Even the most expansive interpretations of the Fair Housing Act "do not extend coverage beyond entities that directly provide housing or those that are integrally involved in the sale or financing of real estate."Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added) (quoting Steptoe v. Beverly Area Planning Ass'n, 674 F. Supp. 1313, 1320 (N.D.Ill. 1987)). The court in Steptoe v. Beverly Area Planning Ass'n, 674 F. Supp. 1313 (N.D.Ill. 1987), also examined the scope of § 3604(a).
116 F.R.D. at 194. This view has been expressly approved in the following authorities: Collins v. Associated Pathologists, Ltd., 844 F.2d 473, 476 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 109 S.Ct. 137, 102 L.Ed.2d 110 (1988); Clements v. County of Nassau, 835 F.2d 1000, 1004 (2d Cir. 1987); Burchett, 699 F. Supp. at 116; Santiago v. Lane, 697 F. Supp. 300, 301 (N.D.Ill. 1988); Nixon v. Celotex Corp., 693 F. Supp. 547, 552 (W.D.Mich. 1988); Butler Foods, 680 F. Supp. at 473; Soot v. General Elec. Co., 681 F. Supp. 157, 162 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); Steptoe v. Beverly Area Planning Ass'n, 674 F. Supp. 1313, 1318 (N.D.Ill. 1987); Haines v. Quigg, 673 F. Supp. 314, 318 (N.D.Ind. 1987). Nevertheless, even applying the "new era" principles, we conclude that the orders granting summary judgment in this case must be reversed.
Even the most expansive interpretations of the Fair Housing Act "do not extend coverage beyond entities that directly provide housing or those that are integrally involved in the sale or financing of real estate." Steptoe v. Beverly Area Planning Ass'n, 674 F. Supp. 1313, 1320 (N.D. Ill. 1987). To state a discrimination claim under the Fair Housing Act, Plaintiff must allege that she was a member of a statutorily protected class who applied for, and was qualified to rent or purchase a house, and was rejected, although housing remained available.
See, e.g., Jancik, 44 F.3d at 554 (involving conduct in the rental of an apartment); Heights Cmty. Cong. v. Hilltop Realty, Inc., 774 F.2d 135, 141 (6th Cir. 1985) (affirming district court's holding that § 3604(c) requires as a predicate of the prohibited housing practice the sale or rental of a dwelling; therefore, § 3604(c) prohibits only statements by an owner or his agent that pertain to the selling or renting of his dwelling); Space Hunters, Inc., 2001 WL 968993, at *1 (involving conduct regarding a newspaper advertisement concerning rooms available for rent); Michael v. Sal Caprice, 99 C 2313, 1999 WL 688733, at *2 (N.D.Ill. June 11, 1999) (finding that § 3604(c) makes it unlawful to make any discriminatory statement in renting a unit; therefore, a tenant already living in the building cannot allege a violation of § 3604(c)); Ores v. Willow West Condo. Ass'n, No. 94 C 4717, 1996 WL 111894, at *1 (N.D.Ill. Mar.12, 1996) (involving conduct regarding the sale of a condominium); Steptoe v. Beverly Area Planning Ass'n, 674 F. Supp. 1313, 1322 n. 13 (N.D.Ill. 1987) (finding that defendant's statement could not have violated § 3604(c) because its statement was not made with respect to the sale or rental of a particular dwelling); Holmgren v. Little Vill. Cmty. Reporter, 342 F. Supp. 512, 513 (N.D.Ill. 1971) (involving classified advertisements indicating a preference for home buyers and apartment tenants of particular national origins).
Id. In support of this proposition, Defendant USMR cites a single case captioned Steptoe v. Beverly Area Planning Ass'n, 674 F. Supp. 1313 (N.D.Ill. 1987). Id. at 12-13.
The critical question is not whether one type of conduct exactly parallels another type already explicitly proscribed by the FHAA. Rather, the issue is whether the defendant's activity is "integrally involved in the sale or financing of real estate." Devereux Foundation, Inc. v. O'Donnell, No. 89-6134, 1990 WL 2796, at *6 (E.D.Pa. Jan. 12, 1990) (quoting Steptoe v. Beverly Area Planning Ass'n, 674 F. Supp. 1313, 1320 (N.D.Ill. 1987)). An analogy to property insurers is instructive.
Plaintiffs' argument is supported by the analysis of many courts, including this one, that have interpreted the phrase to be "as broad as Congress could have made it." See, e.g., Steptoe v. Beverly Area Planning Association, 674 F. Supp. 1313, 1319 (N.D.Ill. 1987) (quoting Zuch v. Hussey, 366 F. Supp. 553, 557 (E.D.Mich. 1973)).
The court concludes that counterplaintiffs have failed to show any such effect of the SSHC's programs. As in Steptoe v. Beverly Area Planning Assn., 674 F. Supp. 1313 (N.D.Ill. 1987), the SSHC's activities do not "affect detrimentally the availability of housing" because they "do not deprive anyone of . . . housing information," but "served to increase, not decrease, the existing supply of housing information," and its "practice of fully informing homeseekers of its policy avoided the dangers inherent in the typical steering situation . . ." Steptoe, supra at 1319, 1320.
Thus, if Tellurian prevails in this action, it may be entitled to attorney's fees. Its claim for attorney's fees is not moot. in fair housing cases, it is not uncommon for some elements of requested relief to become moot while others do not. See, e.g., Keith v. Volpe, 858 F.2d 467, 471-72 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 813 (1989); Steptoe v. Beverly Area Planning Ass'n, 674 F. Supp. 1313, 1316 n. 3 (N.D. Ill. 1987). IV.