Opinion
Case No. 3:11-cv-98
09-22-2014
MARK STENCEL, Plaintiff, v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant.
ORDER THAT: (1) THE ALJ'S NON-DISABILITY FINDING IS FOUND NOT SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE, AND REVERSED; (2) JUDGMENT IS ENTERED IN FAVOR OF PLAINTIFF AND THE MATTER IS REMANDED TO THE SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION FOR AN IMMEDIATE AWARD OF BENEFITS; AND (3) THIS CASE IS CLOSED
This is a Social Security disability benefits appeal. At issue is whether the administrative law judge ("ALJ") erred in finding the Plaintiff "not disabled" and therefore not entitled to supplemental security income ("SSI") and disability insurance benefits ("DIB"). (See Administrative Transcript ("Tr.") (Tr. 307-317) (ALJ's decision)).
I.
Plaintiff filed applications for DIB and SSI on February 27, 2007 and alleged that he became unable to work that same day because of problems breathing and mental health issues, including social anxiety issues, anger issues, and memory problems. (Tr. 67, 282-284). The Agency denied his claims initially and upon reconsideration. (Tr. 285, 289).
Plaintiff requested a hearing, and in September 2009, the ALJ held a hearing on his claims. (Tr. 511-61). In November 2009, the ALJ issued an unfavorable decision, finding that Plaintiff, despite severe mental impairments, had the residual functional capacity ("RFC") to perform a restricted range of unskilled work at all levels of exertion, allowing him to perform his past relevant work as a janitor, forklift operator, machine operator, and production assembler. (Tr. 8-21). After the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for review. Plaintiff sought judicial review pursuant to Section 205(g) of the Act. (Tr. 328). In July 2011, this Court ordered remand of the matter back to the Agency because "significant portions of the recording of the administrative hearing held on September 1, 2009 are inaudible." (Tr. 323).
RFC measures an individual's "ability to do physical and mental work activities on a sustained basis despite limitations from his impairments." 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(1).
In February 2013, an ALJ held a second hearing on Plaintiff's claims. (Tr. 562585). Plaintiff and a vocational expert testified, with Plaintiff's attorney in attendance. (Tr. 562-85). In June 2013, the ALJ issued another unfavorable decision, finding that Plaintiff, despite severe mental impairments, had the RFC to perform a restricted range of unskilled work at all levels of exertion, precluding his past relevant work, but allowing him to perform a significant number of other jobs. (Tr. 304-17). Plaintiff sought Appeals Council review of the ALJ's decision, and in April 2014, the Appeals Council declined to assume jurisdiction. (Tr. 293-95). Plaintiff now seeks judicial review of the ALJ's decision pursuant to 205(g) of the Act.
Plaintiff was 51 years old at the time of the second administrative hearing. (Tr. 282, 304, 562). Plaintiff completed the eighth grade. (Tr. 69, 72). His past relevant work includes jobs as a janitor, machine operator, and forklift operator. (Id.)
Plaintiff claims that he left school because his mom died and he was moving all the time. (Tr. 567). He went to ninth grade, but did not complete it. (Id.) Plaintiff's father was allegedly an alcoholic. (Id.)
Past relevant work experience is defined as work that the claimant has "done within the last 15 years, [that] lasted long enough for [the claimant] to learn to do it, and was substantial gainful activity." 20 C.F.R. § 416.965(a).
The ALJ's "Findings," at the second administrative hearing, which represent the rationale of her decision, were as follows:
1. The claimant meets the insured status requirements of the Social Security Act through September 30, 2013.
2. The claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since February 21, 2007, the alleged onset date (20 CFR 404.1571 et seq., and 416.971 et seq.).
3. The claimant has the following severe impairments: alcohol abuse and alcohol abuse in remission, anxiety, depression, psychosis based on allegations of auditory and visual hallucinations, and borderline personality disorder featuring intermittent explosive disorder (20 CFR 404.1520(c) and 416.920(c)).
4. The claimant does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 CFR 404.1520(d), 404.1526, 416.920(d), 416.925 and 416.926).
5. After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned finds that the claimant has no exertional limitations, and he has the residual functional capacity to perform a full range of work at all exertional levels, except that he has the following nonexertional restrictions and limitations: limited to unskilled work as defined in the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT); limited to low stress work, i.e. no fast-paced work and no assembly-line production quotas; no contact with the general public, and only occasional
contact with coworkers and supervisors; no requirement for reading above the sixth-grade level.(Tr. 309-317).
6. The claimant is unable to perform any past relevant work (20 CFR 404.1565 and 416.965).
7. The claimant was born on July 24, 1961 and was 45 years old, which is defined as a younger individual age 18-49, on the alleged disability onset date (20 CFR 404.1563 and 416.963).
8. The claimant has a limited education and is able to communicate in English (20 CFR 404.1564 and 416.964).
9. Transferability of job skills is not material to the determination of disability because using the Medical-Vocational Rules as a framework supports a finding that the claimant is "not disabled," whether or not the claimant has transferable job skills (See SSR 82-41 and 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 2).
10. Considering the claimant's age, education, work experience, and residual functional capacity, there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that the claimant can perform (20 CFR 404.1569(a), 416.969, and 416.969(a)).
11. The claimant has not been under a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act, from February 21, 2007, through the date of this decision (20 CFR 404.1520(g) and 416.920(g)).
In sum, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was not under a disability as defined by the Social Security Regulations, and, therefore, not entitled to DIB or SSI. (Tr. 309-317).
On appeal, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred: (1) in failing to following the regulatory requirements in weighing the medical source opinions; (2) failed to carry her burden at Step Five of the sequential evaluation by failing to properly consider Plaintiff's psychological impairments in determining his RFC; and (3) failed to properly evaluate Plaintiff's credibility.
II.
The Court's inquiry on appeal is to determine whether the ALJ's non-disability finding is supported by substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Substantial evidence is "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). In performing this review, the Court considers the record as a whole. Hephner v. Mathews, 574 F.2d 359, 362 (6th Cir. 1978). If substantial evidence supports the ALJ's denial of benefits, that finding must be affirmed, even if substantial evidence also exists in the record upon which the ALJ could have found plaintiff disabled. As the Sixth Circuit has explained:
"The Commissioner's findings are not subject to reversal merely because substantial evidence exists in the record to support a different conclusion. The substantial evidence standard presupposes that there is a "zone of choice" within which the Commissioner may proceed without interference from the courts. If the Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence, a reviewing court must affirm."Felisky v. Bowen, 35 F.3d 1027, 1035 (6th Cir. 1994).
The claimant bears the ultimate burden to prove by sufficient evidence that he is entitled to disability benefits. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1512(a). That is, he must present sufficient evidence to show that, during the relevant time period, he suffered an impairment, or combination of impairments, expected to last at least twelve months, that left him unable to perform any job in the national economy. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A).
A.
The record reflects that:
1. Hearing Testimony
Plaintiff lives alone in a one-bedroom apartment. (Tr. 566, 574). He lives in subsidized housing, but since he does not have any income, the housing organization pays his rent. (Tr. 569). Prior to June 2009, Plaintiff was homeless and was staying at the St. Vincent de Paul homeless shelter. (Tr. 208). Plaintiff testified to receiving mental health treatment at South Community, where he sees a doctor every twelve weeks and a case manager "every couple months." (Tr. 568-569). He also receives assistance at South Community with filling out paperwork, and his case manager helped him fill out applications in the current matter because "I can't spell good." (Tr. 569, 577).
Plaintiff claimed he was able to stop drinking alcohol after attending 150 AA meetings. (Tr. 571). He has been looking for work but has not been able to find anything. (Tr. 572). He testified that he can read and write "to a certain point" but that his spelling and grammar are poor. (Tr. 572). He received help filling out applications "trying to find me a dishwashing job" but never received a response. (Tr. 573). He gets paranoid when he gets around people, "because every time I get around somebody, something always bad happens," and his mind goes crazy. (Tr. 572, 574). When asked by the ALJ about recent incidents of something bad happening, Plaintiff replied that "I don't associate with people. I keep to myself." (Tr. 573). He also testified that he "can't work with people, because I'm gonna wind up killing somebody in a workplace. I mean, that's the honest truth, because I've got a real short fuse." (Tr. 573-574). His stress level is "high," and his concentration is "poor." (Tr. 580). He gets frustrated and aggravated a lot and experiences mood swings where he does not want to be around people.
Plaintiff testified that he does not have any hobbies anymore and that he basically just watches television and occasionally goes for a walk, but when he walks down the street, "I think people are looking at me from their houses. I get real paranoid. I get real, real paranoid, when I walk down the street." (Tr. 576).
Vocational expert Charlotta Ewers testified that an individual in an unskilled, entry-level job would not be able to repetitiously miss more than one day per month and still maintain competitive employment. (Tr. 582). She also testified that if a hypothetical individual, due to an interference of psychological distress, could not be able to maintain concentration and would be off-task more than a third of the workday repetitiously, that individual would not be able to maintain full-time work at any exertional level. (Tr. 583).
2. Relevant Medical Evidence
Plaintiff was evaluated by Jerry Flexman, Ph.D., in April 2007. (Tr. 147-150). Dr. Flexman noted that Plaintiff had no money, no job, and was currently living off the street in his car. (Tr. 147). Plaintiff reported that he "doesn't want to live this way." (Id.) Dr. Flexman further noted that Plaintiff reported problems with other people his whole life and "has never been able to keep a job." (Tr. 147). Plaintiff feels uncomfortable around others and has been a loner most of his life. (Id.) He has never had many friends and has never gotten along well with his brother. (Id.) Dr. Flexman noted that his "emotional state is depressed and he doesn't care." (Id.) His temper is irritable and explosive, and he has a low frustration tolerance. (Id.) Dr. Flexman diagnosed Plaintiff with Intermittent Explosive Disorder, Depression, NOS, psychosocial stressors, and a GAF score of 53. (Tr. 149). Dr. Flexman concluded that Plaintiff has moderate restrictions in several functional categories and marked restrictions in interacting appropriately with the public and interacting with coworkers. (Tr. 150).
A GAF (Global Assessment of Functioning) score is a numeric scale (1 through 100) used by mental health clinicians and physicians to rate subjectively the social, occupational, and psychological functioning of adults. A score of 51-60 indicates moderate symptoms or moderate difficulty in social, occupational, or school functioning.
Plaintiff was also evaluated by Damian Danopulos, M.D., in April 2007, who opined that Plaintiff's "ability to do any work-related activities is affected in a negative way from his anti-social and wrong behavior which does not allow him to cooperate with co-workers in any job." (Tr. 142).
Plaintiff was hospitalized for four nights in California in May 2008 for depression with suicidal ideation, where he was kept for a few days and given Zoloft medication. (Tr. 169-178). He reported that he had been drinking heavily in the past but had refrained since February 2008. (Id.) He was homeless and alcohol testing was negative. (Id.) Upon discharge, he was referred to a community mental health source with a diagnosis of depression and alcohol dependency in early remission. (Id.)
On May 28, 2008, a medical doctor at Community Research Foundation indicated that Plaintiff has "a psychiatric disability that renders her/him disabled" and that he "qualifies to receive services and the special consideration for disabled persons." (Tr. 205). A letter dated June 5, 2008 - titled "Psychosocial Rehabilitation Counselor" - noted that Plaintiff is "totally and permanently disabled with a mental/physical handicap." (Tr. 204). Plaintiff followed up for a mental health evaluation through San Diego County Services, where he was diagnosed with schizoaffective disorder due to hearing command voices and visual hallucinations with regard to suicidal and homicidal ideation. (Tr. 179203). Plaintiff was prescribed Invega, advised to attend AA meetings, and given a place to live through a community treatment center. (Id.)
Invega is a drug that is used for the treatment of schizophrenia.
A June 6, 2008 psychiatric assessment from Dr. Papp indicates that "Pt believes people look at him, talk about him, play mind games on him such as read his mind, hears voices (derogatory, commanding, including suicidal and homicidal.)." (Tr. 263). Dr. Papp diagnosed Plaintiff with schizoaffective disorder and depression and assigned a GAF score of 40.
A GAF score of 40 indicates some impairment in reality testing or communication or major impairment in several areas, such as work or school, family relations, judgment, thinking, or mood.
Plaintiff was back in Ohio in December 2008, where he sought mental health treatment at Eastway Behavioral Healthcare. (Tr. 179-203). He went to the emergency room in January 2009 for complaints of depression and ethanol intoxication. (Tr. 266- 269). He was again referred to outpatient mental health treatment where he was seen by psychiatrist Dr. Toca, who prescribed medication. (Tr. 179-203).
Plaintiff was also receiving treatment at Samaritan Behavioral Healthcare from October 2008 to February 2009, where he was diagnosed with alcohol dependence and Psychotic Disorder NOS and assigned a GAF score of 50, indicating serious symptoms or serious difficulty in social, occupational, or school functioning. (Tr. 270-274). He was treated by psychiatrist Dr. Bienenfeld, who prescribed medication and indicated that Plaintiff has extremely limited mental limitations in several categories and markedly limited restrictions in several other categories. (Tr. 208). Notably, Dr. Bienenfeld diagnosed Plaintiff with Psychotic Disorder and opined that Plaintiff was unemployable for a period of 18 months or more. (Tr. 300).
B.
Plaintiff maintains that the ALJ erred in weighing the medical source opinions.
"The ALJ 'must' give a treating source opinion controlling weight if the treating source opinion is 'well supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques' and is 'not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in [the] case record.'" Blakley, 581 F.3d at 406. "If the ALJ does not accord controlling weight to a treating physician, the ALJ must still determine how much weight is appropriate by considering a number of factors, including the length of the treatment relationship, supportability of the opinion, consistency of the opinion with the record as a whole, and any specialization of the treating physician." Id. Further, the ALJ gets to decide how to weigh evidence. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(1).
The Commissioner's regulations establish a hierarchy of acceptable medical source opinions. The hierarchy begins at the top with treating physicians or psychologists. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2), 416.927(d)(2). Next in the hierarchy are examining physicians and psychologists, who often see and examine claimants only once. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d), 416.927(d). In general, more weight is given to examining medical source opinions than is given to the opinions of non-examining medical sources. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(1), 416.927(d)(1). Still, non-examining physicians' opinions are on the lowest rung of the hierarchy of medical source opinions.
The regulations provide progressively more rigorous tests for weighing opinions as the ties between the source of the opinion and the individual become weaker. For example, the opinions of physicians or psychologists who do not have a treatment relationship with the individual are weighed by stricter standards, based to a greater degree on medical evidence, qualifications, and explanation for the opinions, than are required to treating sources.SSR 96-6p. Contradictory opinions from non-examining, reviewing physicians do not constitute substantial evidence. "The opinion of a non-examining physician is entitled to little weight if it is contrary to the opinion of the claimant's treating physician." Shelman v. Heckler, 821 F.2d 316, 321 (6th Cir. 1987).
Specifically, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to consider the opinion of his treating psychologist, Dr. David Bienenfeld. However, the Defendant maintains that the ALJ did not consider Dr. Bienenfeld's opinion because it had not been produced to the Agency and made a part of the record until August 2013 - after the ALJ issued her June 2013 decision. Plaintiff maintains that Dr. Bienenfeld's assessment was submitted to the Social Security Administration prior to the ALJ's decision. (Tr. 296). The record appears to support a finding that the ALJ had Dr. Bienenfeld's opinion before she issued her opinion, but it is not entirely clear. In an abundance of caution, the Court will analyze the six sentence standard.
When an ALJ renders the final decision, additional evidence submitted to the Appeals Council should be considered only for the purposes of a sentence six remand. Cotton v. Sullivan, 2 F.3d 692, 696 (6th Cir. 1993). "Sentence-six remands may be ordered in only two situations: where the Secretary requests a remand before answering the complaint, or where new, material evidence is adduced that was for good cause not presented before the agency." Shalala v. Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292, 297 n.2 (1993). The requirements that the evidence be "new" and "material," and that "good cause" be shown for the failure to present the evidence to the ALJ have been defined by the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit as follows:
For the purposes of a 42 U.S.C. Section 405(g) remand, evidence is new only if it was 'not in existence or available to the claimant at the time of the administrative proceeding.' ...Such evidence is 'material' only if there is 'a reasonable probability that the Secretary would have reached a different disposition of the disability claim if presented with the new evidence.' ...A claimant shows 'good cause' by demonstrating a reasonable justification for the failure to acquire and present the evidence for inclusion in the hearing before the ALJ... [T]he burden of showing that a remand is appropriate is on the claimant.Ferguson v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 628 F.3d 269, 276 (6th Cir. 2010). In declining to assume jurisdiction, the Appeals Council explained that "The totality of the evidence does not support Dr. Bienenfeld's opinion and [the ALJ's] findings are supported by the record. (Tr. 294).
However, this Court finds that Dr. Bienenfeld's assessment is material because it is the only opinion from a treating physician. Part of the ALJ's analysis was that there was "no opinion from a true treating source that the claimant is disabled." (Tr. 315). However, the record indicates that Dr. Bienenfeld saw Plaintiff over the course of at least several months, prescribed medication, diagnosed Plaintiff with a psychotic disorder, and opined that he was unemployable for a period of 18 months or more. (Tr. 270-71, 300). Moreover, a review of the evidence shows that Dr. Bienenfeld's opinion is consistent with the other opinions and with the record evidence. Tina Poteet, MS, LPC, Dr. Bienenfeld's colleague at Samaritan Behavioral Health, also diagnosed Plaintiff with psychotic disorder and assigned him a GAF score of 50. (Tr. 272-273). Dr. Flexman diagnosed Plaintiff with Intermittent Explosive Disorder, depression, psychosocial stressors, and assigned a GAF score of 53. (Tr. 149). Dr. Flexman concluded that Plaintiff had moderate restrictions in several functional categories and marked restrictions in interacting appropriately with the public and coworkers. (Tr. 150). Additionally, Dr. Danopulos opined that Plaintiff's "ability to do any work-related activities is affected in a negative way from his anti-social and wrong behavior which does not allow him to cooperate with co-workers in any job." (Tr. 142). Furthermore, on May 28, 2008, a doctor at Community Research Foundation indicated that Plaintiff has "a psychiatric disability that renders her/him disabled" and that he "qualifies to receive services and the special consideration for disabled persons." (Tr. 205). A letter dated June 5, 2008 - titled "Psychosocial Rehabilitation Counselor" - noted that Plaintiff is "totally and permanently disabled with a mental/physical handicap." (Tr. 204).
Although a counselor is not an "acceptable" medical source, the ALJ must consider these records nonetheless. See C.R.F. § 404.1502, 404.1513(a).
In sum, Dr. Bienenfeld's opinion is consistent with the other opinions and the record as a whole. In fact, four medical doctors opined that Plaintiff is disabled, unemployable, unable to cooperate with coworkers in any job, and/or markedly impaired in multiple mental functional areas. The ALJ failed to properly consider these opinions and the evidence as a whole. Therefore, the ALJ's decision is not supported by substantial evidence.
C.
Next, Plaintiff claims that the ALJ failed to carry her burden at Step Five of the sequential evaluation because the hypothetical question she posed to the vocational expert ("VE") did not accurately portray his mental impairments and restrictions.
Since the ALJ improperly weighed the medical opinions in formulating Plaintiff's RFC, the hypothetical question posed to the VE did not accurately portray his mental impairments and restrictions. Contrary to virtually every medical opinion of record, the ALJ decided that Plaintiff was only moderately impaired in social functioning, thus determining that he can perform work with "occasional" contact with coworkers and supervisors. (Tr. 312-313). Dr. Flexman concluded that Plaintiff has marked restrictions in interacting appropriately with the public and coworkers. (Tr. 150). Treating psychiatrist Dr. Bienenfeld also opined that Plaintiff is extremely limited in these areas. (Tr. 299). Tina Poteet, MS, LPC, Dr. Bienenfeld's colleague at Samaritan Behavioral Health, also diagnosed Plaintiff with Psychotic Disorder and assigned a GAF score of 50, indicating serious symptoms. (Tr. 272-273). While in California, Plaintiff was diagnosed with schizoaffective disorder due to hearing command voices and visual hallucinations with regard to suicidal and homicidal ideation. (Tr. 179-203).
Accordingly, the ALJ went against the great weight of the evidence by only incorporating "moderate" limitations in social functioning in her hypotheticals to the VE. The ALJ's questions did not accurately portray Plaintiff's mental impairments and therefore the Commissioner failed to carry her burden at Step Five.
ALJ's are not medical experts and cannot make their own independent medical findings. Simpson v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 344 F. App'x 181, 194 (6th Cir. 2009).
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D.
Finally, Plaintiff alleges that the ALJ failed to appropriately evaluate his credibility.
The ALJ's credibility determinations are entitled to great deference because the ALJ had the "unique opportunity to observe" the witness's demeanor while testifying." Buxton v. Halter, 246 F.3d 762, 773 (6th Cir. 2001). See also Sullenger v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 255 F. App'x 988, 995 (6th Cir. 2007) (declining to disturb the ALJ's credibility determination, stating that: "[w]e will not try the case anew, resolve conflicts in the evidence, or decide questions of credibility."). Nevertheless, an ALJ's assessment of a claimant's credibility must be supported by substantial evidence. Calvin v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 437 F. App'x 370, 371 (6th Cir. 2011).
In evaluating Plaintiff's credibility, the ALJ pointed out Plaintiff's lack of treatment, including missed appointments and no evidence of treatment until he was ordered into treatment for substance abuse after receiving a DUI in February 2008. (Tr. 314). The ALJ determined that Plaintiff "has not committed himself to achieving long-term improvement or mental health treatment." (Tr. 314). However, the record clearly and unambiguously indicates that Plaintiff sought mental health treatment on numerous occasions. (See Section II.A). It is important to note that, throughout some of the alleged disability period, Plaintiff was homeless. Although Plaintiff was placed in housing in June 2009, he does not pay monthly rent because he is indigent. (Tr. 569). The fact that Plaintiff did not have a long-time treating physician and that he is only able to receive treatment every couple of months is consistent with his financial situation. Regardless, failure to seek examination or treatment says little about a plaintiff's truthfulness. Blankenship v. Bowen, 874 F.2d 1116, 1124 (6th Cir. 1989) (failure to seek medical care "should not be a determinative factor in a credibility assessment" where claimant is operating under a mental impairment).
The ALJ also noted that Plaintiff made conflicting statements about his inability to work around others and his fear of working alone. Although Plaintiff alleged that he had difficulty getting along with others, "[t]here was no evidence of rudeness or aggression toward others"; he "never reported a history of violence, and there is no evidence of such [in the] record"; and he reported to a counselor that "I'm not violent - that's not who I am." (Tr. 312, citing Tr. 182). See Hayes v. Astrue, No. 1:10cv178, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26855, at *12 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 15, 2011) ("ALJ is not required to accept the testimony of a claimant that conflicts with the evidence in the record, and is not supported by any opinion or clinical assessment of a treating physician").
However, these statements are neither conflicting nor mutually exclusive. The record supports Plaintiff's statements that he is unfit to work with others or alone. Drs. Bienenfeld, Flexman, and Ms. Poteet all determined that Plaintiff is at least markedly or seriously impaired in social functioning or in his ability to interact appropriately with coworkers and the general public. Further, the record as a whole illustrates Plaintiff's severe paranoia (even when walking alone) and includes diagnoses of psychosis as well as schizoaffective disorder due to hearing command voices and visual hallucinations with regard to suicidal and homicidal ideation, which likely affects his ability to sustain gainful employment, even in a position where he is working alone. (Tr. 179-203). Moreover, Plaintiff's attempts to work, which have all been unsuccessful, further bolsters his credibility.
Accordingly, the ALJ's credibility findings are not supported by the record evidence.
III.
When, as here, the non-disability determination is not supported by substantial evidence, the Court must decide whether to reverse and remand the matter for rehearing or to reverse and order benefits granted. The Court has authority to affirm, modify or reverse the Commissioner's decision "with or without remanding the cause for rehearing." 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Melkonyan v. Sullivan, 501 U.S. 89, 100 (1991).
Generally, benefits may be awarded immediately "only if all essential factual issues have been resolved and the record adequately establishes a plaintiff's entitlement to benefits." Faucher v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 17 F.3d 171, 176 (6th Cir. 1994); see also Abbott v. Sullivan, 905 F.2d 918, 927 (6th Cir. 1990); Varley v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 820 F.2d 777, 782 (6th Cir. 1987).
The Court may award benefits where the proof of disability is strong and opposing evidence is lacking in substance, so that remand would merely involve the presentation of cumulative evidence, or where the proof of disability is overwhelming. Faucher, 17 F.3d at 176; see also Felisky, 35 F.3d at 1041; Mowery v. Heckler, 772 F.2d 966, 973 (6th Cir. 1985). Such is the case here.
Here proof of disability is overwhelming and remand will serve no purpose other than delay. As fully recited here, in view of the extensive medical record of evidence of disability, hospitalization and periods of decompensation, and the credible and controlling findings and opinions of Drs. Bienenfeld, Flexman, and Danopulos, proof of disability is overwhelming.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED THAT:
The decision of the Commissioner, that Mark Stencel was not entitled to disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income beginning February 27, 2007, is NOT SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE, and is REVERSED; this matter is REMANDED to the Commissioner of Social Security for an immediate award of benefits; and this case is CLOSED in this Court. Date: 9/22/14
s/ Timothy S. Black
Timothy S. Black
United States District Judge