Summary
In Stemple v. Carson, 366 Pa. 392 (1951), 77 A.2d 438, we said: "We are satisfied that the learned court below correctly ruled that the Common Pleas Court was without jurisdiction to grant the relief prayed for in the bill and that the Orphans' Court alone has exclusive jurisdiction.
Summary of this case from Trout v. LukeyOpinion
September 28, 1950.
January 2, 1951.
Courts — Jurisdiction — Common pleas — Orphans' court — Rescission of sale of stock to decedent.
The common pleas court is without jurisdiction in a suit against the executors of a decedent to rescind the sale of shares of stock to the decedent because of alleged material misrepresentations by him.
Before DREW, C. J., STERN, STEARNE, JONES, LADNER and CHIDSEY, JJ.
Appeal, No. 117, March T., 1950, from decree of Court of Common Pleas of Washington County, in Equity, No. 4836, in case of Jean Calvert Stemple et al., Executrices of Estate of William H. Calvert, Deceased v. Roy I. Carson et al., Executors, Estate of Samuel A. Swearingen, Deceased et al. Decree affirmed.
The facts are stated in the opinion, by GIBSON, P. J., of the court below, GIBSON, P. J., CUMMINS, J., and ANDERSON, P. J., Orphans' Court, specially sitting, as follows:
Plaintiffs filed their bill in equity alleging that they, as executrices of the estate of William H. Calvert, who died June 3, 1944, had, on July 28, 1945, sold to Samuel A. Swearingen 248 shares of stock of Coca Cola Bottling Company of Pennsylvania, which was the property of the Calvert estate, for the sum of $45,000.00; that, by reason of misrepresentations made by the purchaser at and prior to the time of sale, the price paid for the stock was inadequate; that Samuel A. Swearingen, the purchaser, died on June 24, 1948; that two of the defendants are his executors; that Alex A. Tomayko, one of the defendants, had filed a claim with the executors of Samuel A. Swearingen for the certificates of stock; that the plaintiffs had demanded of the executors of Samuel A. Swearingen that the said stock be returned to them, and that they, in turn, were ready and willing to return the sum of $45,000.00 purchase money, which demand was refused; and praying for a decree restraining the transfer of the stock in question, that the sale made by the plaintiffs be rescinded, that the executors of Samuel A. Swearingen be directed to endorse the stock certificates over to plaintiffs in exchange for the purchase price of $45,000.00, and an accounting for dividends or profits realized from the ownership of the stock to the present time.
Alex A. Tomayko filed an answer to the plaintiffs' bill and the executors of Samuel A. Swearingen filed preliminary objections averring laches on the part of the plaintiffs and, further, that no proper cause of action was stated, and that there were no averments of fraud or damages.
One of the present judges of the Court of Common Pleas being a defendant executor of Samuel A. Swearingen, disqualified himself, and D. M. Anderson, President Judge of the Orphans' Court, at the request of this court sat with the other two judges of the Court of Common Pleas in hearing the argument.
After argument of the preliminary objections, the court, of its own volition, raised the question of the jurisdiction of the Court of Common Pleas to hear and determine the matters set forth in the bill of complaint, whereupon the judge of the Orphans' Court, specially presiding, stated that he did not wish to take part in the determination of the case where it involved a conflict of jurisdiction between the Court of Common Pleas and the court where he regularly presided.
The first question appears to be whether or not this court has any jurisdiction, regardless of the fact that this question has not been raised by any of the parties, and this question is determined by the majority of the bench who heard the argument. The president judge of the Orphans' Court, specially presiding in the Common Pleas, declines to enter into questions regarding conflicting jurisdiction with his court.
It clearly appears by the allegations in the bill that prior to the time of his death, Samuel A. Swearingen had in his possession the stock certificates in question.
The Act of May 5, 1911, P. L. 126, provides for the transfer of stock certificates and the effect thereof. The delivery of a stock certificate properly endorsed by the person appearing by the certificate to be the owner or by his authorized representatives passes title to the stock except in certain instances specified by the act. Therefore, under the allegations of the bill, Samuel A. Swearingen was the owner during his lifetime of these shares of stock in question. It appears from the bill that these certificates of stock passed into the possession and under the control of his executors, who are defendants in this bill and perhaps under the control of Alex A. Tomayko, who is alleged to be a claimant.
These being the circumstances, what court has jurisdiction to determine the rights of the parties?
The jurisdiction of the Orphans' Court is set forth in the Act of June 7, 1917, P. L. 363, section 9. Under sub-paragraph (e) of this section, this jurisdiction extends to the distribution of the assets and the surplusage of estates of decedents among creditors and others interested. Under sub-section (1), the jurisdiction extends to all cases within their respective counties, wherein executors, administrators, guardians, or trustees may be possessed of, or are in any way accountable for, any real or personal estate of the decedent. Under sub-section (n), the jurisdiction extends to the exercise of all powers needful to the doing of anything which is or may be hereafter required or permitted to be done in said court, whether incidental to the powers enumerated or in addition thereto.
In Mauser v. Mauser, 326 Pa. 257, it was held that the Orphans' Court had exclusive jurisdiction to decree a discovery and compel the transfer of property belonging to the estate of a decedent which had been wrongfully converted after the death of the decedent, and that the jurisdiction of the Orphans' Court was complete and exclusive, this court having the full powers of equity within its jurisdiction.
In Slagle's Estate, 335 Pa. 552, it was held that the Orphans' Court has both jurisdiction and control over property belonging to a decedent's estate and in his possession at the time of his death, and that this jurisdiction was exclusive.
In Keyser's Estate, 329 Pa. 514, it was held that where the title to personal property was in dispute, the Orphans' Court has jurisdiction to determine who was in possession of the disputed property at the time of decedent's death and thereafter, and if the property was in the decedent's possession at the time of his death, or thereafter in any way going into the possession of his personal representatives as a part of his estate, the Orphans' Court may decree or award the disposition thereof.
In Turner's Estate, 244 Pa. 568, the Supreme Court approved a statement previously made by it that the Orphans' Court has jurisdiction finally to decide the question of ownership of property already actually in a decedent's estate, and, incidentally, where the facts called for it, to decree a final surrender of such assets to outside claimants.
In Williams' Estate, 236 Pa. 259, it was held that the Orphans' Court has jurisdiction finally to decide the ownership of stock certificates owned, or claimed to be owned, by a decedent's estate and transferred after the death of the decedent, and to require them to be returned to the estate until final disposition thereof be made by the Orphans' Court.
In Criswell's Estate, 334 Pa. 266, the court held that the jurisdiction of the Orphans' Court over the settlement and distribution of decedent's estates is exclusive and necessarily includes the power to determine all questions essential thereto, and that, where the property was in decedent's possession at the time of his death, or thereafter in the possession of his personal representatives as part of the estate for further administration and distribution, the jurisdiction of the Orphans' Court over the property attaches, and furthermore, that the question of jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the controversy may be raised at any stage of the proceeding. In this case a claimant undertook, through a replevin proceeding, to recover possession of certain stock certificates which had belonged to and were in possession of James H. Criswell, who was then deceased. The Orphans' Court issued an injunction restraining the claimant from prosecuting this action in replevin, but permitted her to present a petition for the allowance of her claim. The question of jurisdiction was raised, and it was determined that jurisdiction was solely in the Orphans' Court, resulting in holding that the Court of Common Pleas was without jurisdiction to entertain the action of replevin.
In Landis v. Landis, 343 Pa. 252, it was held in an equity proceeding to determine the ownership of a note, the title to which was prima facie in an estate, the exclusive jurisdiction was in the Orphans' Court and, until the Orphans' Court submitted an issue to it for trial, the Court of Common Pleas was without jurisdiction, and the bill was dismissed. It was said in this case by the Supreme Court, "Appellant cannot short-circuit the case into the common pleas by merely pleading facts which, if properly proven, may establish her title."
We are satisfied that the jurisdiction in this case is in the Orphans' Court and that the Court of Common Pleas has no jurisdiction to determine the ownership of the Coca Cola stock in question or direct its transfer by the executors, or in any manner meddle with the administration of the estate now in the Orphans' Court by taking from the executors of Samuel A. Swearingen any part of the assets of this estate which were found in the hands of the decedent, or came into the hands of his executors. The question of ownership of this stock may eventually come before the Court of Common Pleas when the Orphans' Court submits to it an issue to be tried, but until that has been done we have no right or authority to interfere in the settlement of this estate.
And now, Feby. 6th, 1950, for the sole reason that this court has no jurisdiction to hear and determine the matters set forth in the bill of complaint, the said bill is hereby dismissed at the cost of the plaintiffs.
Plaintiffs appealed.
Francis H. Patrono, with him D. M. Anderson, Jr., for appellants.
Charles C. Arensberg, with him Alexander W. Acheson, Howard F. Carson, Clarence O. Devore and Patterson, Crawford, Arensberg Dunn, for appellee.
We are satisfied that the learned court below correctly ruled that the Common Pleas Court was without jurisdiction to grant the relief prayed for in the bill and that the Orphans' Court alone has exclusive jurisdiction. To what Judge GIBSON has so well said we merely add that the title to the stock in question had passed to a decedent and was in his possession at his death. His executor, who now holds possession, is under the control and supervision of the Orphans' Court. The title is being attacked as voidable because of material misrepresentations. The action to rescind is therefore exclusively in the jurisdiction of the Orphans' Court and not in any court of general equity jurisdiction.
Decree affirmed at the appellants' costs.