Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 01-3226, SECTION "A"(5)
November 20, 2002
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is a Motion for Summary Judgment (Rec. Doc. 23) filed by defendant, Stevedores, Inc. ("Stevedores") seeking dismissal of all claims asserted by plaintiff Steelmark, Inc. ("Steelmark") on the basis that the claims are barred by the doctrine of laches. Stevedores also seeks dismissal of the cross-claims brought by co-defendants, American Commercial Barge Lines, L.L.C. ("ACBL") and Warrior Gulf Navigation Company ("Warrior Gulf"). All parties oppose the motion. The motion, set for hearing on October 23, 2002, is before the Court on briefs without oral argument. For the reasons that follow, the motion is DENIED.
Background
On November 5 and 6, 2000, Stevedores loaded a cargo of 45 colis of hot rolled steel into Barge ACBL 6050 ("the 6050") The barge was then shifted to ACBL's upper fleet in Harahan, Louisiana, where it remained secured until November 9, 2000. On that date, the 6050 sank into the river. On November 22, the 6050 was salvaged and placed on dry-dock. Steelmark, Warrior Gulf, and ACBL conducted a joint survey of the 6050 five days later.
The captioned lawsuit was filed by Steelmark, the owner of the cargo, and American National Insurance Company against ACBL, the owner of the barge, Warrior Gulf, the charterer of the barge, and Stevedores, whose employees loaded the cargo into the 6050 barge. Steelmark's main demand was filed within one year of the casualty, and the allegations against ACBL are that the sinking was due to ACBL's failure to provide a seaworthy vessel. The claim asserted against Stevedores is based upon its allegedly negligent loading of the barge which resulted in the sinking and damage to the cargo. ACBL and Warrior Gulf filed cross-claims and indemnity actions against Stevedores. Stevedores filed this motion for summary judgment arguing that all claims are barred by the doctrine of laches.
Applicable Law
The doctrine of laches is an equitable doctrine that protects parties from stale claims. Melrose Assocs. v. United States, 43 Fed. Cl. 124, 150 (Fed.Cl. 1999). In order for a claim to be barred by laches, it must be shown that there was a delay in asserting the claim, that the delay was inexcusable, and that the delay resulted in undue prejudice to the party against whom the claim is asserted. Mecom v. Levingston Shipbuilding Co., 622 F.2d 1209, 1215 (5th Cir. 1980). Under maritime law, the court will look to analogous state statutes of limitation to determine whether there has been a delay in asserting a property damage claim. See id. at 1214. If the analogous state prescriptive period has run when the plaintiff files his claim, there is a presumption of laches that the plaintiff must then rebut. Id.
However, proof of delay alone is not enough to bar a suit because an excusable delay does not support a laches defense. See Gaddesden Shipping Corp. v. Barwil Agencies (N.A.) Inc., 2001 WL 775578, *3 (E.D. La. July 9, 2001). Further, the court must determine whether the parry against whom the claim is asserted has been unduly prejudiced as a result of the delay. Cornetta v. United States, 851 F.2d 1372, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 1988) Prejudice may be established if the party being sued is unable to mount a defense as a result of the delay. Id. "`Defense prejudice' may include the loss of records, destruction of evidence, fading memories, or unavailability of witnesses." Id.
Stevedore's Motion For Summary Judgment
Stevedores asserts that it had no notice of these cargo damage claims until a year after the incident occurred, unlike the other parties to this lawsuit who had immediate notice. Stevedore's laches defense is grounded on two circumstances which it contends are prejudice resulting from this delay: That it was not invited to participate in the joint survey of the 6050 that occurred within a week after the incident, and that its supervisor in charge of loading the 6050 now has no recollection of the loading of the barge. Stevedore's arguments as to how these two circumstances bar the claims asserted by each party are discussed below.
A. Steelmark
Stevedores concedes that it has the burden of proving inexcusable delay and undue prejudice with regard to Steelmark's claim because Steelmark filed the principal demand within one year of the 6050's demise. Stevedores states that Steelmark delay in filing suit was inexcusable.
Louisiana Civil Code article 3492, the analogous state prescriptive statute, provides for a one year prescriptive period.
In opposition, Steelmark contends that the 6050 was available for inspection until June 2002, but that Steelmark did not choose to inspect the vessel before it was scrapped. Furthermore, all of the evidence gathered thus far is completely available to Stevedores so it unable to show prejudice in not having personally attended the joint survey. Finally, the supervisor's lack of memory is not prejudice sufficient to constitute laches because to give credence to this argument would mean that parties would always have to file suit immediately after a casualty.
In reply, Stevedores argues that the fact that the barge was available for inspection until June 2002 is of no moment because by that time it had already been repaired.
B. ACBL
ACBL has cross-claimed against Stevedores for its own damages resulting from the sinking of its barge and for indemnity for any sums ACBL might ultimately have to pay to Steelmark for its lost cargo.
Stevedores points out that ACBL did not sue for its own losses until after the one year analogous prescriptive period had passed and therefore bears the burden of showing excusable delay. Stevedores contends that ACBL was in possession of information on which a claim against Stevedores would be based within days of the loss. As for the indemnity claims, Stevedores recognizes that those generally do not accrue until after liability is established but nevertheless asserts that ACBL has unreasonably delayed in filing suit.
In opposition, ACBL argues that all of the evidence necessary for preparation of Stevedores' defense is available to Stevedores. ACBL contends that Stevedores possesses the reports and photographs generated by the joint survey and that ACBL has not criticized the surveyors' findings. One of the reports is even favorable to Stevedores. Finally, ACBL points out that the supervisor's declaration regarding his loss of memory was executed nearly one year after the principal claims were filed, and that had Stevedores interviewed its own employee a year earlier when it did have notice of this suit, his memory might not be so lacking. In sum, ACBL asserts that any prejudice now suffered by Stevedores is due to its own failure to pursue discovery.
C. Warrior Gulf
Warrior Gulf has cross-claimed against Stevedores for its own damages and for indemnity for any sums Warrior Gulf might ultimately have to pay to Steelmark for its lost cargo.
Stevedores contends that for the same reasons given in support of its motion for summary judgment against the other parries, Warrior Gulf's claims should likewise be barred.
In opposition, Warrior Gulf notes that the indemnity or contribution claims do no: have to be brought until liability on the underlying claim is fixed. Moreover, it argues that even though the cross-claim against Stevedores was not brought within the analogous stature of limitations, the cross-claim arose out or me same occurrence that is the subject matter of the original action and the actions should be resolved in one proceeding.
Discussion
Considering the foregoing arguments that Stevedores makes in support of its laches defense, the Court is unpersuaded that Stevedore's has shown any real prejudice from the circumstances it complains about nor has inexcusable delay on the part of any other party been shown. The main demand was unarguably timely under the analogous state statute of limitations. The fact that Stevedore's supervisor now has no recollection of the 6050 cargo load is not convincing evidence of prejudice because a routine barge loading is not likely a memorable event. Surely there were other non-supervisory longshoremen who participated in the loading who could perhaps remember something. In short, there is no guarantee that any Stevedore employee would have remembered anything about the loading even if asked just after it occurred. Therefore, it requires sheer speculation to conclude that any delay in filing suit caused Stevedores prejudice.
Further, the Court is unwilling to conclude that Stevedore's inability to personally participate in the joint survey is per se prejudice. In deed, Stevedores points to nothing specific about the survey, other than its own absence, that makes it unreliable or suspect. It has complete access to all the data and evidence gathered.
Finally, Stevedore's arguments with respect to the indemnity claims are particularly unconvincing given that liability in the main demand has not even been established.
In sum, no evidence of inexcusable delay or prejudice has been presented to the Court so as to warrant dismissal of any of the claims based upon laches.
Accordingly;
IT IS ORDERED that the Motion for Summary Judgment (Rec. Doc. 23) filed by Stevedores, Inc. should be and is hereby DENIED.