The court of appeals found "unpersuasive" the argument that Coquina "first became aware of the excessive charges" after the time for protest and adjustment under section 39-5-122 had passed because the information necessary to show the tax was excessive was in Coquina's files since the spring of 1982. The court of appeals relied on E.A. Stephens Co. v. Board of Equalization, 104 Colo. 556, 92 P.2d 732 (1939), in concluding that a taxpayer who provides erroneous information to the taxing authority cannot seek relief after the time for protest and adjustment has passed. Two months after the court of appeals reversed the judgment of the district court, this court decided Board of Assessment Appeals v. Benbrook, 735 P.2d 860 (Colo.

The court of appeals reversed the judgment of the district court in an unpublished opinion. Although it disagreed with the BAA that Aurora Plaza was required to exhaust its administrative remedies by protesting within the time limits described in section 39-5-122, the court of appeals concluded under E.A. Stephens Co. v. Board of Equalization, 104 Colo. 556, 92 P.2d 732 (1939), that a taxpayer who caused the double assessment may not recover a refund under section 39-10-114(1)(a). II.

The BAA affirmed the county board. In reliance on E.A. Stephens Co. v. Board of Equalization, 104 Colo. 556, 92 P.2d 732 (1939), the BAA concluded that Amoco could not obtain relief under the "clerical error" provision of section 39-10-114(1)(a) because the error was due solely to Amoco's misreporting of revenue figures. It also concluded that Amoco could not obtain relief under the "illegal or erroneous" provision of section 39-10-114(1)(a) because the taxing authority properly calculated the tax from the figures provided by Amoco. Amoco sought judicial review of the BAA decision in the Adams County District Court.

The payment of taxes may be voluntary, and hence unrecoverable, even though it is made as a result of a mistake on the part of the taxpayer. City of Phoenix v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc., 100 Ariz. 189, 412 P.2d 693 (1966); Sierra Investment Corporation v. County of Sacramento, 252 Cal.App.2d 339, 60 Cal.Rptr. 519 (1967); E. A. Stephens Co. v. Board of Equalization, 104 Colo. 556, 92 P.2d 732 (1939); Scoa Industries, Inc. v. Howlett, 33 Ill. App.3d 90, 337 N.E.2d 305 (1975); Bateson v. City of Detroit, 143 Mich. 582, 106 N.W. 1104 (1906). This is especially the case where, as here, it is within the ability of the taxpayer to ascertain the actual facts.

Under such circumstances we agree with the Attorney General that there is no common law right to refund in such a situation and the right must arise by statute. See National State Bank of Boulder v. State, 156 Colo. 34, 396 P.2d 948, and Stephens and Co. v. Board, 104 Colo. 556, 92 P.2d 732. MR. JUSTICE GROVES delivered the opinion of the Court.

See, also, Charlestown v. County Com'rs, 109 Mass. 270; 3 Cooley on Taxation (4th ed.), p. 2557, § 1280. Since Stephens v. Board, 104 Colo. 556, 92 P.2d 732, is cited and emphasized by plaintiff in error, we pause to give it particular consideration. That case had to do with the valuation of a stock of merchandise, which, perforce, was assessable pursuant to a special statute ('35 C.S.A., c. 142, § 54) (amended S.L. '43, p. 493), which does not require itemization or description of property in kind, but a valuation based on the merchant's average investment, etc. There, although the opinion does not make it wholly clear, the record shows that the merchant filed schedules for 1932 and 1933, in which he fixed the value of his stock, based whereon assessments and levies were made by the proper officers, and paid by the taxpayer. November 3, 1936, the merchant, claiming he had over valued his merchandise for the years mentioned — 1932 and 1933, demanded refund, which was refused.

See, e.g.,Coquina Oil Corp. v. Larimer Cnty. Bd. of Equalization, 770 P.2d 1196, 1199 (Colo.1989) (concluding that the term “clerical error” in § 39–10–114(1)(a)—a tax abatement provision—did not encompass error made by the taxpayer and relied upon by the taxing authority); Armstrong v. Driscoll Constr. Co., 107 Colo. 218, 222, 110 P.2d 651, 652–53 (1941) (concluding that the limitation period for filing tax refunds “undoubtedly was a legislative attempt to prevent the filing of stale claims”); E.A. Stephens & Co. v. Bd. of Equalization, 104 Colo. 556, 561, 92 P.2d 732, 734 (1939) (denying a claim for refund where permitting recovery “would endanger the entire tax structure of the state and lead to a multiplicity of suits for refund of taxes”); see also§ 39–26–703(2)(d), C.R.S.2013 (statute of limitations for sales and use tax disputes and refunds). ¶ 23 Qwest effectively claims to be exempt from the statute of limitations and taxpayer burden, arguing that Northglenn bears the burden of correcting its mistake, even though Qwest failed to notify Northglenn of the error until eight years after the first erroneous payment.

§ 39-5-122. In a case involving an in-house bookkeeping error resulting in a higher tax to the taxpayer, E. A. Stephens Co. v. Board of Equalization, 104 Colo. 556, 92 P.2d 732 (1939), the supreme court applied the statutes strictly as written to preclude granting relief to the taxpayer. It noted that: