And if the follow-up inspections be any guide, it performed that work properly. Notwithstanding its expertise in the area of lead abatement, Riverdale had no duty to go beyond the specifications of its contract to detect and warn of other latent hazards or defective conditions ( Stern v. 522 Shore Rd. Owners, 237 A.D.2d 277, 279). In opposing Riverdale's motion, plaintiffs and third-party plaintiffs had the burden of demonstrating triable issues of fact ( Zuckerman v. City of New York, 49 N.Y.2d 557), namely, by pointing to specific areas where Riverdale had performed negligently.

See Rodriguez by Rodriguez v. Presbyterian Hosp., 688 N.Y.S.2d 120, 122 (App. Div. 1999) (holding that contractor "had no duty to go beyond the specifications of its contract to detect and warn of other latent hazards or defective conditions." (citing Stern v. 522 Shore Rd. Owners, 655 N.Y.S.2d 51, 53 (App. Div. 1997))); see also Russin, 429 N.E.2d at 808; H. R. Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co., 159 N.E. 896, 897-98 (N.Y. 1927); Lippman v. Island Helicopter Corp., 670 N.Y.S.2d 529, 529-30 (App. Div. 1988). The undisputed evidence in the record establishes that Plaintiff's injuries were caused either by a defect in the design or manufacture of the x-ray machine or by a defect in the protocols implemented to clean the machine.

Rather, NRMC called Bauer, an independent repairer/contractor, on an as-needed basis to make specific repairs. Additionally, although NRMC occasionally called Bauer to conduct annual municipally required inspections, there was no evidence to contradict Bauer's contention that the inspection did not involve checking the mixing valve or water temperature ( see Ledesma v. Aragona Mgt. Group, 50 A.D.3d 510, 511, 857 N.Y.S.2d 519;Daniels v. Kromo Lenox Assoc., 16 A.D.3d 111, 791 N.Y.S.2d 17;Allen v. Thompson Overhead Door Co., 3 A.D.3d 462, 771 N.Y.S.2d 521;Stern v. 522 Shore Rd. Owners, 237 A.D.2d 277, 655 N.Y.S.2d 51;McMurray v. P.S. El., 224 A.D.2d 668, 638 N.Y.S.2d 720;Ayala v. V & O Press Co., 126 A.D.2d 229, 512 N.Y.S.2d 704;Alvarez v. Tele–Mechanics Inc., 276 A.D.2d at 514, 713 N.Y.S.2d 765). In opposition to Bauer's showing, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact.

Instead, the plaintiff seeks to raise a new, unpleaded theory of liability. However, inasmuch as the plaintiff failed to raise said theory before the Supreme Court, it is improperly raised for the first time on appeal and thus will not be addressed ( see Stern v 522 Shore Rd. Owners, 237 AD2d 277; Gordon v Hong, 126 AD2d 514). Accordingly, the defendant was entitled to summary judgment dismissing the complaint ( see generally Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320).

"'An appellate court should not, and will not, consider different theories or new questions, if proof might have been offered to refute or overcome them had those theories or questions been presented in the court of first instance'" ( Weber v. Jacobs, 289 AD2d 226, 227, quoting Fresh Pond Rd. Assoc. v. Estate of Schacht, 120 AD2d 561, 561). The plaintiff's attempt, for the first time on appeal, to characterize the complaint as stating a cause of action pursuant to Navigation Law § 181 (5) against the defendant Northville Industries, Inc. (hereinafter Northville), is without merit, as the allegations in the complaint cannot be read as supporting that theory of liability ( see Stoetzel v. Wappingers Cent. School Dist., 166 AD2d 643, 644; see also Wheeler v. Town of Hempstead, 238 AD2d 580, 581; Stern v. 522 Shore Rd. Owners, 237 AD2d 277, 280). The Supreme Court properly concluded that the plaintiff's claims sounding in negligence, professional malpractice, and breach of contract, which accrued no later than March 1995, were time-barred ( see CPLR 203 [a]; 213 [2]; 214 [4], [6]).

However, contrary to the plaintiff's assertion, GFC advised the plaintiff that the forklift would have to be taken out of service and removed to GFC's premises in order to be fully repaired. Furthermore, although the GFC representative told the plaintiff over the phone to go ahead and use the forklift, the plaintiff could not have reasonably relied on the alleged statement because he repeatedly admitted that he knew that the brakes on the forklift were defective. Accordingly, in the absence of any evidence of a negligent repair, the defendant was entitled to summary judgment (see Stern v. 522 Shore Rd. Owners, 237 A.D.2d 277; Ayala v. V O Press Co., 126 A.D.2d 229; Vermette v. Kenworth Truck Co., 111 A.D.2d 448, revd on other grounds 68 N.Y.2d 714). SMITH, J.P., SCHMIDT, ADAMS and COZIER, JJ., concur.

The Supreme Court properly granted the defendants' motion for judgment in their favor as a matter of law made at the close of the plaintiff's case as there was no rational process by which the trier of fact could find in favor of the plaintiff ( see, CPLR 4401; Szczerbiak v. Pilat, 90 N.Y.2d 553, 556; Slutzky v. Aron Estates Corp., 256 A.D.2d 402). We decline to consider theories of liability that were not raised at trial and are improperly raised for the first time on appeal ( see, Stern v. 522 Shore Rd. Owners, 237 A.D.2d 277, 280). The plaintiff contends that he was prejudiced by the use of an unofficial interpreter during the proceedings at the close of the plaintiff's case.