" Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. I, Sec. I, Par. II. See Stepperson, Inc. v. Long, 256 Ga. 838, 839-840 ( 353 S.E.2d 461) (1987) (holding unconstitutional statute that gave a right of action to "a father or, if the father is dead, a mother" against persons furnishing alcoholic beverages to an underage child); Ins. Co. of N. America v. Russell, 246 Ga. 269, 271 ( 271 S.E.2d 178) (1980) (declaring unconstitutional a workers' compensation law that gave a conclusive presumption of dependency to widows, but not widowers); Stitt v. Stitt, 243 Ga. 301 ( 253 S.E.2d 764) (1979) (holding alimony statutes unconstitutional because they failed to allow alimony awards to husbands); Sims v. Sims, 243 Ga. 275, 276 ( 253 S.E.2d 762) (1979) (invalidating "live-in lover" bill that provided for modification of alimony of the wife, but not the husband). 2. Hill argues that the seduction statute establishes a gender classification in three ways.
In a footnote, it was pointed out that "[p]unitive damages [under OCGA § 51-12-5], however, are excluded, as the tort itself is designed as a deterrent." Thus, under Yost, damages for mental distress are permitted and the plaintiff-in- Yost, may, as did Coleman in this case, elect under Stepperson v. Long, 256 Ga. 838 ( 353 S.E.2d 461) (1987), to forego actual damages, whether general, special or nominal, and pursue damages for injury to peace, happiness or feelings, as provided in OCGA § 51-12-6. The Court of Appeals properly affirmed the award of damages under this code section in Case No. 46074.
See Section 1, Ga. Laws 1988, p. 366, not codified by the General Assembly. See also Stepperson, Inc. v. Long, 256 Ga. 838, 353 S.E.2d 461 (1987). Although Defendants strenuously argue that the enactment of section 51-1-40 repealed section 51-1-18, this argument is without merit.
Also present in the Code prior to the 1987 passage of the Act was then-OCGA § 51–12–5, which permitted the award of “additional damages to deter the wrongdoer” in tort actions where “aggravating circumstances” were shown. However, evidence of the worldly circumstances of the defendant was not admissible in cases brought under OCGA § 51–12–5. Stepperson, Inc. v. Long, 256 Ga. 838, 841, 353 S.E.2d 461 (1987). In effect, if a plaintiff was faced with a situation in which damages could be claimed under either then- OCGA § 51–12–5 or then- OCGA § 51–12–6, the plaintiff would have to elect which damages to pursue.
] In Stepperson, Inc. v. Long, 256 Ga. 838, 844 ( 353 S.E.2d 461) (1987), we applied this Code section, holding specifically that a statute in question "was obsolete both because of the passage of time and the constitutional principles announced in Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 ( 99 S.C. 1102, 59 L.Ed.2d 306) (1979)." See also Porter v. State, 168 Ga. App. 703 ( 309 S.E.2d 919) (1983).
OCGA § 1-1-2 provides that the Code of 1981 was enacted to "revise and modernize and to repeal those laws which are obsolete as a result of the passage of time or other causes. . . ." As § 92A-502 was "obsolete . . . because of . . . constitutional principles," Stepperson, Inc. v. Long, 256 Ga. 838, 844 ( 353 S.E.2d 461) (1987), I conclude that § 92A-502 was correctly not carried forward to the Code of 1981. Stepperson, supra, 256 Ga.
We have uniformly held these statutes unconstitutional and have allowed suits to proceed by the discriminated class under the otherwise valid statutes. E.g., Stepperson v. Long, 256 Ga. 838 ( 353 S.E.2d 461) (1987) (mother for minor given alcohol); Tolbert v. Murrell, 253 Ga. 566 ( 322 S.E.2d 487) (1984) (survivors treated same for death of father or mother); Bell v. Sigal, 254 Ga. 78 ( 326 S.E.2d 730) (1985) (father for wrongful death of child); Edenfield v. Jackson, 251 Ga. 491 ( 306 S.E.2d 911) (1983) (illegitimate children for wrongful death of father); Insurance Co. of North America v. Russell, 246 Ga. 269 ( 271 S.E.2d 178) (1980) (conclusive presumption of dependency eliminated for widows under workers' compensation). In 1981, the Code Revision Committee, recognized the unconstitutionality of OCGA § 45-5-85 because of Orr, and, realizing the legislature intended to change it in 1979, revised the statute to reflect current law by eliminating gender bias.
Reeves v. Bridges, 248 Ga. 600, 602 ( 284 SE2d 416) (1981).Stepperson, Inc. v. Long, 256 Ga. 838, 839 (1) ( 353 SE2d 461) (1987). Accord Eldridge v. Aronson, 221 Ga. App. 662, 663 (1) ( 472 SE2d 497) (1996).
For purposes of this case, Mowell has conceded that she is only entitled to damages under OCGA § 51-12-6. See generally Stepperson, Inc. v. Long, 256 Ga. 838, 840-843 (2) ( 353 SE2d 461) (1987) (OCGA § 51-12-6 damages are available for cause of action under OCGA § 51-1-18). OCGA § 51-12-6 provides: "In a tort action in which the entire injury is to the peace, happiness, or feelings of the plaintiff, no measure of damages can be prescribed except the enlightened consciences of impartial jurors."
Wellborn v. DeKalb County School Dist., supra, 227 Ga. App. 377, (3); see Ryckeley, supra, 261 Ga. at 828; Sanders, supra, 178 Ga. App. at 450; Howard v. Bloodworth, 137 Ga. App. 478, 479 ( 224 S.E.2d 122) (1976).Westview Cemetery, supra, 234 Ga. at 544-545 (B); Carroll v. Rock, 220 Ga. App. 260, 261 (1) ( 469 S.E.2d 391) (1996); Waldrip v. Voyles, 201 Ga. App. 592, 595 (2) (a) ( 411 S.E.2d 765) (1991); Deutz-Allis Credit Corp., supra, 193 Ga. App. at 80-81; Brunswick Gas c. Co., 179 Ga. App. 495, 496-499 (3) ( 347 S.E.2d 240) (1986); see generally Stepperson, Inc. v. Long, 256 Ga. 838, 840-843 (2) ( 353 S.E.2d 461) (1987). 234 Ga. at 544.