If the filing of employer's first notice of injury with the Commission and the payment of wages in lieu of compensation to October 22, 1930, to the respondent were sufficient to invoke the jurisdiction of the Commission, then the contention of the petitioner must fall; otherwise, it should be sustained. In Steffens Ice Cream Co. v. Jarvis, 132 Okla. 300, 270 P. 1103, we held: "There is no particular form of pleading required to give the State Industrial Commission jurisdiction to hear and determine a claim for compensation. Anything filed with the Industrial Commission that challenges its attention, causes it to act, is sufficient to put in motion the process of the Industrial Commission to see that compensation is paid to injured employees. It was intended by the Legislature that the Industrial Commission should supervise and protect labor and compel industry to pay for the loss of man power occasioned by accidents arising in the particular industry.

However, the record does affirmatively show that the petitioner gave notice to the Commission of the injury May 20, 1930, showing that it had actual knowledge of the accident, the injury, and its extent; that it was furnishing medical attention, and, on August 25, 1930, when both parties filed the stipulation and receipt, respondent represented and stated to the Commission that it had paid compensation and medical expenses. In Steffens Ice Cream Co. v. Jarvis, 132 Okla. 300, 270 P. 1103, we held: "Can it be said that the petitioner here, after reporting the injury and admitting the injury and liability; after the insurance carrier, acting on behalf of petitioner, had paid compensation for 20 months, admitting the injury and liability thereon; after the attending physician had reported to the Industrial Commission the nature and character of the injury, the treatment given claimant; that the petitioner then could be heard in this court to say that the plaintiff's claim was barred by this statute?

McClenahan v. Oklahoma Ry Co. (1928) 131 Okla. 73, 267 P. 657, citing: Haiselden v. Indus. Board of Ill. (Ill.) 113 N.E. 877; Rubin v. Fisher Body Corp., 205 Mich. 605, 172 N.W. 534; Good v. City of Omaha, 102 Neb. 654, 168 N.W. 639; each case holding that filing of a claim within time provided by statute is jurisdictional. Steffens Ice Cream Co. v. Jarvis (1928) 132 Okla. 300, 270 P. 1103, is sought to be distinguished in that it is said the rule therein announced that no particular form of pleading is required to give the Commission jurisdiction is sound, but that the obiter dictum employed, to the effect that an employee who receives all the law allows is not compelled to file a claim in order to give the Commission jurisdiction, is unsound for that the filing of a claim in some form or other in the specified time is necessary to confer jurisdiction, and without the filing of such a claim, in such time, jurisdiction cannot be conferred by estoppel, waiver, conduct, or consent, either expressed or implied. Citing Wilson Drilling Co. v. Beyer (1929) 138 Okla. 248, 280 P. 846, wherein it was held:

Due filing of a notice and report of accident with the commission and the filing of the agreement and receipt left the matter within the jurisdiction of commission. Sections 35, 36, Workmen's Compensation Act, Laws 1927, pp. 510, 511; Section 42, Workmen's Compensation Act, Laws 1927, p. 512; Curtis v. Slater Construction Co., 194 Mich. 259, 160 N.W. 659; Steffens Ice Cream Co. v. Jarvis (Okla.), 270 P. 1103, 132 Okla. 300; Ontario Mining Co. v. Industrial Commission (Colo.), 280 P. 483; Speas v. Boone County (Neb.), 227 N.W. 87, 91; Travelers' Insurance Co. v. Ohler (Neb.), 227 N.W. 449; Bailey v. Hess (So. Dak.), 227 N.W. 69, 70-71; Kirchner v. Michigan Sugar Co., 206 Mich. 459, 173 N.W. 193, 195; Schaefer v. Buffalo Steel Car Co., 250 N.Y. 507, 166 N.E. 183; Gilliland Oil Co. v. State Ind. Comm. (Okla.), 273 P. 208, 135 Okla. 21; Matter of Eggleston v. Shinola Co., 229 N.Y. 622, 129 N.E. 933. Where the parties have entered into a stipulation with reference to compensation under the act, such action confers jurisdiction upon the commission and waives the requirement of the filing of formal claim. Curtis v. Slater Construction Company (1916), 194 Mich. 259, 160 N.W. 659; 14 Negligence and Compensation Cases Annotated 785.

Logan County v. York, Okla., 270 P.2d 968 (1954).Oklahoma Furniture Mfg. Co. v. Nolen, 164 Okla. 213, 23 P.2d 381 (1933); Pine v. The Indus. Comm'n., 148 Okla. 200, 298 P. 276 (1931); Atlas Coal Co. v. Corrigan, 148 Okla. 36, 296 P. 963 (1931); Steffens Ice Cream Co. v. Jarvis, 132 Okla. 300, 270 P. 1103 (1928); W.R. Pickering Lumber Co. v. Tincup, 132 Okla. 241, 269 P. 262 (1928); Skelly Oil Co. v. Harrell, 187 Okla. 412, 103 P.2d 88 (1940); Shank v. Oklahoma Office Bank Supply Co., Okla., 387 P.2d 626 (1963); and National Zinc Company v. Van Gunda, Okla., 402 P.2d 264 (1965). See n. 1, supra.

Evans v. Tulsa City Lines, Okla., 290 P.2d 126. But filing an employer's first notice, report of attending physician required under § 25, or an insurance carrier's payment of compensation, serve to prevent any bar of the statute. Steffens Ice Cream Co. v. Jarvis, 132 Okla. 300, 270 P. 1103; Oklahoma Natural Gas Corp. v. Craig, 193 Okla. 56, 139 P.2d 181. Under § 25 of the Act, respondent's treating physician furnished a copy of his final report [Form 19] to the employer and insurance carrier or their attorney.

Settled decisional law declares this statute of limitations is a special statute of repose, covering a particular class of claims, designed to prevent fraud and protect litigants from stale claims. Steffens Ice Cream Co. v. Jarvis, 132 Okla. 300, 270 P. 1103. The limitations provided by statute, supra, are a limitation upon the remedy, and not upon the right itself.

The rule is that our statute provides a limitation upon the remedy only and not upon the right. Steffens Ice Cream Co. v. Jarvis, 132 Okla. 300, 270 P. 1103; Pine v. State Ind. Comm., 148 Okla. 200, 298 P. 276, 78 A.L.R. 1294; National Zinc Co. v. Van Gunda, Okla., 402 P.2d 264. A portion of claimant's argument is that no right against the Fund accrues until there has been an award for a compensable injury with which claimant can combine his prior physical impairment. From this it is argued that it is unreasonable to place responsibility or duty upon a claimant to file a claim against the Fund before his cause of action arises.

As regards compensation claims this is a special statute of limitations covering a special, specific class of claims. Steffens Ice Cream Co. v. Jarvis, 132 Okla. 300, 270 P. 1103. No sound basis appears for permitting application of section 43, supra, solely to claims against the employer and insurance carrier while denying application of the statute to claims against the Special Indemnity Fund. Basically both claims arise from injury sustained by the employee.

This court has repeatedly held that the statutory limitation of time within which a claim may be filed or prosecuted constitutes a limitation upon the remedy rather than upon the right itself. See, in this connection, Skelly Oil Co. v. Harrell, 192 Okla. 101, 134 P.2d 136, 138; Steffens Ice Cream Co. v. Jarvis, 132 Okla. 300, 270 P. 1103, 1104; Skelly Oil Co. v. Harrell, 187 Okla. 412, 103 P.2d 88, 90; Atlas Coal Co. v. Corrigan, 148 Okla. 36, 296 P. 963; Pine v. State Industrial Commission, 148 Okla. 200, 298 P. 276, 78 A.L.R. 1287; Sinclair Prairie Oil Co. v. Smith, 168 Okla. 483, 34 P.2d 248; Bowling v. Blackwell Zinc Co. et al., Okla., 347 P.2d 1022. The limitation provisions contained in 85 O.S. 1961 § 22[ 85-22], subdiv.