The Samsons argue that the ICA "grievously erred" in affirming the verdict where erroneous instructions given, specifically Nahulu's Instructions Nos. 1, 2, and 6, improperly instructed the jury that (1) a driver need not anticipate pedestrians who are not strictly following the law, and (2) Minor forfeited her right to recover from a negligent driver if she violated any traffic rules. (citing Steigman v. Outrigger Enter., Inc., 126 Hawai‘i 133, 145, 267 P.3d 1238, 1250 (2011) ).1. Alleged Error in Specific Instructions
“Prior to the legislative enactment of comparative negligence,” Hawai‘i courts applied the common law “rule of contributory negligence, and an injured plaintiff was denied recovery upon a showing that her negligence contributed to her own injury.” Steigman v. Outrigger Enters., Inc., 126 Hawai‘i 133, 135, 267 P.3d 1238, 1240 (2011). Then, in 1969, the Hawai‘i legislature passed a modified comparative negligence statute, because of a “legislative perception of unfairness in the common law doctrine of contributory negligence.” Wong v. Hawaiian Scenic Tours, Ltd., 64 Haw. 401, 403-04, 642 P.2d 930, 932 (1982).
Young says that mitigation of damages is no longer an affirmative defense. In support of that argument, Young cites Steigman v. Outrigger Enterprises, Inc., 126 Haw. 133, 267 P.3d 1238 (2011). Steigman is entirely inapposite.
Seeking damages for her injuries, the woman filed suit against, inter alia, the State of Hawai'i, which had previously "acquired an easement over [the] seawall for the express purpose of providing a path for public travel."Id. at 498, 443 P.2d at 144. The Levy court's description of the easement indicates that it was expressly granted to the State of Hawai'i. 50 Haw. at 498, 443 P.2d at 144; see also Ass'n of Apartment Owners of Wailea Elua v. Wailea Resort Co., 100 Hawai'i 97, 109, 58 P.3d 608, 620 (2002) (noting that in Levy, "[t]he State of Hawai'i owned an easement over the seawall that had been obtained for the purpose of providing a path for public travel"); Steigman v. Outrigger Enter., Inc., 126 Hawaii 133, 139, 267 P.3d 1238, 1244 (2011) (describing the seawall in Levy as "state-controlled"); Friedrich v. Dep't of Transp., 60 Haw. 32, 37, 586 P.2d 1037, 1041 (1978) (stating that the seawall in Levy was used by the public as a thoroughfare, which purpose had been "provided by the State"), superseded by statute as recognized in Steigman, 126 Hawaii 133, 267 P.3d 1238. It is noted that the parties' stipulations and the circuit court's findings of fact in this case also confirm that the certificate of title to the property on which the seawall in Levy was located reflected an express easement over the seawall in favor of the State.
Seeking damages for her injuries, the woman filed suit against, inter alia, the State of Hawai'i, which had previously "acquired an easement over [the] seawall for the express purpose of providing a path for public travel."Id. at 498, 443 P.2d at 144. The Levy court's description of the easement indicates that it was expressly granted to the State of Hawai'i. 50 Haw. at 498, 443 P.2d at 144 ; see also Ass'n of Apartment Owners of Wailea Elua v. Wailea Resort Co., 100 Hawai'i 97, 109, 58 P.3d 608, 620 (2002) (noting that in Levy, "[t]he State of Hawai'i owned an easement over the seawall that had been obtained for the purpose of providing a path for public travel"); Steigman v. Outrigger Enter., Inc., 126 Hawaii 133, 139, 267 P.3d 1238, 1244 (2011) (describing the seawall in Levy as "state-controlled"); Friedrich v. Dep't of Transp., 60 Haw. 32, 37, 586 P.2d 1037, 1041 (1978) (stating that the seawall in Levy was used by the public as a thoroughfare, which purpose had been "provided by the State"), superseded by statute as recognized in Steigman, 126 Hawaii 133, 267 P.3d 1238. It is noted that the parties' stipulations and the circuit court's findings of fact in this case also confirm that the certificate of title to the property on which the seawall in Levy was located reflected an express easement over the seawall in favor of the State.
In Pickard, however, this court "sought to eliminate distinctions with respect to owner or occupier duty, making clear that there is only one standard of care owed by an owner or occupier of land: ‘reasonable care for the safety of all persons reasonably anticipated to be upon the premises.’ " Steigman v. Outrigger Enters., Inc., 126 Hawai‘i 133, 151, 267 P.3d 1238, 1256 (2011) (Acoba, J., concurring) (quoting Pickard, 51 Haw. at 135, 452 P.2d at 446) (internal brackets omitted). This court's holding was based on the recognition that "the common law distinctions between classes of persons have no logical relationship to the exercise of reasonable care for the safety of others."
And, although Hawaii courts often rely on portions of Restatements, they do not always follow them. See, e.g., Steigman v. Outrigger Enters., Inc., 126 Haw. 133, 145, 267 P.3d 1238, 1250 (2011); Kutcher v. Zimmerman, 87 Haw. 394, 406, 957 P.2d 1076, 1088 (Haw. Ct. App. 1998).
The Hawaii Supreme Court has stated that "an occupier of land has a duty to use reasonable care for the safety of all persons reasonably anticipated to be upon the premises, regardless of the legal status of the individual." Pickard v. City and County of Honolulu, 51 Haw. 134, 135, 452 P.2d 445, 446 (1969); accord Steigman v. Outrigger Enterprises, Inc., 126 Haw. 133, 136, 267 P.3d 1238, 1241 (2011). A hotel owes this duty to a hotel guest.
These issues, as well as the "quintessential issues of fact such as whether the injured party knew, or should have known of the danger" shall be decided by a trier of fact, not as a matter of law. Steigman v. Outrigger Enters., Inc., 267 P.3d 1238, 1250 (Haw. 2011) (noting that a jury - not a judge - should decide "quintessential issues of fact such as whether the injured party knew, or should have known of the danger . . . , and so on" (quoting Harrison v. Taylor, 768 P.2d 1321, 1328 (Idaho 1989))). Because the material facts are disputed and do not "lend themselves to only one reasonable interpretation or conclusion," Ribeiro's claim of negligence is "not susceptible of summary judgment."
Plaintiff responds that § 329-124 "seems more likely to relate to health insurance coverage, wherein health insurers would not have to reimburse medical marijuana users . . . ." [Mem. in Opp. at 6.] Plaintiff, however, cites no authority for her interpretation of § 329-124. The plain language of the statute does not support such a limited interpretation, and there is nothing in the legislative history that suggests the Legislature intended to limit § 329-124 to medical insurance. Cf. Steigman v. Outrigger Enters., Inc., 126 Hawai`i 133, 148-49, 267 P.3d 1238, 1253-54 (2011) ("Although the statutory language of HRS § 663-31 is plain and unambiguous, we may resort to the legislative history to confirm this interpretation of the statute." (citing E & J Lounge Operating Co. v. Liquor Comm'n of City & County of Honolulu, 118 Hawai`i 320, 335, 189 P.3d 432, 447 (2008) ("Legislative history may be used to confirm interpretation of a statute's plain language."); State v. Entrekin, 98 Hawai`i 221, 228, 47 P.3d 336, 343 (2002) ("Although we ground our holding in the statute's plain language, we nonetheless note that its legislative history confirms our view."))).