Steiner, Admr. v. Fecycz

7 Citing cases

  1. Murray v. Gadsden

    197 F.2d 194 (D.C. Cir. 1952)   Cited 55 times
    In Murray v. Gadsden (D.C. Cir. 1952), 197 F.2d 194, 33 ALR2d 554, the court examined the parol evidence rule exception, which allows an inquiry into the object of the parties in executing the instrument, and admitted the parol evidence.

    Peugh v. Davis and Brick v. Brick were cited, among other cases, in support of this statement. As was stated by the Court of Appeals of Ohio in Steiner v. Fecycz, 1942, 72 Ohio App. 18, 50 N.E.2d 617, 621, a "* * * contract creating a joint and survivorship bank account is no more sacred or inviolable than a deed of real estate, a bank account created by will in a single name, or a bill of sale of any personal property."

  2. Matter of Triple a Coal Co., Inc.

    55 B.R. 806 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1985)   Cited 12 times

    It is equally settled law in both Ohio and Kentucky that a constructive trust will follow funds into a bank account. See, In re Hurricane Elkhorn Coal Corp. II, supra; Ferguson v. Deuble, supra; Steiner v. Fecycz, 72 Ohio App. 18, 50 N.E.2d 617 (1942). Where trust funds have been commingled with other funds held by the wrongdoer, the claimant need only trace the money into the commingler's account in order to impress the funds with a constructive trust.

  3. King v. Merryman

    86 S.E.2d 141 (Va. 1955)   Cited 21 times

    Cerny v. Cerny, (1943) 152 F1a. 333, 11 So.2d 777; Northcott v. Livingood, La. App. 1942, 10 So.2d 401. See also Green v. Comer, (1943) 193 Okla. 133, 141 P.2d 258; and Steiner v. Fecycz, (1942) 72 Ohio App. 18, 50 N.E.2d 617, for discussions of the contract theory as applied to joint bank accounts. In the recent case of Murray v. Gadsden, (1952) 91 App. D.C. 38, 197 F.2d 194, 33 A.L.R.2d 554, the evidence showed that Emma G. Murray signed an instrument declaring her savings account in a building and loan association to be thereafter a joint account in the name of herself and her sister, Vellmar G. Gadsden, "subject to order of either, and the balance at death to the survivor."

  4. Mitts v. Williams

    29 N.W.2d 841 (Mich. 1947)   Cited 11 times
    In Mitts v. Williams, 319 Mich. 417, the statutory presumption of ownership of a joint account by the survivor was recognized but was held to have been overcome by competent proof indicating that the deposit was made for the sole benefit and convenience of the party whose funds were deposited. A similar situation existed in Pence v. Wessels, 320 Mich. 195, which appellant has cited.

    Neither was it within the purview of the rule, recognized by some courts, that testimony of this character may be received to contradict testimony offered by the opposite party. Apparently, the testimony of Mrs. Moose, here in question, was offered on the theory that the statements made by Mrs. Malco legitimately tended to show the latter's intention with reference to the deposit at the time it was made. For the reasons indicated we think that this testimony was not competent. Egan v. Grece, 79 Mich. 629, 640; Bunker v. Motor Wheel Corp., 231 Mich. 334; Elliotte v. Lavier, 299 Mich. 353, 357; Walkling v. Walkling, 162 Md. 188, 190 ( 159 A. 264); Steiner v. Fecycz, 72 Ohio App. 18, 22 ( 50 N.E. [2d] 617). The competent evidence in the record indicates that Mrs. Malco and Mrs. Williams, prior to the making of the deposit in question, had in mind an arrangement under which the daughter would render to her mother the services that Mrs. Wilton had previously been performing.

  5. American Diabetes v. Diabetes Society

    509 N.E.2d 84 (Ohio Ct. App. 1986)   Cited 4 times
    In Amer. Diabetes Assoc., Inc. v. Diabetes Society of Clinton County, 31 Ohio App.3d 136, 509 N.E.2d 84 (1986), the Court found a charitable trust for the benefit of a local non-profit in the hands of a regional non-profit for donations received to further the charitable purpose locally.

    This would include situations where the property was acquired by mistake. See Barnes v. Christy (1921), 102 Ohio St. 160, 131 N.E. 352; Steiner v. Fecycz (1942), 72 Ohio App. 18, 26 O.O. 515, 50 N.E.2d 617. The record reflects a genuine concern on appellee's part that the funds currently in appellant's control would be used for purposes other than diabetes treatment and research in Clinton County, particularly to help bail the Cincinnati Affiliate out of its financial difficulties.

  6. In re Estate of Voegeli

    161 N.E.2d 778 (Ohio Ct. App. 1959)   Cited 7 times

    In general, it seems that in the absence of the signing of the signature card by both the depositor, who contributed all the money to the joint account, and the codepositor, parol evidence is admissible to show the true intent with which the account was opened or the nature of the account as joint tenancy, a gift or a trust. 33 A. L. R. (2d), 571; Held, Admr., v. Myers, 48 Ohio App. 131, 192 N.E. 540; Union Properties, Inc., v. Cleveland Trust Co., supra ( 152 Ohio St. 430); Steiner, Admr., v. Fecycz, 72 Ohio App. 18, 50 N.E.2d 617 (involving fraud); Ferguson v. Deuble, 27 Ohio Law Abs., 533 (involving fraud); In re Estate of Hatch, supra ( 154 Ohio St. 149), at page 152; In re Estate of Jones, supra (68 Ohio Law Abs., 282), 288; Guitner, Admx., v. McEowen, 99 Ohio App. 32, 124 N.E.2d 744. In a hearing upon exceptions to an inventory to determine the ownership of a joint account (not in terms a survivorship account) parol evidence of the secretary of the loan association who prepared the certificates of deposit at the joint request of the husband and wife was held to be admissible, not to vary the terms of the contract of deposit, but to explain its ambiguity and the circumstances under which it was made.

  7. Ottjes v. Littlejohn

    285 S.W.2d 243 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956)   Cited 8 times

    Moreover, the foregoing testimony is largely in the record without objection — and the latter testimony, i. e. what Mrs. Ottjes herself told Mrs. Tunnell, constitutes an admission against her which was neither objected to nor contradicted. The Supreme Court has held that in equity extrinsic evidence is admissible to show that a conveyance on its face was intended as security. Peugh v. Davis, 96 U.S. 332, 24 L.Ed. 775; Brick v. Brick, 98 U.S. 514, 25 L.Ed. 256. An instrument in writing creating a joint and survivorship bank account is no more sacred or inviolable than a deed to real estate. Steiner v. Fecycz, 72 Ohio App. 18, 50 N.E.2d 621. The U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, in Murray v. Gadsden, 91 U.S.App.D.C. 38, 197 F.2d 194, 195, 201, 38 A.L.R.2d 554, in an identical factual situation to the case at bar, held that the parol evidence rule does not forbid inquiry into the object of the parties in executing and receiving an instrument creating a joint and survivorship bank account.