Steinichen v. Stancil

6 Citing cases

  1. Nelson v. Georgia Sheriffs

    286 Ga. 192 (Ga. 2009)   Cited 8 times

    The statutory requirement that a special master make a report to the trial court of the special master's findings is important to both the trial court's entry of judgment and the appellate court's review since a trial court can adopt the special master's findings and enter judgment thereon ( Heath v. Stinson, supra, 238 Ga. at 366), and a special master's findings adopted by the trial court are upheld by the appellate court unless clearly erroneous. Steinichen v. Stancil, 284 Ga. 580, 581 ( 669 SE2d 109) (2008). But see Thompson v. Central of Ga. RR., 282 Ga. 264, 266 ( 646 SE2d 669) (2007) (where, in a case in which no request for a jury trial was timely filed, this Court addressed the merits of the appeal in the absence of findings in the Special Master's report and recommendation or in the trial court's adoption of the Special Master's recommendation).

  2. Fox v. Norfolk S. Corp.

    342 Ga. App. 38 (Ga. Ct. App. 2017)   Cited 11 times
    Explaining that because "the trial court allowed [appellant] to pursue the argument as part of his motion for reconsideration, and the trial court ruled on that argument," the issue was "raised and ruled on in the court below, [such that] we may consider this claim of error"

    In this case, it appears that Fox seeks to satisfy the 20-year requirement by tacking his period of possession onto the successive periods of possession by his predecessors-in-title. See Steinichen v. Stancil, 284 Ga. 580 , 582 (669 SE2d 109 ) (2008). ‘

  3. DeCay v. Houston

    295 Ga. 223 (Ga. 2014)   Cited 3 times

    The Special Master's finding that there was no fraud with the recording of the corrective deed is supported by evidence, and the trial court's judgment adopting that finding is not clearly erroneous. See, e.g., Steinichen v. Stancil, 284 Ga. 580, 669 S.E.2d 109 (2008). 3. Upon review of the record, we find no merit in Decay's remaining contentions regarding the quiet title action.

  4. Szuber C, Ltd. v. Petrash

    2022 Ohio 2694 (Ohio Ct. App. 2022)

    ""Possession of a tenant is regarded as the possession of the landlord, [and] hence there may be tacking to establish the landlord's title, although the land is occupied by tenants." Ferguson v. Zimmerman, 2nd Dist. Montgomery No. 9426, 1986 WL 878, *9, citing Powers v. Malavazos, 25 Ohio App. 450, 158 N.E. 654 (4th Dist. 1927); USA Cartage Leasing, LLC v. Baer, 202 Md.App. 138, 204, 32 A.3d 88 (Md.App.2011), quoting 652 2 C.J.S. Adverse Possession, Section 47 (1941) (stating that "tenant may adversely possess land 'on behalf of landlord"); Steinichen v. Stancil, 284 Ga. 580, 582, 669 S.E.2d 109 (2008) (determining that tenants' use inured to landlord and subsequent owner could tack tenants' use in order to satisfy continuous possession for statutory period); see generally Eddyville Corp. v. Relyea, 35 A.D.3d 1063, 1066-1067, 827 N.Y.S.2d 315 (2006); Ebenhoh v. Hodgman, 642 N.W.2d 104, 109 (Minn.App.2002). Cline v. Rogers Farm Enterprises, LLC, 4th Dist. No. 16CA7, 2017-Ohio-1379, 87 N.E.3d 637, ¶ 41.

  5. Moxie Capital, LLC v. Delmont 21, LLC

    363 Ga. App. 152 (Ga. Ct. App. 2022)

    Accordingly, pretermitting whether the redemption statutes permit a bad faith defense, because there is evidence supporting Delmont's lack of bad faith under the circumstances of this case, "the special master's finding ... and the trial court's judgment adopting that finding [are] not clearly erroneous." Steinichen v. Stancil , 284 Ga. 580, 582, 669 S.E.2d 109 (2008). For purposes of this appeal, we are assuming, without deciding, that Moxie's statement regarding bank closing times is accurate.

  6. Cline v. Rogers Farm Enters., LLC

    2017 Ohio 1379 (Ohio Ct. App. 2017)   Cited 14 times

    {¶ 41} Furthermore, even if privity is lacking between Martin and the appellees, the appellees share contractual privity with FLB. Martin's adverse use of the property as FLB's tenant inured to FLB. "Possession of a tenant is regarded as the possession of the landlord, [and] hence there may be tacking to establish the landlord's title, although the land is occupied by tenants." Ferguson v. Zimmerman, 2nd Dist. Montgomery No. 9426, 1986 WL 878, *9, citing Powers v. Malavazos, 25 Ohio App. 450, 158 N.E. 654 (4th Dist. 1927) ; USA Cartage Leasing, LLC v. Baer, 202 Md.App. 138, 204, 32 A.3d 88 (Md.App.2011), quoting 2 C.J.S. Adverse Possession, Section 47 (1941) (stating that "tenant may adversely possess land ‘on behalf of’ landlord"); Steinichen v. Stancil, 284 Ga. 580, 582, 669 S.E.2d 109 (2008) (determining that tenants' use inured to landlord and subsequent owner could tack tenants' use in order to satisfy continuous possession for statutory period); see generallyEddyville Corp. v. Relyea, 35 A.D.3d 1063, 1066–1067, 827 N.Y.S.2d 315 (2006) ; Ebenhoh v. Hodgman, 642 N.W.2d 104, 109 (Minn.App.2002). FLB, therefore, is deemed to have adversely possessed the disputed property.