As such, the State failed to lay a sufficient foundation for the lead agent's voice identification testimony. Compare Stevanus v. State, 185 Ga.App. 7, 10(2), 363 S.E.2d 322 (1987) (witness's voice identification testimony was properly admitted since the evidence showed that the witness had conversed with the defendant on numerous occasions and, thus, had ample opportunity to be familiar with his voice). Nevertheless, prior to the playing of the audiotape, the informant testified that she was equipped with an electronic recording device during the controlled buy transaction, and the informant identified Perry as being the person who sold her the cocaine during the transaction.
Even insofar as that identification was based on recognizing Jones's voice, the store clerk explained the basis of that opinion so that the probative value of the evidence was an issue for the jury. McKay v. State, 251 Ga. App. 115, 116-117 ( 553 SE2d 672) (2001); Stevanus v. State, 185 Ga. App. 7, 10 (1) ( 363 SE2d 322) (1987). The jury was authorized to find Jones guilty of the offenses of which he was charged.
The voice identification testimony, as well as the testimony of the eyewitness, were more than sufficient to enable a rational trier of fact to find Morales guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the offenses for which he was convicted. See McKay v. State, 251 Ga. App. 115, 117 ( 553 SE2d 672) (2001); Stevanus v. State, 185 Ga. App. 7, 10 (1) ( 363 SE2d 322) (1987). Morales also claims in a one-sentence argument that the evidence produced at trial "failed to exclude every reasonable possibility except that of [Morales'] guilt."
(Citation omitted.) Stevanus v. State, 185 Ga. App. 7, 10 (1) ( 363 S.E.2d 322) (1987). MILLER, Judge.
Under the facts set forth above, "[t]he voice identification testimony and the circumstantial evidence were more than sufficient to enable a rational trier of fact to find defendant guilty of the offenses for which he was convicted beyond a reasonable doubt." Stevanus v. State, 185 Ga. App. 7, 10 (1) ( 363 S.E.2d 322) (1987). See also Thomas v. State, 222 Ga. App. 120 ( 473 S.E.2d 251) (1996) (probative value to be accorded voice identification evidence is matter for jury's determination).
We first conclude that a proper foundation was laid to show the basis of the victim's opinion that she recognized her assailant by voice. See Stevanus v. State, 185 Ga. App. 7, 9-10 ( 363 S.E.2d 322) (1987); Shepherd v. State, 173 Ga. App. 499, 500-501 ( 326 S.E.2d 596) (1985); Jenkins v. State, 167 Ga. App. 840, 841-842 ( 308 S.E.2d 14) (1983). Next, we conclude that the voice identification was admissible under the test of Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 ( 93 SC 375, 34 L.Ed.2d 401) (1972). See Stith v. State, 201 Ga. App. 621, 622 ( 411 S.E.2d 532) (1991).
Mercer v. State, 169 Ga. App. 723, 725 (1) ( 314 S.E.2d 729) (1984). See also Stevanus v. State, 185 Ga. App. 7, 10 (1) ( 363 S.E.2d 322) (1987). Accordingly, appellant's enumeration of the general grounds is without merit.
Therefore, defendant was not entitled to reversal on this ground, because even though the original sentence was a nullity, a legal sentence may be imposed. King v. State, 103 Ga. App. 272, 276 (3) ( 119 S.E.2d 77) (1961). See also Stevanus v. State, 185 Ga. App. 7, 10 (4) ( 363 S.E.2d 322) (1987). 4. Count two of the indictment charged defendant with violation of the Georgia Controlled Substances Act by possession of marijuana with intent to distribute.