Opinion
October 10, 2000.
Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Richard Lowe, III, J.), entered on or about March 22, 2000, which granted defendant's motion to discharge his insurer-assigned trial counsel, authorized defendant's retention of counsel of his choice, and directed defendant's insurer to pay the reasonable costs of retaining such counsel, unanimously reversed, on the law, without costs, and the motion denied.
Brian J. Isaac, for defendant-respondent.
Michael A. Miranda, for non-party appellants.
Before: Lerner, J.P., Andrias, Saxe, Buckley, Friedman, JJ.
Contrary to the conclusion reached by Supreme Court, we perceive no conflict of interest necessitating a substitution of counsel. As a general rule, "[i]ndependent counsel is only necessary in cases where the defense attorney's duty to the insured would require that he defeat liability on any ground and his duty to the insurer would require that he defeat liability only upon grounds which would render the insurer liable" (Pub. Serv. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Goldfarb, 53 N.Y.2d 392, 401, fn). In this action, both defendant and his insurer share a single, common interest in defeating the claim made against defendant. Hence, there is no conflict of interest. To the extent that defendant and his trial counsel may have certain disagreements regarding trial or settlement strategy, this, without more, is insufficient to warrant the relief requested (see, Pub. Serv. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Goldfarb, supra; 69th St. and Second Ave. Garage Assocs., L.P. v. Ticor Title Guar. Co., 207 A.D.2d 225, lv denied 87 N.Y.2d 802).
THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST DEPARTMENT.