It may be said in this connection that on practically every proposition that it is necessary to consider in a case of this kind, the authorities are in direct conflict, with numerous decisions on each side; and this was true even at the time of the decision in the Reeves case. See 20 C. J. S. 174, § 1922; 23 Am. Jur. p. 501, § 496; Lipe v. Carolina c. Railway Co., 123 S.C. 515 ( 116 S.E. 101, 30 A.L.R. 248); Gregonis v. Philadelphia Reading Coal c. Co., 235 N.Y. 152 ( 139 N.E. 223, 32 A.L.R. 1); Steele v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 206 N.C. 220 ( 173 S.E. 583, 96 A.L.R. 361); State ex rel. Taylor Laundry Co. v. District Court, 102 Mont. 274 ( 57 P.2d 772, 113 A.L.R. 1, and especially the annotations). The decision in the Reeves case accorded with the weight of authority at the time of its rendition, and still accords therewith. It expressly overruled Bawknight v. Liverpool London Globe Insurance Co., 55 Ga. 194, supra, as being in conflict with modern authority and with the policy of this State as indicated by legislation in existence at the time that case was decided; and, as shown in the quotation above, it also disapproved Central Railroad Co. v. Carr, 76 Ala. 388 (52 Am. R. 339), another exponent of the minority view, until the Alabama law was changed by legislative enactment.
Held: Service of process on the person designated as process agent for the State of North Carolina by defendant in compliance with U.S.C.A. Title 49, sec. 321 (c), is invalid and defendant is entitled to have the action dismissed. Steele v. Tel. Co., 206 N.C. 220, cited and distinguished. APPEAL by plaintiff from Nettles, J., at December Term, 1940, of BUNCOMBE.
" — International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 579 [ 34 Sup. Ct. 944], 58 L.Ed. 1479, and cases therein cited. See also the recent case of Steele v. Western Union Telegraph Co., [ 206 N.C. 220] 173 S.E. 583. In conclusion, we may state that there is no precise test of the nature or extent of the business that must be done in order to constitute "doing business."
It later held that "when a foreign corporation has property in this state and is here present transacting its corporate business through local agents, such corporation is amenable to service of process according to the provisions of C. S. § 483 ... and that this statute in the respect here assailed neither offends against the commerce clause of the Federal Constitution (art. 1, § 8, cl. 3) nor runs counter to the Fourteenth Amendment." Steele v. W. Union Tel. Co., 206 N.C. 220 (1934).
The question presented, therefore, is whether a suit by a nonresident against a foreign corporation on a cause of action arising outside this State can be maintained in North Carolina, and the defendant brought into court by a service of process on the Secretary of State. That a nonresident has access to the courts of this State is not debatable. That he can sue a foreign corporation is also beyond dispute. But to bring the foreign corporation into court the service of process must be made upon an officer or agent as defined in G.S. 1-97, and in the following cases only: (1) Where it has property in this State; or (2) where the cause of action arose in this State; or (3) where the service can be made personally upon some officer designated in G.S. 1-97. McDonald v. McArthur Brothers Co., 154 N.C. 122, 69 S.E. 832; Steele v. Telegraph Co., 206 N.C. 220, 173 S.E. 583. In the latter case the plaintiff was a nonresident, the defendant a foreign corporation, the cause of action (transitory) grew out of a transaction in the District of Columbia.
A nonresident has full right to bring an action in our courts. See McDonald v. MacArthur, 154 N.C. 122, 69 S.E. 832, and cases cited. Also Howard v. Howard, 200 N.C. 574, 158 S.E. 101; Steele v. Telegraph Co., 206 N.C. 220, 173 S.E. 583; Ingle v. Cassady, 208 N.C. 497, 181 S.E. 562; Alberts v. Alberts, 217 N.C. 443, 8 S.E.2d 523. In the McDonald case, supra, Clark, C.J., writing for the Court, had this to say: "Indeed, Const. U.S., Art. IV, Sec. 2, provides `The citizens of each State shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States.'
This, however, only brings us to the larger question whether the statute so observed and invoked is effective to bring a foreign corporation into the jurisdiction of the State court upon a cause of action arising in another state, and not in any manner connected with its activities in this State. Old Wayne Mutual Life Association v. McDonough, 204 U.S. 8, 51 L.Ed., 345, and Simon v. Southern Ry., 236 U.S. 116, 59 L.Ed., 492, followed in King v. Motor Lines, 219 N.C. 223, 13 S.E.2d 233, and Hamilton v. Greyhound Corp., 220 N.C. 815, 18 S.E.2d 367, are authorities to the contrary. ( Steele v. Telegraph Co., 206 N.C. 220, 173 S.E. 583, cited in plaintiff's brief, is distinguished in King v. Motor Lines, supra, and is unavailable as authority in support of the validity of the questioned service.) Certainly, service on the Secretary of State, a mere alternative, would be of no greater avail than service on a process agent, appointed by the corporation itself, in compliance with the statute.
Right of a corporation to enter in relationship of employment is not a fundamental right and State may qualify it by imposing conditions. 11 Amer. Jur. 1171, Sec. 344; Prudential Co. v. Chawk, 66 L.Ed. 1044; 27 A.L.R. 27. Colorado had right to provide for service on stockholder of foreign corporation employing truck driver and mechanic performing service within state. 14 C.J. 805; U.S. v. Sachington and Georgetown R.R. Co., 21 L.Ed. 675; Minnesota Commercial Men's Ass'n. v. Benn, 67 L.Ed. 573; Steele v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 96 A.L.R. 361; State ex rel. Kahn v. Tazwell, 266 P. 328; Showne v. J.L. Ownes Co., 133 Am. St. Rep. 376; 19 C.J.S. 997. Colorado Law providing for service upon stockholder of foreign corporation not violative of constitution. State of Washington ex rel. v. Superior Court, 89 A.L.R. 653. General statement in return is sufficient and disclosure of probative facts to support the ultimate conclusions is unnecessary.
' We think that although plaintiff is a nonresident and the action transitory, the doors of the courts of this State are open to her to determine her rights. Howard v. Howard, 200 N.C. 574; Steele v. Telegraph Co., 206 N.C. 220; Ingle v. Cassady, 208 N.C. 497 (498)."
The exact provisions of C. S., 483, as they relate to the service of process upon a foreign corporation, have heretofore been outlined and discussed by this Court in a number of cases. Cunningham v. Express Co., 67 N.C. 425; Higgs v. Sperry, 139 N.C. 299; Tinker v. Rice Motors, Inc., 198 N.C. 73, 150 S.E. 701; Steele v. Telegraph Co., 206 N.C. 220, 173 S.E. 583; Mauney v. Luzier's, Inc., 212 N.C. 634, 194 S.E. 323. Further repetition would serve no good purpose. The term local, as used in the statute, pertains to place and a local agent to receive and collect money ex vi termini means an agent residing either permanently or temporarily within the State for the purpose of his agency.