Summary
finding that the causal nexus between plaintiff's knee injury suffered at a navy shipyard and the alleged shipyard's discriminatory conduct was too attenuated to warrant damages and that Title VII did not justify awarding lost future earnings under the plaintiff's theory of "but for" causation
Summary of this case from Morgan v. ChaoOpinion
Argued and Submitted June 11, 2001.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION. (See Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure Rule 36-3)
Action for sex discrimination was brought against the Secretary of the Navy. The United States District Court for the Western District of Washington, Robert J. Bryan, J., rendered summary judgment against plaintiff on her claim for compensatory damages for lost earnings capacity due to a knee injury. Plaintiff appealed. The Court of Appeals held that: (1) plaintiff was not entitled to compensatory damages as requested, and (2) she was not entitled to attorney fees.
Affirmed.
Page 860.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington Robert J. Bryan, District Judge, Presiding.
Before B. FLETCHER, BRUNETTI and FISHER, Circuit Judges.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as may be provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
Appellant Carol Stepper seeks reversal of a summary judgment order denying her claim for compensatory damages for lost earnings capacity on account of a disabling injury to her left knee suffered at the Puget Sound Navy Shipyard ("Shipyard"). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm for the reasons stated by the district court.
The causal nexus between Stepper's injury and the Shipyard's discriminatory conduct was too attenuated to merit compensatory damages of this type. The relevant statutory and regulatory provisions under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, in conjunction with our prior case law, do not justify the awarding of lost future earnings under Stepper's theory of "but for" causation.
Although Stepper successfully represented herself at the administrative hearing on her initial claim of sex discrimination, she did not prevail in any of her subsequent claims for compensatory damages while represented by counsel. She is not a prevailing party. Accordingly, we affirm the denial of attorney's fees.
AFFIRMED.