See Betterson, supra at 813. See Stephens v. State, 170 Ga. App. 267, 268(1) ( 316 S.E.2d 847) (1984). 3.
The decision to sever was within the trial court's discretion and we will not disturb that ruling absent a showing of clear abuse of that discretion. OCGA ยง 17-8-4; Stephens v. State, 170 Ga. App. 267(1) ( 316 S.E.2d 847). Although defendant Redding was not available for cross-examination at trial, this alone does not demand a finding that the denial of defendant Gay's motion to sever was an abuse of discretion. A defendant seeking severance on such grounds must at least show a bona fide need for a co-defendant's testimony.
The decision of whether to sever was within the trial court's discretion and we will not disturb that ruling absent a showing of clear abuse of that discretion. OCGA ยง 17-8-4; Stephens v. State, 170 Ga. App. 267(1) ( 316 S.E.2d 847). Although eyewitness Latoya Brown questioned the reliability of her own identification testimony โ that defendant Courtney G. Shelley was a gunman at the DeKalb County "Waffle House" armed robbery โ based on her view that the defendants "look a lot alike," this uncertainty does not demand a finding that the denial of a motion to sever was an abuse of discretion.
" (Punctuation and citations omitted.) Sims v. State, 186 Ga. App. 74 (4) ( 366 S.E.2d 406) (1988); see also Sims v. State, 195 Ga. App. 631 ( 394 S.E.2d 422) (1990); Martin v. State, 189 Ga. App. 483, 487-488 (3) ( 376 S.E.2d 888) (1988); Stephens v. State, 170 Ga. App. 267 (1) ( 316 S.E.2d 847) (1984); see Cain v. State, 235 Ga. 128 ( 218 S.E.2d 856) (1975). Majors has failed to articulate any specific reason for severance, he has failed to show any actual prejudice or denial of due process which resulted from the failure to sever, and we find no error in the trial court's denial of the motion to sever.
The record shows there were no antagonistic defenses among the issues, and appellants have asserted none; the number of defendants did not create confusion as to the evidence and law applicable to each defendant; and no evidence prejudicial to the misdemeanor defendants was admitted against Greg Scroggins. See Stephens v. State, 170 Ga. App. 267, 268 ( 316 S.E.2d 847), as to the standards and the trial court's discretion for granting motions to sever trial. We reject the assertion that the AIDS issue relevant to appellant Greg Scroggins operated to the prejudice of the remaining defendants.
" Stevens v. State, 165 Ga. App. 814, 816-817 (3) ( 302 S.E.2d 724) (1983). See also Stephens v. State, 170 Ga. App. 267 (1) ( 316 S.E.2d 847) (1984). Judgment affirmed. Banke, P. J., and Benham, J., concur.
[Cits.]" Stephens v. State, 170 Ga. App. 267, 268 (3) ( 316 S.E.2d 847) (1984). Thus, the trial court did not err by denying appellant the right to make the closing argument.
The denial of appellant's motion to sever was within the discretion of the trial court, and we will not disturb the ruling absent a showing of clear abuse of that discretion. OCGA ยง 17-8-4; Stephens v. State, 170 Ga. App. 267 (1) ( 316 S.E.2d 847) (1984). Appellant has failed to show that the number of defendants created confusion as to the evidence and law applicable to each individual defendant; that evidence admissible against appellant's co-defendant was considered against appellant despite cautionary instructions to the contrary; and that appellant's defenses were antagonistic to those of his co-defendant.
No such showing is manifest here. Perry's co-defendant testified and was cross-examined by counsel for Perry. Proper cautionary instructions to the jury were given. We find no abuse of discretion. See also Stephens v. State, 170 Ga. App. 267 (1) ( 316 S.E.2d 847) (1984); House v. State, 170 Ga. App. 88 (4) ( 316 S.E.2d 483) (1984). 4.