Similarly, in Lenius v. Deere & Co., No. 12-20063, 2014 WL 2891029, at *22 (N.D. Iowa Jun.25, 2014), this Court held there was a sufficient identity of interest where the individual defendants were managers of the company, "[a]ll three had actual knowledge that [the plaintiff] filed a claim with the EEOC," and "[a]ll three were named in the narrative portion of [the plaintiff's] EEOC charge." In contrast, in Stefanovic v. University of Tennessee, 935 F. Supp. 950, 953-54 (E.D. Tenn. 1996), the court found that individual officials did not, in their individual capacities, have an identity of interest with the University for whom they worked.

"If an individual is not named in an EEOC complaint, then the complaining party cannot sue that individual in a Title VII action." Stefanovic v. Univ. of Tenn., 935 F. Supp. 950, 953 (E.D. Tenn. 1996). Similarly, the ADA and ADEA require the complaining party, before bringing suit, to name that individual in its EEOC complaint.Gordon v. MCG Health, Inc., 301 F. Supp. 2d 1333, 1338 (S.D. Ga. 2003) (noting that the "ADA has adopted the procedural requirements of Title VII," namely that "[o]nly parties previously identified as respondents in charges filed with the EEOC are subject to subsequent liability"); Spruill v. New York City Health Hosp., 2007 WL 2456960, *6 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 27, 2007) ("[U]nder both Title VII and the ADEA, a claimant may bring suit in federal court only if . . . the current defendant [was] named as a defendant in the EEOC complaint.").

Instead, such claims may only be pursued via a § 1983 action. See Thomas v. Shipka, 818 F.2d 496, 502 (6th Cir. 1987), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 488 U.S. 1036 (1989) ("there is no place for a cause of action against a municipality directly under the 14th Amendment because the plaintiff may proceed . . . under § 1983."); Stefanovic v. University of Tenn., 935 F. Supp. 950, 952 (E.D. Tenn. 1996) ("where a plaintiff states a constitutional claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, then that statute is the exclusive remedy for the alleged constitutional violation"). Thus, to the extent that the plaintiffs have asserted claims under the Equal Protection clause, those claims will be deemed to arise under § 1983 and not as independent causes of action.

Therefore, assuming individuals can be held liable in their individual capacities under the ADA, Smith's failure to name Vick in his EEOC complaint bars his claims against her here. See Knafel, 899 F.2d at 1481; Romain, 836 F.2d 241; Stefanovic v. University of Tenn., 935 F. Supp. 950, 953-54 (E.D.Tenn. 1996). Smith's counsel avers that he was unable to ascertain through discovery the relationship among Sofco of Ohio, Inc. and the remaining corporate defendants, Sofco, Inc. and Scotia Paper Company.