Opinion
NO. 12-12-00094-CV
10-24-2012
STEVE STEPHENS AND CRISSY STEPHENS f/b/o R.A.S., A MINOR CHILD, APPELLANTS v. TRINITY INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT, APPELLEE
APPEAL FROM THE 258TH
JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
TRINITY COUNTY, TEXAS
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Steve Stephens and Crissy Stephens, for the benefit of R.A.S., a minor child, appeal the trial court's order granting Trinity Independent School District's (TISD) plea to the jurisdiction. The Stephenses raise two issues on appeal. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
The Stephenses' son, R.A.S., was an eleven year old intermediate school student at TISD. While in the process of exiting the stadium after attending a TISD high school football game with his grandfather, R.A.S. approached another student, spoke to him, and shook his hand. What occurred during their conversation forms the basis of the underlying lawsuit.
TISD alleges that R.A.S. purchased an illegal "Vicodin" pill while on school property. Constable Woody Wallace witnessed the events in question and approached R.A.S. and his grandfather as they left the game. Constable Wallace believed that R.A.S. and the other student had just completed a narcotics transaction.
Unable to substantiate his belief, Constable Wallace allowed R.A.S. and his grandfather to leave the premises. Officers discovered that the other student, who allegedly sold drugs to R.A.S., possessed narcotics. That student was arrested, tried, and convicted for the possession and sale of narcotics on school property. During the investigation, the seller-student made an affidavit in which he declared that he sold R.A.S. Vicodin. According to the Stephenses, R.A.S. was not under the influence of any narcotic, Constable Wallace did not discover any evidence of narcotic possession or usage by R.A.S., and R.A.S. was innocent of any wrongdoing.
R.A.S. has never been arrested or convicted for the alleged offense in the juvenile justice system. However, TISD decided to place R.A.S. into a Disciplinary Alternative Education Program (DAEP) for forty-five days. The Stephenses allege that R.A.S. was given additional time in DAEP for violating policy by attending a school function he was prohibited from attending under DAEP rules. They also allege that he was never at the function and that he received additional punishment in retaliation for protesting TISD's placement of R.A.S. in DAEP. The Stephenses began the internal TISD appeal process, which involved an appeal to the TISD Superintendent, and subsequently an appeal to the TISD Board of Trustees (the Board).
While that process was pending, the Stephenses filed suit against TISD and individual defendants, seeking a temporary restraining order (TRO), a temporary injunction, and permanent injunctive relief enjoining TISD from placing R.A.S. in DAEP. The suit was brought as a declaratory judgment action. The trial court granted a TRO. TISD filed an answer and a plea to the jurisdiction. While the lawsuit was pending, the Board issued its final ruling, affirming R.A.S.'s placement in DAEP. The Stephenses ultimately nonsuited the individual defendants, leaving TISD as the only defendant. The trial court granted TISD's plea to the jurisdiction, and dismissed the Stephenses' suit with prejudice. R.A.S. has not returned to TISD since the Board issued its final ruling, although he has not formally withdrawn. This appeal followed.
JURISDICTION
In their first issue, the Stephenses argue that the trial court erred when it granted TISD's plea to the jurisdiction. Standard of Review
Subject matter jurisdiction is essential to the court's power to decide a case. Tex. Ass'n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 443 (Tex. 1993). A plea to the jurisdiction challenges the court's subject matter jurisdiction. Bland Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Blue, 34 S.W.3d 547, 554 (Tex. 2000). When deciding a plea to the jurisdiction, the trial court looks solely to the allegations in the petition, accepting those allegations as true, without considering the merits of the case. Harris Cnty. v. Proler, 29 S.W.3d 646, 647 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, no pet.). Whether the court has subject matter jurisdiction is a matter of law and, therefore, the granting or denial of a plea to the jurisdiction is subject to de novo review. Harris Cnty. v. Cypress Forest Pub. Util. Dist. of Harris Cnty., 50 S.W.3d 551, 553 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, no pet.). If the pleadings affirmatively negate jurisdiction, a plea to the jurisdiction may be granted without allowing the plaintiff an opportunity to amend the petition. Tex. Dep't of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 227 (Tex. 2004). Applicable Law
Chapter 37 of the Texas Education Code establishes the disciplinary consequences for specific conduct and the procedural due process to which any student punished under this chapter is entitled. Aledo Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Reese, 987 S.W.2d 953, 956 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1999, pet. denied). One disciplinary program established by Chapter 37 is DAEP. See TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. §§ 37.006, 37.008 (West Supp. 2012). A student can be placed in DAEP, which is a disciplinary option without expulsion, if the student possesses, uses, or is under the influence of an illegal controlled substance or dangerous drug as those terms are used in the health and safety code. See id § 37.006(a)(2)(C). The education code also provides for notice and various hearings and appeals at which the student and parents may "participate." See id § 37.009(a)-(b). "Any decision of the board or the board's designee [to place the student in DAEP] under this subsection is final and may not be appealed." See id. § 37.009(b) (West 2006).
Texas courts have interpreted this section to mean just what it says—district and appellate courts have no jurisdiction to review the decision to place a student in DAEP. See, e.g., Hankins v. P.H., 1 S.W.3d 352, 354 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1999, pet. denied) (same); Aledo, 987 S.W.2d at 958-59 (holding court lacked jurisdiction under Section 37.009(b) to address parents' appeal of placement of child in DAEP and had no authority to consider appeal; see also Flour Bluff Indep. Sch. Dist. v. R.S., No. 13-05-00623-CV, 2006 WL 949968, at *1-2 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi Apr. 13, 2006, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (reversing trial court's denial of district's plea to the jurisdiction, holding trial court had no authority to entertain challenge to DAEP placement after school officials discovered hydrocodone pill in student's purse). Discussion
The Stephenses made several complaints in their petition. Specifically, they argued that TISD (1) violated its own policies by singling out and targeting R.A.S., (2) failed to engage in informal negotiations, (3) should have waited until juvenile authorities took action, (4) failed to provide documents supporting its actions against R.A.S. and withheld evidence, (5) unlawfully retaliated against R.A.S. for filing a complaint against the district, (6) predetermined that R.A.S. committed the alleged offense, and (7) misrepresented to them the reasons for R.A.S.'s discipline.
Because R.A.S.'s placement in DAEP was not an expulsion, review of the TISD's decision is governed by Section 37.009(b). See Aledo, 987 S.W.2d at 958-59. The record reflects that the Stephenses followed the appeal procedures in the education code and under district policy, and that the Board upheld the DAEP placement decision. Section 37.009(b) expressly states that the Board's decision is final and may not be appealed. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 37.009(b). Therefore, the trial court had no jurisdiction to consider the Stephenses' claims as they relate to TISD's decision to place R.A.S. in DAEP.See Aledo, 987 S.W.2d at 958-59; Hankins, 1 S.W.3d at 354. Accordingly, the trial court did not err when it granted TISD's plea to the jurisdiction.
The fact that this suit was brought as a declaratory judgment action does not confer subject matter jurisdiction where it does not otherwise exist. See Chenault v. Phillips, 914 S.W.2d 140, 141 (Tex. 1996) (stating the Declaratory Judgment Act "is not a grant of jurisdiction, but merely a procedural device for deciding cases already within a court's jurisdiction").
The Stephenses' first issue is overruled.
DUE PROCESS
In their second issue, the Stephenses argue that Texas Education Code Sections 37.006 and 37.009(b) are unconstitutional because those sections operated here to deny them their right to a fair and impartial hearing and denied them due process of law. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
Even without jurisdiction to review the Stephenses' complaints arising out of the statutory rights in Chapter 37 of the Texas Education Code, we have jurisdiction to determine whether the complained of action violates the student's constitutional rights. See United Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Gonzalez, 911 S.W.2d 118, 123 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1995) writ denied per curiam, 940 S.W.2d 593 (Tex. 1996) (citing Firemen's & Policemen's Civil Serv. Comm'n v. Kennedy, 514 S.W.2d 237, 239 (Tex. 1974)).
Students in Texas are entitled to free public education, and attendance is compulsory unless an exemption applies. Stafford Mun. Sch. Dist. v. L.P., 64 S.W.3d 559, 562 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, no pet.). "[P]rotected property rights are affected and due process protections are required when the discipline imposed amounts to a deprivation of access to education." Id. at 562-63 (citing Riggan v. Midland Indep. Sch. Dist., 86 F. Supp. 2d 647, 655 (W.D. Tex. 2000)). Transferring a student from regular classes to DAEP does not impact a protected property or liberty interest implicating due process concerns, because it does not deny the student access to public education. See id. at 563 (citing Nevares v. San Marcos Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist., 111 F.3d 25, 26-27 (5th Cir.1997)). Texas schools maintain DAEP for those students whose violations of the law or the school's code of conduct fall short of triggering suspension or expulsion, but who, for reasons of safety and order, must be removed from the regular classroom and transferred to a different facility with stricter discipline. See id.
"The requirements of procedural due process apply only to the deprivation of interests protected under Article I, Section 19 of the Texas Constitution." Id. at 562 (citing University of Tex. Med. Sch. at Houston v. Than, 901 S.W.2d 926, 929 (Tex. 1995); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569-70, 92 S. Ct. 2701, 33 L. Ed. 2d 548 (1972) (stating plaintiff must allege deprivation of sufficient property or liberty interest to invoke protection of due process clause)).Discussion
Although Article I, Section 19 of the Texas Constitution is textually different from the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution in that it refers to "due course of law" rather than "due process of law," these terms are without meaningful distinction. Stafford Mun. Sch. Dist., 64 S.W.3d at 562, n.5 (citing Than, 901 S.W.2d at 929). Therefore, in matters of procedural due process, Texas courts have followed federal due process interpretations of procedural due process issues. Id.
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The Stephenses contend that TISD's appeal process falls below constitutional standards. The Stephenses acknowledge the authorities cited above holding that no constitutionally protected property or liberty interest is implicated when a student is placed in DAEP, but argue that their case is different, because R.A.S. was never charged with a crime nor was any evidence produced that he violated the law. However, the Stephenses provide no authority for their position, and we note that this is not a criminal proceeding, which involves a different burden of proof and serves a different purpose. As we have noted, R.A.S. was placed in DAEP, and was not denied access to public education. He was simply placed in an alternative facility. Therefore, he has alleged no constitutionally protected interest implicating due process concerns. See id. at 563-64.
The Stephenses nevertheless argue that the due process interest here is the "stigma of being punished for something you did not do." In other words, as in Stafford Municipal School District, the alleged damage is to the student's reputation and the harm that flows from unsubstantiated DAEP placement, particularly, harm to the student's standing with fellow pupils and teachers, as well as interference with opportunities for higher education and employment. See id. As that case and the authorities cited therein make clear, damage to the reputation of the student alone is not enough to establish a due process violation. See id. Consequently, R.A.S. has not shown that he was deprived of a substantive due process right, or that he was entitled to additional procedural due process protection. In any event, the statutory scheme and the procedures set forth by TISD provide substantial opportunity to be heard.
The Stephenses second issue is overruled.
DISPOSITION
Having overruled the Stephenses' first and second issues, we affirm the trial court's order granting TISD's plea to the jurisdiction and dismissing the suit with prejudice.
SAM GRIFFITH
Justice
Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Griffith, J., and Hoyle, J.
(PUBLISH)
JUDGMENT
NO. 12-12-00094-CV
STEVE STEPHENS AND CRISSY STEPHENS f/b/o R.A.S., A MINOR CHILD, Appellants
V.
TRINITY INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT, Appellee
Appeal from the 258th Judicial District Court
of Trinity County, Texas. (Tr.Ct.No. 20949)
THIS CAUSE came to be heard on the appellate record and briefs filed herein, and the same being considered, it is the opinion of this court that there was no error in the judgment.
It is therefore ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that the order granting Trinity Independent School District's plea to the jurisdiction and dismissing Steve Stephens and Crissy Stephens's suit with prejudice be in all things affirmed, and that all costs of this appeal are hereby adjudged against the appellants, STEVE STEPHENS AND CRISSY STEPHENS for which execution may issue, and that this decision be certified to the court below for observance.
Sam Griffith, Justice.
Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Griffith, J., and Hoyle, J.