Summary
reversing trial court's finding that easement for ingress and egress prevented servient tenement owner from any use of the property
Summary of this case from Dama v. Bay Bank & Trust Co.Opinion
No. 86-3025.
July 29, 1987. Rehearing Denied August 25, 1987.
Appeal from the Circuit Court, Hillsborough County, James A. Lenfestey, J.
James V. Lau of Lau, Lane, Pieper Asti, P.A., Tampa, for appellants.
James D. Whittemore of Whittemore Campbell, P.A. Tampa, for appellees.
The owners of a partial interest in a parcel of real property appeal a judgment finding that the appellees have an exclusive easement over the land which precludes any use of the land by the landowners. We reverse.
The general rule of law in Florida is that an instrument creating an easement must be construed as creating a nonexclusive easement unless the instrument clearly shows an intention that the easement is to be exclusive. See Wiggins v. Lykes Brothers, Inc., 97 So.2d 273 (Fla. 1957); Gelfand v. Mortgage Investors of Washington, 453 So.2d 897 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984); Consolidated Gas Co. v. City Gas Co., 447 So.2d 351 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984). The instrument creating the easement in this case stated only that it gave the easement owners "an easement for ingress and egress" over the particular parcel of land. Because the instrument did not specifically state that the easement was an exclusive easement, the instrument should be construed as having created a nonexclusive easement allowing appellants any use of the land which does not interfere with appellees' rights under the easement.
Reversed and remanded for proceedings consistent herewith.
DANAHY, C.J., and SCHEB, J., concur.