Opinion
14-P-1114
11-20-2015
JOSEPH STEFFLIN v. PINNCON, LLC & others.
NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to its rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 (2009), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 1:28
The plaintiff, Joseph Stefflin, brought this action against Pinncon, LLC (Pinncon) and A.F. Underhill, Inc. (Underhill), to recover damages for injuries he allegedly sustained while working on a construction project at a Stop & Shop grocery store located in Natick. He appeals from a judgment on a jury verdict in favor of the defendants and from the subsequent denial of his motion for a new trial. We affirm.
Background. On June 6, 2006, the plaintiff was working as a drywall finisher and taper for his employer, New Finish Systems, Inc. Pinncon and Underhill were, respectively, the general contractor and first-tier subcontractor on the construction project. The plaintiff alleged in his complaint that Pinncon and Underhill maintained an unsafe work environment by requiring him to use a scissor lift, as opposed to the knuckle boom lift he requested, to access certain areas of the ceiling. While he was using the scissor lift, the plaintiff reached over the railing with the sander and heard a "pop," after which he experienced abdominal pain. He was later diagnosed with a large ventral hernia, which required surgery to repair. He suffered complications from that surgery, had two additional surgeries, and additional complications followed. He now claims permanent disability .
Prior to trial, the plaintiff provided notice of his intent to submit, pursuant to G. L. c. 233, § 79G, three independent medical examiner (IME) reports generated in a workers' compensation action arising from the same injuries at issue here. The defendants moved in limine to exclude the reports on the grounds that the reports failed to meet the criteria for admissibility under § 79G and that they were prejudicial. The trial judge allowed the defendants' motion on the grounds that the reports were unreliable and merely cumulative of other expert and medical evidence, despite being otherwise admissible under § 79G.
The case was submitted to the jury on special questions. The judge instructed the jury that they were not to reach the issues of causation and damages unless they found that the defendants were negligent. The jury answered the first special question as to each defendant in the negative; that is, they found each defendant's conduct to be not negligent. Consequently, they did not reach the issues of causation and damages. Judgment then entered for the defendants, after which the plaintiff filed a motion for a new trial, which was denied.
Discussion. The sole issue raised by the plaintiff is whether the judge abused her discretion in excluding the IME reports. Generally, we will not disturb a judge's decision to admit or exclude evidence unless the ruling constitutes an error of law or an abuse of discretion. See Zucco v. Kane, 439 Mass. 503, 507 (2003). On a motion in limine, a judge may exercise discretion "to prevent irrelevant, inadmissible[,] or prejudicial matters from being admitted in evidence." Boston v. Board of Educ, 392 Mass. 788, 796 (1984), quoting from Commonwealth v. Hood, 389 Mass. 581, 594 (1983).
The plaintiff claims that the judge erred in allowing the defendants' motion to exclude the reports.
The plaintiff's argument fails if only because he has not shown that the exclusion of the reports affected the jury's verdict. See Grant v. Lewis/Boyle, Inc., 408 Mass. 269, 274 (1990), quoting from G. L. c. 231, § 119 ("[A]n error in the admission of evidence should not be ground for a new trial unless the error has injuriously affected the 'substantial rights of the parties'"). The jury went no further than the threshold issues of duty and negligence; i.e., whether the defendants owed a duty of care to the plaintiff and whether they breached that duty in failing to provide a safe work environment. These questions are dispositive of the plaintiff's claims. The reports are not probative of the defendants' duty to the plaintiff or whether they failed to provide a safe work environment, because they are only relevant to the plaintiff's injuries. Therefore, even if it were error to exclude the reports, that error did not result in prejudice to the plaintiff.
The plaintiff's argument, that evidence of the nature and extent of his injuries is probative of the "mechanism of injury" and thus should be admitted to prove negligence, does not survive scrutiny. The plaintiff has not provided us with any Massachusetts cases to support his theory that medical evidence of the extent or cause of a plaintiff's injuries may be used to show that a defendant owed a duty of care or breached that duty. In the primary case cited by the defendant, Inferrera v. Sudbury, 31 Mass. App. Ct. 96, 101 (1991), the plaintiff's injuries were probative of the defendant's reckless conduct. ("[T]he gravity of the danger posed by the . . . [unmarked cable] was demonstrated by the injuries to the plaintiff.") Ibid., quoting from Everett v. Bucky Warren, Inc., 376 Mass. 280, 291 [1978]). Here, the theory of liability is not the defendants' reckless conduct, but rather their alleged negligence in failing to provide a safe work environment.
Judgment affirmed.
Order denying motion for new trial affirmed.
By the Court (Katzmann, Vuono & Agnes, JJ.),
The panelists are listed in order of seniority. --------
/s/
Clerk
Entered: November 20, 2015.