The record here shows that Chambers had been convicted of not only two previous burglaries, but three other felonies as well. Thus "[he] was, for sentencing purposes, more than a mere [three]-time burglary offender under the specific recidivist provisions of OCGA § 16-7-1 (b). He was a [six]-time felony offender under the general recidivist provisions of OCGA § 17-10-7 (a)." Stephens v. State, 259 Ga. App. 564, 565 ( 578 SE2d 179) (2003); compare Norwood v. State, 249 Ga. App. 507, 508-509 (2) ( 548 SE2d 478) (2001) (where the only prior felony conviction used to enhance the defendant's sentence was one for burglary, the trial court erred in applying sentence under general recidivist statute). The existence of prior felony convictions in addition to those for burglary "removes the case from the exclusive provisions of OCGA § 16-7-1 (b) and allows for the application of the repeat offender statute for sentencing purposes."
Mitchell v. State, 202 Ga. App. 100, 102 (2) ( 413 SE2d 517) (1991). See also Stephens v. State, 259 Ga. App. 564, 565 ( 578 SE2d 179) (2003). Because Goldberg was "more" than just a habitual burglar, he was subject, as a habitual felon, to the "supplemental" provisions of OCGA § 17-10-7.
Scott v. State, 240 Ga. App. 586, 588 (3) ( 524 SE2d 287) (1999). See also Stephens v. State, 259 Ga. App. 564 ( 578 SE2d 179) (2003). 1. Contrary to Marshall's assertion, the trial court did not err in considering for sentencing purposes his prior conviction for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. It is true that the state may not both rely upon a defendant's prior felony conviction to prove the defendant's guilt of a convicted felon in possession of a firearm charge and also use that prior conviction in aggravation of punishment.
(Punctuation omitted.) State v. Chambers, 275 Ga. App. 666, 667 ( 621 SE2d 588) (2005), citing Stephens v. State, 259 Ga. App. 564, 565 ( 578 SE2d 179) (2003). Compare Norwood v. State, 249 Ga. App. 507, 508-509 (2) ( 548 SE2d 478) (2001) (where only prior felony conviction used to enhance defendant's sentence was one for burglary, trial court erred in utilizing general recidivist statute).
Accordingly, the trial court did not err in sentencing Smith. See Stephens v. State, 259 Ga. App. 564, 565-566 ( 578 SE2d 179) (2003); Mitchell v. State, 202 Ga. App. 100, 102 (2) ( 413 SE2d 517) (1991).Judgment affirmed.
Accordingly, the trial court properly sentenced Nordahl as a recidivist under the general recidivist provisions contained that statute rather than under OCGA § 16-7-1 (b).Kennedy , 302 Ga. App. at 290, 690 S.E.2d 255 ; see Nelson , 277 Ga. App. at 101 (5) (b), 625 S.E.2d 465 (holding that defendant’s prior felony conviction in New York for assault, in addition to those for burglary, removes the case from the exclusive provisions of OCGA § 16-7-1 (b) and allows for the application of the repeat offender statute, OCGA § 17-10-7 (c), for sentencing purposes); Stephens v. State , 259 Ga. App. 564, 565, 578 S.E.2d 179 (2003) (holding that in light of the introduction of a prior felony conviction for forgery in addition to defendant’s prior conviction for burglary, defendant was, for sentencing purposes, more than a mere two-time burglary offender under the specific recidivist provisions of OCGA § 16-7-1 (b), but, rather, was a three-time felony offender under the general recidivist provisions of OCGA § 17-10-7 (a) ).--------