Opinion
18-P-1631
03-31-2020
Kathleen M. STEFANI v. MASSACHUSETTS COMMISSION AGAINST DISCRIMINATION & another.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 1:28
The plaintiff filed a charge of gender discrimination with the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination (commission) after she was demoted from the rank of major by the Massachusetts Department of State Police (State police). The commission determined that the plaintiff failed to prove that her demotion was motivated by discriminatory animus and dismissed her complaint. On judicial review under G. L. c. 30A, § 14, a Superior Court judge upheld the commission's decision, and the plaintiff appeals. We affirm.
Background. We summarize the commission's findings of fact, which are undisputed on appeal. The plaintiff worked for the State police from 1978 until 2004, becoming the first female major in 1999 and the commander of Troop H in 2000. When the acting colonel of the State police retired, the plaintiff applied for the position, as did male officers Thomas Foley and Bradley Hibbard. Foley was appointed colonel in December 2001 and thereafter removed two high-ranking male officers from his staff and appointed Hibbard as deputy superintendent. Foley kept the plaintiff on as a major in his command staff.
Troop H is responsible for, among other things, covering major events in "metropolitan Boston and areas south."
The colonel is the overall commanding officer of the State police and is appointed by the Governor.
In September 2002 the plaintiff sent her resume to a nonprofit group that promotes the advancement of women in government. Following the gubernatorial election later that fall, the nonprofit group decided to recommend the plaintiff for various positions, including colonel of the State police. The plaintiff did not tell Foley when she initially sent her resume but later, at a colleague's urging, e-mailed Foley stating that the nonprofit group had forwarded her resume to the Governor-elect's transition team for consideration. Foley, having already learned that the plaintiff submitted her resume, was disappointed that she had not told him sooner.
In February 2003 Foley held a command staff meeting, at which he "stressed the need for members of the [c]ommand [s]taff to work together as a team, be loyal to the [d]epartment, and to him." Several weeks later, on March 10, 2003, Hibbard informed the plaintiff that she was being demoted. That night, Foley spoke to a member of his command staff about the plaintiff's demotion and said "words to the effect of ‘it is all about loyalty.’ "
The plaintiff then filed a charge of gender discrimination with the commission. After three days of hearings, the hearing officer concluded that the plaintiff failed to prove gender discrimination under the three-part analytical framework applicable to discrimination claims based on indirect evidence. See Chief Justice for Admin. & Mgt. of the Trial Court v. Massachusetts Comm'n Against Discrimination, 439 Mass. 729, 732-733 (2003). On the plaintiff's administrative appeal, the commission affirmed the hearing officer's decision in its entirety. Relevant here, the commission found there to be sufficient evidence to support the hearing officer's finding that Foley demoted the plaintiff not because of her gender, but because of the plaintiff's "perceived disloyalty" to him. Thus, the commission concluded that the plaintiff failed to meet her burden of showing that discriminatory animus was the "determinative cause" for her demotion.
Under the three-part framework, as applied to hiring decisions, a plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination by showing that she is a member of a protected class, that she applied for a position and was not selected, and that the employer filled the position with a similarly qualified person. See Chief Justice for Admin. & Mgt. of the Trial Court, 439 Mass. at 732. If the plaintiff meets this burden, the burden shifts to the employer to provide a nondiscriminatory reason for the hiring decision. See id. at 733. If the employer does so, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show "that discriminatory animus was the ‘determinative cause’ for the employer's decision." Id., quoting Lipchitz v. Raytheon Co., 434 Mass. 493, 504 (2001).
Discussion. The question before us is whether there is substantial evidence to support the commission's decision. See Ramsdell v. Western Mass. Bus Lines, Inc., 415 Mass. 673, 676 (1993). Substantial evidence is that which "a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." G. L. c. 30A, § 1 (6).
We need not reach the plaintiff's argument that the hearing officer committed an error of law by concluding that the plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination. The hearing officer went on to assume that the plaintiff met her burden, and the commission did not base its decision on any failure of proof at the prima facie stage.
Substantial evidence supports the commission's conclusion that the plaintiff failed to meet her ultimate burden of proving that discriminatory animus was the reason for her demotion. As the commission determined, the hearing officer's finding that "Foley was motivated by a sense of betrayal and anger at [the plaintiff] for being disloyal" was "well supported" by the evidence. Foley expressed disappointment that the plaintiff applied for his job and made statements emphasizing loyalty before and after the plaintiff's demotion. A reasonable mind could accept this evidence as adequate to support the commission's conclusion that Foley demoted the plaintiff because he perceived her to be disloyal. See Ramsdell, 415 Mass. at 677-678.
The plaintiff's conclusory assertion that her application for colonel did not present a loyalty issue does not detract from the commission's determination. The point, as the commission found, is that Foley perceived the plaintiff to be disloyal.
The other evidence cited by the plaintiff does not "point[ ] to an overwhelming probability of the contrary" conclusion. Duggan v. Board of Registration in Nursing, 456 Mass. 666, 674 (2010), quoting Cobble v. Commissioner of the Dep't of Social Servs., 430 Mass. 385, 390-391 (1999). The plaintiff primarily relies on the fact that she was recruited by a group dedicated to the advancement of women. But contrary to her assertion, this does not, standing alone, show discriminatory animus. The plaintiff had to present evidence showing that Foley's decision to demote her was connected to the purpose of the group. She presented no such evidence.
The plaintiff also points to evidence of Foley's "cold treatment of her," including during a July 4 event when Foley berated her for raising the threat level without consulting him. The commission found, however, that Foley believed that the plaintiff had not complied with his orders and that "there was no evidence to suggest that [he] treated [the plaintiff] differently than he would have treated a male counterpart." The plaintiff offers no reason why we should disturb this finding.
Finally, the plaintiff argues that the commission should have inferred discriminatory animus from "the Massachusetts State [p]olice's historic treatment of women." The commission acknowledged that the plaintiff "was the first female to attain the rank of [m]ajor and remained the only female at the rank of [m]ajor throughout her tenure," which "speaks to the difficulties female officers historically faced in rising through the ranks." But the commission was warranted in concluding that this did not "make it more probable than not that Colonel Foley's adverse actions were motivated by gender bias." While the plaintiff claims on appeal that Foley himself "stifled the advancement of women within the State [p]olice," the commission found otherwise. The commission observed that Foley demoted multiple men during his tenure and promoted two women to major after demoting the plaintiff. The commission was not required to adopt the plaintiff's alternative view of the evidence -- namely, that Foley purposefully limited female representation by waiting to promote another woman to major until after he demoted the plaintiff -- and we cannot draw different inferences from the facts found by the commission. See Gnerre v. Massachusetts Comm'n against Discrimination, 402 Mass. 502, 509 (1988). Furthermore, Foley's favorable treatment of Hibbard in 2001 does not detract from the commission's determination because, as the hearing officer found, Hibbard applied for an open position, whereas the plaintiff applied for Foley's job.
In the end the commission properly determined that there was "insufficient evidence to disturb the [h]earing [o]fficer's conclusion that Colonel Foley was motivated by a sense of betrayal and anger at [the plaintiff] for being disloyal and, in his view, seeking to undermine him by applying for his job." Substantial evidence thus supports the commission's conclusion that the plaintiff failed to prove her charge of gender discrimination.
To the extent we have not specifically addressed any of the plaintiff's arguments, we have considered them and found them to be without merit.
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Judgment affirmed.