The right of contribution, by contrast, arises not out of statutory enactment, but is in fact a claim based in equity. See Steele v. Grot, 232 Ga. App. 847, 848 (1998) (stating that the right to contribution is inherently equitable in nature). Thus, the Court finds that the applicable statute of limitations for this claim is four years.

"The presumption that each co-obligor benefitted in an equal degree is subject to rebuttal by proof that there was an inequality of benefits received." Steele v. Grot , 232 Ga. App. 847, 848-849 (1), 503 S.E.2d 92 (1998). The Defendants argue that issues of material fact exist as to whether Connell received unequal benefits, and as such the trial court erred by granting summary judgment on the amount of damages.

As the Georgia Court of Appeals has explained, "[t]o the creditor both parties are equally bound, and if one pays more than his equal share he may seek contribution from the other." Steele v. Grot, 232 Ga.App. 847, 848 (1998) (emphasis in original). "The right of contribution arises not when the joint obligation is made but when one obligor pays more than his share of the liability."

As the Georgia Court of Appeals has explained, "[t]o the creditor both parties are equally bound, and if one pays more than his equal share he may seek contribution from the other." Steele v. Grot, 232 Ga.App. 847, 848 (1998) (emphasis in original). "The right of contribution arises not when the joint obligation is made but when one obligor pays more than his share of the liability."

A co-guarantor who has paid more than its share is entitled to demand contribution from each of the others for an aliquot part of the entire debt, and to maintain suit to enforce the right to contribution. See, e.g., Steele v. Grot, 503 S.E.2d 92, 93 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998) ("[t]he right of contribution arises not when the joint obligation is made but when one obligor pays more than his share of the liability"); W. Coach Corp. v. Roscoe, 650 P.2d 449, 454 (Ariz. 1982).

See generally Byrne v. Fierman, 256 Ga. App. 443(1) ( 568 S.E.2d 494) (2002). Because this evidence was relevant to whether the obligations in issue were "valid" and this issue was within the scope of the remand, the trial court did not err. See generally Steele v. Grot, 232 Ga. App. 847, 849(1) ( 503 S.E.2d 92) (1998) (possible set-off if one partner made unauthorized charges on partnership credit cards is relevant to amount of contribution due). 4. Murphy complains of four jury charges.

Given that decision, Ingram's cross-appeal is now moot and must be dismissed.Judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part in Case No. A01A1612; appeal dismissed in Case No. A01A1613. Johnson, P.J., and Ellington, J., concur. See Steele v. Grot, 232 Ga. App. 847, 849-850 (2) ( 503 S.E.2d 92) (1998). RUFFIN, Judge.

The ruling in Division 1 also renders defendant's cross-appeal moot. Accordingly, the cross-appeal must be dismissed. Steele v. Grot, 232 Ga. App. 847, 849 (2), 850 ( 503 S.E.2d 92). Judgment affirmed in Case No. A99A0598; appeal dismissed in Case No. A99A0599. Andrews and Ruffin, JJ., concur.

The Georgia Court of Appeals has recognized this right as well. "The right of contribution arises not when the joint obligation is made but when one obligor pays more than his share of the liability." Steele v. Grot, 232 Ga. App. 847, 848, 503 S.E.2d 92 (1998). Bankruptcy courts have enforced Georgia's law of contribution.