(Citation omitted.) Stelco Industries, Inc. v. Cohen, 182 Conn. 561, 563, 438 A.2d 759 (1980)." Carrara Marble Co. of America, Inc. v. Ferazzoli Imports of New England, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of Middlesex, Docket No. CV-11-6006230-S, (January 10, 2014, Marcus, J.).

(Emphasis added.) Hartford Electric Light Co. v. Tucker, 183 Conn. 85, 91, 438 A.2d 828, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 837, 102 S.Ct. 143, 70 L.Ed.2d 118 (1981); accord Barco Auto Leasing Corp. v. House, 202 Conn. 106, 121, 520 A.2d 162 (1987); see also Appliances, Inc. v. Yost, 186 Conn. 673, 680-81, 443 A.2d 486 (1982); Stelco Industries, Inc. v. Cohen, 182 Conn. 561, 567-68, 438 A.2d 759 (1980). We also have noted that "courts have a general knowledge of what would be reasonable compensation for services which are fairly stated and described"; (emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted) Shapero v. Mercede, 262 Conn. 1, 9, 808 A.2d 666 (2002); and that "[c]ourts may rely on their general knowledge of what has occurred at the proceedings before them to supply evidence in support of an award of attorney's fees."

The UCC authorizes a buyer of goods who "rightfully rejects or justifiably revokes acceptance," because of the seller's breach, to recover "so much of the price as has been paid. "(Emphasis added.) General Statutes 42a-2-711 (1); General Statutes 42a-2-608; Plateq Corporation v. Machlett Laboratories, Inc., 189 Conn. 433, 440-41, 456 A.2d 786 (1983); Superior Wire Paper Products, Ltd. v. Talcott Tool Machine, Inc., 184 Conn. 10, 13-14, 441 A.2d 43 (1981); Stelco Industries, Inc. v. Cohen, 182 Conn. 561, 565, 438 A.2d 759 (1980). That section does not expressly permit the defaulting seller to claim an offset for the buyer's use of the defective goods.

Cases interpreting contract clauses which require the payment of "reasonable attorney's fees," where we have required an evidentiary showing of reasonableness, are therefore equally inapposite. Stelco Industries, Inc. v. Cohen, 182 Conn. 5.61, 567-68, 438 A.2d 759 (1980); Lebowitz v. McPike, 151 Conn. 566, 568, 201 A.2d 469 (1964). We are persuaded that a contract clause calling for the reimbursement of fees "incurred" by the plaintiff permits the recovery of such fees upon the presentation of an appropriate bill, whether such fees are payable to an attorney or to a physician.

General Statutes 42a-2-607 (4)." Stelco Industries, Inc. v. Cohen, 182 Conn. 561, 563-64, 438 A.2d 959 (1980). Acceptance does not, however, constitute a definitive election to waive all claims and defenses with respect to the accepted goods. If the buyer can demonstrate that he has been damaged by the nonconformity of the goods that he has accepted, he is entitled to recover such damages as he can prove.

" The standard by which notice is measured for the purposes of § 42a-2-607(3)(a) is not as rigorous a standard as that which governs notice of rejection . . ." Stelco Industries, Inc. v. Cohen, 182 Conn. 561, 565, 438 A.2d 759, (1980). With respect to the content of the notice, Official Comment 4 to § 42a-2-607 states, " The content of the notification need merely be sufficient to let the seller know that the transaction is still troublesome and must be watched.

In cases involving the former, the prevailing party bears the burden of establishing the reasonableness of its attorneys fees by showing that the fees in question were actually incurred, at reasonable rates, for work reasonably performed in the prosecution of its breach-of-contract claim. Stelco Industries, Inc. v. Cohen, 182 Conn. 561, 567-68, 438 A.2d 759 (1980). Though such a showing does not require the introduction of expert testimony; Appliances, Inc. v. Yost, 186 Conn. 673, 680-81, 443 A.2d 486 (1982) (quoting Piantedosi v. Floridia, 186 Conn. 275, 279, 440 A.2d 977 (1982), for the proposition that "Not only is expert testimony not required, but such evidence, if offered, is not binding on the court"); and may rely, at least in part, upon the trial court's own familiarity with local practice and the case before it; id.; it does assign the burden to the plaintiff to make a threshold evidentiary showing as to reasonableness of its claimed fees. Stelco Industries, Inc. v. Cohen, supra, 182 Conn. at 567-68.

Because plaintiff's claim is one for damages, plaintiff may recover losses resulting from "any nonconformity," see Conn. Gen. Stat. § 42a-2-714(1), and is not required to meet "the higher standard of showing that the nonconformity of the goods `substantially impairs their value to [it],' which is the statutory standard governing revocation of acceptance."See Stelco Indus., Inc. v. Cohen, 182 Conn. 561, 564, 438 A.2d 759, 761 (Conn. 1980) (citing Conn. Gen. Stat. § 42a-2-608). The cases cited by defendant in its opposition are likewise distinguishable from this case because they involve claims for revocation of acceptance, where a plaintiff returned nonconforming goods and sought to recover the contract price, rather than claims for damages resulting from a nonconformity.

Alternatively, a buyer may keep defective goods and sue for damages resulting from the non-conformity. § 42a-2-714; Stelco Industries, Inc. v. Cohen, 182 Conn. 561, 564, 438 A.2d 759 (1980). See § 42a-2-607(3)(a) (buyer must timely notify seller of breach); § 42a-2-608, comment 1 (buyer may both revoke acceptance and sue for breach).

Furthermore, the buyer bears the burden of proof in establishing that the goods delivered to the buyer failed to conform to the contract. See Stelco Industries, Inc. v. Sherman Cohen, 182 Conn. 561, 563-4 (Conn. 1980) (stating that the burden of proving non-conformance rests on the buyer). O.R.S. § 1302.64. (UCC 2-606)