Steidel v. County of Nassau

25 Citing cases

  1. Roberts v. N.Y.C. Health & Hosps. Corp.

    2019 N.Y. Slip Op. 33156 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2019)

    A comment or two can be disregarded if they do not "cross the line," or the judge can provide a curative instruction. But remarks that "so violate the rights of the other party to the litigation and may have substantially influenced or been determinative of the outcome, will not be condoned" (see Steidel v County of Nassau, 182 AD2d 809 [2d Dept 1992]). It is error for trial counsel to bolster his case by accusations that the witnesses for the other side are liars (see Clarke v New York City Transit Authority, 174 AD 2d 268 [1st Dept 1992]).

  2. Bertram v. N.Y. Presbyterian Hosp.

    2013 N.Y. Slip Op. 30988 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2013)

    E.g., Rodriguez v. New York City Hous. Auth.. 209 A.D.2d at 261-62; Nuccio v. Chou, 183 A.D.2d 511, 514 (1st Dep't 1992); O'Neil v. Klass, 36 A.D.3d 677, 678 (2d Dep't 2007); Pagano v. Murray, 309 A.D.2d at 911. See Sanchez v. Manhattan & Bronx Surface Tr. Operating Auth., 170 A.D.2d at 405; Berkowitz v. Marriott Corp., 163 A.D.2d 52, 53-54 (1st Dep't 1990); Dwyer v. Nicholson, 193 A.D.2d at 77; Steidel v. County of Nassau, 182 A.D.2d 809, 814 (2d Dep't 1992). This line of assault did not end with Dr. Fethke.

  3. Betancourt v. Trump Empire State Partners

    2007 N.Y. Slip Op. 31677 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2007)

    Particularly when the evidence does not overwhelmingly favor any one party, it is essential that the issues be determined by an impartial jury upon legal evidence uninfluenced by extraneous and prejudicial circumstances ( Cherry Creek, 207 A.D. 787, 789). Thus, in Steidel v. County of Nassau, counsel's suggestions that the opposing party's expert was "shading the truth" and accusation that the expert was a "hired gun," were deemed factors necessitating a new trial ( Steidel, 182 A.D.2d 809, 814). There, the court concluded that "had [liability] been shown with any degree of clarity, these improper remarks probably would have been attributed to excessive zeal and forgiven as harmless" ( Steidel, 182 A.D.2d 809, 814; see also, Johnson v. Lazarowitz, 4 A.D.3d 334, 335).

  4. Schuster v. Sourour

    207 A.D.3d 491 (N.Y. App. Div. 2022)   Cited 6 times

    Sourour contends that the first interrogatory was unfair and prejudicial in failing to adequately specify his alleged departure from accepted medical practice, and that the resulting jury verdict was a general verdict. The Supreme Court properly determined that the plaintiff did not seek recovery on several different theories, and that the interrogatory accurately described the alleged departure (cf. Steidel v. County of Nassau, 182 A.D.2d 809, 813, 582 N.Y.S.2d 805 ). We note that while the interrogatory erroneously encompassed a period of time after the decedent underwent surgery, during which Sourour's alleged departure could no longer have occurred, there is no indication that the error caused substantial confusion for the jury.

  5. Mackauer v. Parikh

    148 A.D.3d 873 (N.Y. App. Div. 2017)   Cited 58 times

    Despite the absence of the word "appendicitis," the supplemental bill of particulars adequately sets forth an alternate theory that Parikh deviated from the accepted standard of care on April 21, 2009, by failing to perform a more thorough evaluation or to diagnose the source of the plaintiff's abdominal pain. While the dissent concludes that the supplemental bill did not place the defendants on notice that this failure-to-diagnose theory was "free-standing" from the plaintiff's theory that the appendix was perforated during the April 13, 2009, colonoscopy, this is a distinction without a difference, as a plaintiff is permitted to pursue independent and overlapping theories of liability, with each discrete departure requiring separate consideration by a jury (see Steidel v. County of Nassau, 182 A.D.2d 809, 813, 582 N.Y.S.2d 805 ; see also Davis v. Caldwell, 54 N.Y.2d 176, 445 N.Y.S.2d 63, 429 N.E.2d 741 ; NY PJI 2:150, Comment, Caveat 1). While, in certain circumstances, "a plaintiff may successfully oppose a motion for summary judgment by relying on an unpleaded cause of action which is supported by the plaintiff's submission" (Langan v. St. Vincent's Hosp. of N.Y., 64 A.D.3d 632, 633, 882 N.Y.S.2d 500 ; see Alvord & Swift v. Muller Constr. Co., 46 N.Y.2d 276, 281, 413 N.Y.S.2d 309, 385 N.E.2d 1238 ), here, the plaintiff's theory that Parikh failed to diagnosis him with appendicitis was adequately set forth in his supplemental bill of particulars and, therefore, was not a new theory of liability raised for the first time in opposition to the defendant's motion.

  6. Selzer v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth.

    100 A.D.3d 157 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012)   Cited 31 times
    Finding that defense counsel's remarks did not contaminate the proceedings and deprive the plaintiff of a fair trial

    Finally, defense counsel did not make any character attacks on the plaintiff or the plaintiff's witnesses. See cf. Steidel v. County of Nassau, 182 A.D.2d 809, 814, 582 N.Y.S.2d 805, 808 (2d Dept.1992) (new trial when counsel referred to opposing expert as “hired gun” whose idea of truth and justice is that “this is a game to be played”). In order to warrant a mistrial, an ad hominem attack must be extreme and pervasive.

  7. Maraviglia v. Lokshina

    92 A.D.3d 924 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012)   Cited 5 times

    Based on the foregoing, the Supreme Court should have granted that branch of the plaintiffs' motion which was pursuant to CPLR 4404(a) to set aside the jury verdict on the issue of liability and for a new trial ( see Blinds to Go [ U.S.], Inc. v. Times Plaza Dev., L.P., 88 A.D.3d 838, 931 N.Y.S.2d 105; Gutierrez v. City of New York, 205 A.D.2d 425, 613 N.Y.S.2d 627; Pagano v. Murray, 309 A.D.2d 910, 911, 766 N.Y.S.2d 110; Reynolds v. Burghezi, 227 A.D.2d 941, 942, 643 N.Y.S.2d 248; Steidel v. County of Nassau, 182 A.D.2d 809, 814, 582 N.Y.S.2d 805).

  8. Smolinski v. Smolinski

    78 A.D.3d 1642 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010)   Cited 4 times

    Nevertheless, we agree with Ford Credit that reversal is warranted based on, inter alia, the misconduct of plaintiffs counsel during the last trial. In her summation, counsel for plaintiff improperly implied that Ford Credit's expert witnesses testified falsely for compensation ( see Nuccio v Chou, 183 AD2d 511, 514-515, lv dismissed 81 NY2d 783; Steidel v County of Nassau, 182 AD2d 809, 814); repeatedly alleged that Ford Credit engaged in a conspiracy to cover up the facts ( see Calzado v New York City Tr. Auth., 304 AD2d 385; Berkowitz v Marriott Corp., 163 AD2d 52, 54); and made numerous references to the resources that Ford Credit had as a large corporation ( see Kenneth v Gardner, 36 AD2d 575). Further, plaintiff introduced extensive irrelevant and highly prejudicial evidence ( see Wylie v Consolidated Rail Corp., 229 AD2d 966, 967; Escobar v Seatrain Lines, 175 AD2d 741, 744).

  9. Grasso v. Koslowe

    38 A.D.3d 599 (N.Y. App. Div. 2007)   Cited 6 times

    Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs. The Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion under CPLR 4404 (a) in setting aside the jury verdict and granting a new trial to the defendant Rama Koslowe (hereinafter the defendant) based on the pervasive inflammatory and improper summation remarks of counsel for the plaintiff ( see Pagano v Murray, 309 AD2d 910; King v City of New York, 209 AD2d 673; Steidel v County of Nassau, 182 AD2d 809; Weinberger v City of New York, 97 AD2d 819, 820; La Russo v Pollack, 88 AD2d 584; see also Berkowitz v Marriott Corp., 163 AD2d 52).

  10. Pagano v. Murray

    309 A.D.2d 910 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003)   Cited 16 times

    In light of the inflammatory and improper summation comments of the counsel for the defendant Stephen A. Katz, we conclude that the trial court properly exercised its discretion under CPLR 4404(a) in setting aside the jury verdict and granting a new trial as to Katz ( see King v. City of New York, 209 A.D.2d 673; Steidel v. County of Nassau, 182 A.D.2d 809, 814; La Russo v. Pollack, 88 A.D.2d 584). The defense counsel's comments were particularly improper and unbecoming because Katz offered no expert witness on his behalf and instead, chose to suggest that the plaintiffs' expert was "a biased prejudiced paid off witness" who "lied," and whose testimony was "worthless" and "valueless."