclusive right of possession). However, as set forth below, replevin is not a permissible claim against the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.
B. Claims against the Commonwealth are barred by the Eleventh Amendment.
“Our federalist system of government accords respect for the sovereignty of the States in a variety of ways, including the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution, which immunizes States from suits brought in federal court by both their own citizens and citizens of other States.” Maliandi v. Montclair State Univ., 845 F.3d 77, 81 (3d Cir. 2016). The Eleventh Amendment provides:
The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.
U.S. Const. Amend. XI. Although its text appears to restrict only the Article III diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts, the Eleventh Amendment has been interpreted ‘“to stand not so much for what it says, but for the presupposition . . . which it confirms.”' Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996) (quoting Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 779 (1991)). That presupposition is that each state is a sovereign entity in our federal system and it is inherent in the nature of sovereignty that a sovereign is not amenable to suit unless it consents. Id.
“Immunity from suit in federal court under the Eleventh Amendment is designed to preserve the delicate and ‘proper balance between the supremacy of federal law and the separate sovereignty of the States.'” Karns v. Shanahan, 879 F.3d 504, 512 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 757 (1999)). It “serves two fundamental imperatives: safeguarding the dignity of the states and ensuring their financial solvency.” Id. It serves those interests by barring suits against the nonconsenting states. Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 73 (2000) (stating that “the Constitution does not provide for federal jurisdiction over suits against nonconsenting States”); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984) (“It is clear, of course, that in the absence of consent a suit in which the State or one of its agencies or departments is named as the defendant is proscribed by the Eleventh Amendment.”).
There are two circumstances when the Eleventh Amendment does not bar a suit against a state or state agency. First, a state may waive its Eleventh Amendment immunity by consenting to suit. College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 670 (1999). Second, Congress may abrogate a state's Eleventh Amendment immunity when it unequivocally intends to do so and when it acts pursuant to a valid grant of constitutional authority. Geness v. Admin. Off. of Pennsylvania Cts., 974 F.3d 263, 269-70 (3d Cir. 2020). The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania has not waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity. See 42 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8521(b) (“Nothing contained in this subchapter shall be construed to waive the immunity of the Commonwealth from suit in Federal courts guaranteed by the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.”); Downey v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Corr., 968 F.3d 299, 310 (3d Cir. 2020) (“Pennsylvania has not waived its sovereign immunity defense in federal court.”). And 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not override a state's Eleventh Amendment immunity. Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332 (1979).
Additionally, under Ex parte Young, claims against a state official in his or her official capacity for prospective injunctive relief are not barred by the Eleventh Amendment. See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). But Ex parte Young “has no application in suits against the States and their agencies, which are barred regardless of the relief sought.” Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 146 (1993).
Here, Lundy alleges that “in the complete absence of jurisdiction,” the Commonwealth has waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity. Doc. 21 at 6. Lundy cites as evidence to this effect 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8522(b)(3). That statute imposes liability as an exception to sovereign immunity in certain limited circumstances, one of these being “claims for damages caused by . . . [t]he care, custody or control of personal property in the possession or control of Commonwealth parties, including Commonwealth-owned personal property and property of persons held by a Commonwealth agency.” Id.
Lundy has only vaguely alleged the taking of his property, and in no specific detail. He has alleged no “damage” to his personal property, only that the state is keeping it. Doc. 21 at 2-3. Further, the only other specific allegations in his amended complaint involve the litigation of his state court claims, involving a state judge, numerous unnamed Commonwealth “agents, actors, and representatives,” and the Attorney General of the Commonwealth. See id. Lundy has attempted to remedy the situation several times in state court; the mere fact that he has failed to prevail there does not imply a cause of action in federal court. See Great W. Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 165 (3d Cir. 2010) (noting that “federal district courts lack jurisdiction over suits that are essentially appeals from state-court judgments.”).
Thus, we recommend finding that the Commonwealth has not waived its immunity. And as such, its immunity would bar any claims against it by Lundy.
C. Leave to amend would be futile, and this court should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims.
“[I]f a complaint is subject to a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, a district court must permit a curative amendment unless such an amendment would be inequitable or futile.” Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 245 (3d Cir. 2008). The court “must provide the plaintiff with this opportunity even if the plaintiff does not seek leave to amend.” Id. In this case, we have already granted Lundy leave to amend, which led to the amended complaint from Lundy. The amended complaint, if anything, is less clear than the initial complaint. As such, we believe further leave to amend would be futile.
In addition to federal claims, Lundy is asserting state law claims. Indeed, the crux of Lundy's claims revolve around the deprivation of property by the Commonwealth, and cites to Commonwealth common law claims and statutes. Such claims would fall within the court's supplemental jurisdiction.
Whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction is within the discretion of the court. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) provides that district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a state-law claim if the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction. When deciding whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, “a federal court should consider and weigh in each case, and at every stage of the litigation, the values of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.” City of Chicago v. Int'l Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 173 (1997) (quoting Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cahill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 (1988)). The Third Circuit has held that “where the claim over which the district court has original jurisdiction is dismissed before trial, the district court must decline to decide the pendent state claims unless considerations of judicial economy, convenience, and fairness to the parties provide an affirmative justification for doing so.” Hedges v. Musco, 204 F.3d 109, 123 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting Borough of West Miflin v. Lancaster, 45 F.3d 780, 788 (3d Cir. 1995)).
There is nothing unique about this case such that considerations of judicial economy, convenience, and fairness provide an affirmative justification for exercising supplemental jurisdiction over Lundy's state-law claims. Accordingly, because we conclude that the amended complaint fails to state any federal claims upon which relief can be granted, the court should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Lundy's state-law claims.
D. Lundy's motion for attorney's fees should be dismissed.
Lundy asserts in his motion for attorney's fees that attorney's fees are due to Lundy, and demands an hourly rate of $ 2,500.00, 8 hours a day, 6 days a week, which totals $ 120,000.00 weekly starting from November 17, 2017. See doc. 18 at 1-2. All told, this amount would total $ 28,320,000.00. Doc. 18 at 2. Lundy requests annual interest, and immediate payout. Id. In his motion, Lundy does not cite to any case law or statute to support his demand.
A plaintiff in some circumstances may have a right to attorney's fees, which derives from 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k), permitting a district court to at its discretion award the “prevailing party” in a Title VII suit “a reasonable attorney's fee.” Title VII standards governing these awards are the same as those for those awarded under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, which also reads that prevailing parties in civil rights cases may receive “a reasonable attorney's fee.” Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 n.7 (1983). However, generally, a pro se litigant cannot recover attorneys' fees for their work litigating a case. See Kay v. Ehrler, 499 U.S. 432, 438 (1991); see also Pitts v. Vaughn, 679 F.2d 311, 313 (3d Cir.1982).
Here, Lundy has not brought a claim under either Title VII or a civil rights claim, or identified another statute giving rise to that right. Thus, we are unaware of any statute or case that would entitle Lundy a recovery of attorney's fees. We therefore recommend dismissing his motion for attorney's fees.
V. Recommendations.
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, IT IS RECOMMENDED that the court DISMISS this action with prejudice in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), and the case be closed. Further, IT IS RECOMMENDED that the court DISMISS plaintiff's motion for attorney's fees with prejudice.
The Parties are further placed on notice that pursuant to Local Rule 72.3:
Any party may object to a magistrate judge's proposed findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge, however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or where required by law, and may consider the record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge may
also receive further evidence, recall witnesses or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.