Stephens v. State

6 Citing cases

  1. State v. Chambers

    621 S.E.2d 588 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005)   Cited 4 times
    In State v. Chambers, 275 Ga. App. 666 (621 SE2d 588) (2005), the Court of Appeals concluded that the general recidivist statute took precedence when the defendant's prior convictions included convictions for violating statutes other than the statute for which the defendant was then being sentenced for violating (i.e., defendant being sentenced for burglary had prior felony convictions for robbery, criminal damage to property, as well as burglary). That qualification is not present in the case at bar and its propriety is not before the Court.

    The record here shows that Chambers had been convicted of not only two previous burglaries, but three other felonies as well. Thus "[he] was, for sentencing purposes, more than a mere [three]-time burglary offender under the specific recidivist provisions of OCGA § 16-7-1 (b). He was a [six]-time felony offender under the general recidivist provisions of OCGA § 17-10-7 (a)." Stephens v. State, 259 Ga. App. 564, 565 ( 578 SE2d 179) (2003); compare Norwood v. State, 249 Ga. App. 507, 508-509 (2) ( 548 SE2d 478) (2001) (where the only prior felony conviction used to enhance the defendant's sentence was one for burglary, the trial court erred in applying sentence under general recidivist statute). The existence of prior felony convictions in addition to those for burglary "removes the case from the exclusive provisions of OCGA § 16-7-1 (b) and allows for the application of the repeat offender statute for sentencing purposes."

  2. Goldberg v. State

    282 Ga. 542 (Ga. 2007)   Cited 34 times
    In Goldberg, we specifically considered the relationship between OCGA § 17-10-7 (a) ’s requirement that recidivist felons be given maximally long sentences and one part of OCGA § 16-7-1 that, at the time, authorized sentences of between five and 20 years for three-time burglars.

    Mitchell v. State, 202 Ga. App. 100, 102 (2) ( 413 SE2d 517) (1991). See also Stephens v. State, 259 Ga. App. 564, 565 ( 578 SE2d 179) (2003). Because Goldberg was "more" than just a habitual burglar, he was subject, as a habitual felon, to the "supplemental" provisions of OCGA § 17-10-7.

  3. Marshall v. State

    668 S.E.2d 892 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008)   Cited 5 times

    Scott v. State, 240 Ga. App. 586, 588 (3) ( 524 SE2d 287) (1999). See also Stephens v. State, 259 Ga. App. 564 ( 578 SE2d 179) (2003). 1. Contrary to Marshall's assertion, the trial court did not err in considering for sentencing purposes his prior conviction for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. It is true that the state may not both rely upon a defendant's prior felony conviction to prove the defendant's guilt of a convicted felon in possession of a firearm charge and also use that prior conviction in aggravation of punishment.

  4. Goldberg v. State

    280 Ga. App. 600 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006)   Cited 5 times

    (Punctuation omitted.) State v. Chambers, 275 Ga. App. 666, 667 ( 621 SE2d 588) (2005), citing Stephens v. State, 259 Ga. App. 564, 565 ( 578 SE2d 179) (2003). Compare Norwood v. State, 249 Ga. App. 507, 508-509 (2) ( 548 SE2d 478) (2001) (where only prior felony conviction used to enhance defendant's sentence was one for burglary, trial court erred in utilizing general recidivist statute).

  5. Smith v. State

    614 S.E.2d 219 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005)   Cited 5 times

    Accordingly, the trial court did not err in sentencing Smith. See Stephens v. State, 259 Ga. App. 564, 565-566 ( 578 SE2d 179) (2003); Mitchell v. State, 202 Ga. App. 100, 102 (2) ( 413 SE2d 517) (1991).Judgment affirmed.

  6. Nordahl v. State

    811 S.E.2d 465 (Ga. Ct. App. 2018)   Cited 8 times
    Holding rule of lenity did not apply because OCGA § 16-7-1 (b) and OCGA § 17-10-7 could be read in harmony in sentencing an habitual burglar

    Accordingly, the trial court properly sentenced Nordahl as a recidivist under the general recidivist provisions contained that statute rather than under OCGA § 16-7-1 (b).Kennedy , 302 Ga. App. at 290, 690 S.E.2d 255 ; see Nelson , 277 Ga. App. at 101 (5) (b), 625 S.E.2d 465 (holding that defendant’s prior felony conviction in New York for assault, in addition to those for burglary, removes the case from the exclusive provisions of OCGA § 16-7-1 (b) and allows for the application of the repeat offender statute, OCGA § 17-10-7 (c), for sentencing purposes); Stephens v. State , 259 Ga. App. 564, 565, 578 S.E.2d 179 (2003) (holding that in light of the introduction of a prior felony conviction for forgery in addition to defendant’s prior conviction for burglary, defendant was, for sentencing purposes, more than a mere two-time burglary offender under the specific recidivist provisions of OCGA § 16-7-1 (b), but, rather, was a three-time felony offender under the general recidivist provisions of OCGA § 17-10-7 (a) ).--------