Stephens v. Weyl-Zuckerman Co.

7 Citing cases

  1. Sun Harbor Marina, Inc. v. Sellick

    250 Cal.App.2d 281 (Cal. Ct. App. 1967)   Cited 1 times

    The present saving clause, excepting all remedies to which a lien holder is entitled, a fortiori excepts his common law remedies. Defendant's jurisdictional arguments are premised upon decisions inapplicable to the instant situation, upon a claim the lien in question is a federal maritime lien (46 U.S.C. §§ 971 and 975), or a state maritime lien provided by Harbors and Navigation Code section 491, subdivision (d), and upon the further claim the foreclosure sale and instant action were proceedings in rem to enforce a maritime lien enforceable only in a federal court (46 U.S.C. § 975; Stephens v. Weyl-Zuckerman Co., 34 Cal.App. 210 [ 167 P. 171]); disregard the broad character of the present saving clause and the fact the lien in question s a possessory lien; and for these reasons, are immaterial to the issue. [3] The maritime lien conferred by federal law (46 U.S.C. § 971), like the maritime lien conferred by state law (Harb.

  2. Crofton v. Pappas

    75 Cal.App.2d 814 (Cal. Ct. App. 1946)

    In Harbor Supply Co. v. Motor Boat Astorian, 116 Cal.App. 563 [ 2 P.2d 1004], it is said: "Actions in personam involving supplies furnished an ocean-going boat, with ancillary attachment proceedings upon the vessel may be brought in the state courts." In Stephens v. Weyl-Zuckerman Co., 34 Cal.App. 210 [ 167 P. 171], in speaking of the act of Congress giving jurisdiction to the federal courts in proceedings in rem to enforce such a lien, it is stated that this was intended to apply to in rem proceedings only, and that this "was not thereby intended as an obstacle to the maintenance of suits in state courts against the owners of vessels for repairs thereof and the attachment of such vessels as a means of enforcing judgments obtained in such suits." Not only would it seem that the lien provided for in section 813 is not such a definite lien as was intended to be covered by the excluding provision of section 537, but there is another reason why the lien thus provided for should not prevent the issuance of an attachment.

  3. Harbor Supply Co. v. Motor Boat Astorian

    116 Cal.App. 563 (Cal. Ct. App. 1931)   Cited 4 times
    In Harbor Supply Co. v. Motor Boat Astorian, 116 Cal.App. 563 [ 2 P.2d 1004], it is said: "Actions in personam involving supplies furnished an ocean-going boat, with ancillary attachment proceedings upon the vessel may be brought in the state courts."

    In support of this contention they cite the case of The Moses Taylor v. Hammons, 4 Wall. 411 [18 L.Ed. 397], which reversed a decision of the Supreme Court of this state and held somewhat similar provisions of the Practice Act of California unconstitutional. They further cite the case of Stephens v. Weyl-Zuckerman Co., 34 Cal.App. 210 [ 167 P. 171], which they seek to construe as a similar holding upon the present provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. From the view we take of the case we do not find it necessary to determine these questions raised by appellants.

  4. United States v. Zarco

    187 F. Supp. 371 (S.D. Cal. 1960)   Cited 8 times

    This is the position taken by California courts. In Stephens v. Weyl-Zuckerman Co., 1917, 34 Cal.App. 210, 167 P. 171, there was involved a lien authorized by Sec. 813 of the Code of Civil Procedure of the State of California, which purported to give a lien for the repair of vessels and the question was as to the effect upon the lien of the statute of June 23, 1910, 36 Stats. 604, entitled, "An Act Relating to liens on vessels for repairs, supplies, or other necessaries." It should be here noted that the footnote to Sec. 975, 46 U.S.C.A., states that the section is the equivalent of the Act of June 23, 1910 above referred to.

  5. Farwest Steel Corp. v. DeSantis

    102 Wn. 2d 487 (Wash. 1984)   Cited 8 times

    State v. Reed, 92 Wn.2d 271, 595 P.2d 916, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 930 (1979). [2] The California court addressed a similar problem in Stephens v. Weyl-Zuckerman Co., 34 Cal.App. 210, 216, 167 P. 171 (1917): In this case, although the action, so far as its title is concerned, is directly against the owner of the launch only, yet the plaintiffs have in their complaint gone further, and proceeded in rem, or against the res or launch itself as effectually as though they had done so directly, or eo nomine, by alleging their right to the lien provided by section 813 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and praying for the sale of the launch under the foreclosure of the lien for the satisfaction of the debt sued for.

  6. Mississippi State Highway Commission v. Wear

    175 So. 2d 508 (Miss. 1965)   Cited 4 times
    In Wear, 175 So.2d at 509, the real property and sandstone were under no prior laws, rules, or regulations which restricted the mining of the sandstone before the condemnation proceedings.

    Evidence relating to the quantity, quality and accessibility of the sandstone deposit in the land condemned and its marketability and value was proper and the jury was entitled to be informed as to these matters. Boom Co. v. Patterson, 98 U.S. 403, 25 L.Ed. 206; Charles W. Hollister v. Cox, 131 Conn. Appeals 523, 41 A.2d 93, 156 A.L.R. 1412; Foster v. Mississippi State Highway Comm., supra; Mitchell v. United States, 267 U.S. 341, 69 L.Ed. 644, 45 S.Ct. 293; National Brick Co. v. United States, 131 F.2d 30; United States v. 158.76 Acres of Land, 298 F.2d 559, 92 A.L.R. 2d 766; 18 Am. Jur., Eminent Domain, Sec. 244 p. 879; 29A C.J.S., Eminent Domain, Sec. 174 p. 735; 4 Nichols, Eminent Domain (3d ed.), Secs. 13.1, 13.22 pp. 346, 408; 1 Orgel, Eminent Domain (2d ed.), Sec. 167 p. 171. VIII. Rules of evidence for proof of value of land are modified since land has no market in the sense that securities and articles of commerce have market value.

  7. Latterner v. Latterner

    274 P. 194 (Nev. 1929)   Cited 27 times
    In Latterner v. Latterner, 51 Nev. 285, 274 P. 194, defendant appeared and filed an answer denying the allegation in the complaint that plaintiff had resided in the county where the suit was filed for more than three months immediately preceding the commencement of the action.

    Sec. 5045, Rev. Laws of Nevada, 1912. It is a well-settled principle of law that the question of jurisdiction can be raised at any time during the trial, and if not at that time it can be raised for the first time on appeal, when the want of jurisdiction appears affirmatively from the record. Aram v. Edwards (Idaho), 74 P. 961; Oppenheimer v. Regan (Mont.), 79 P. 695; Empire Ranch Cattle Co. v. Millet, 135 P. 127; First Nat. Bank of Pateau v. School Dist. No. 4 of Hughes Co. (Okla.), 160 P. 68; Stephens v. Weyl-Zuckerman Co. (Cal.), 167 P. 171; Maguire v. Cunningham (Cal.), 222 P. 838; Dant Russell v. Pierce (Ore.), 255 P. 603; Gamble v. Silver Peak, 35 Nev. 319, 133 P. 936. Jurisdiction of subject matter of character incapable of being waived must be considered when raised for first time on appeal. Bosher v. Bellas (Ariz.), 264 P. 468; Twin Falls Realty Co. v. Brune (Ida.), 264 P. 382; Boarman v. Home State Bank of Tecumseh (Okla.), 239 P. 579; Labbitt v. Bunston (Mont.), 260 P. 727.