Opinion
No. CV 09 4020808S
October 7, 2009
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
The plaintiff, Darren Stedman, appeals from an 120-day suspension of his motor vehicle license imposed by the defendant department of motor vehicles (DMV) pursuant to General Statutes § 14-227b for his failure to pass a chemical alcohol test. The hearing officer found against the plaintiff on the four factors required under the law. See § 14-227b(g); Fishbein v. Kozlowski, 252 Conn. 38, 49, 743 A.2d 1110 (1999). The only factor appealed to this court is that of probable cause to arrest.
The issue of when the breathalyzer tests were administered was waived at the hearing in this court.
The record shows the following. On April 16, 2009, at 9:05 p.m., an officer of the Wolcott police department was dispatched to the scene of a motorcycle accident on Woodtick Road. (Return of Record, ROR, R-12.) Upon arrival, the officer noticed a damaged motorcycle located on its side in the northbound lane. There was a group of people standing in the southbound lane, one of whom was wearing leather clothing and had "scrapes on his face head." ( Id.).
Two of the witnesses stated that they came across the plaintiff lying face down in the roadway and smelled the odor of alcohol when speaking with the plaintiff. ( Id.). The officer spoke to the plaintiff who denied that anything had occurred. ( Id.) The plaintiff did admit to having drinks with friends. (ROR, R-13.) The officer could smell the odor of alcohol coming from the plaintiff ( Id.). As a result, the officer asked the plaintiff to perform field sobriety tests, which the plaintiff failed. ( Id.) The plaintiff was then arrested for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol and was transported to the Wolcott police department.
The plaintiff received an administrative hearing before a hearing officer of the DMV and received the appealed-from suspension. At the hearing, the officer testified that he based his conclusion on the plaintiff as the operator on his "training and experience." (ROR, R-28, line 1.) He had also seen nearby property damage to a mailbox and a blood stain, all of which showed the accident was fresh. (ROR, R-32, lines 1-13.)
The plaintiff claims that this evidence only shows a suspicion on the part of the officer as to his operation. In addition, the plaintiff claims that at a subsequent criminal proceeding under § 14-227a, the prosecutor stated that witnesses were not able to state that the plaintiff was operating the motorcycle.
The plaintiff has submitted to the court a transcript of the September 3, 2009 proceeding in Waterbury Superior Court. See page 1, lines 14-16. The prosecutor agreed to an " Alford" plea to reckless driving in lieu of the charge under § 14-227a.
In this argument, the plaintiff mistakenly sets the standard of review under § 14-227b at the level required for a criminal conviction. The Supreme Court has stated that "[p]robable cause, broadly defined, comprises such facts as would reasonably persuade an impartial and reasonable mind not merely to suspect or conjecture, but to believe that criminal activity has occurred . . . [O]ur case law clearly establishes that sufficient evidence justifying the commissioner's determination of probable cause may be found where the totality of the circumstances existing at the time of the plaintiff's arrest support[s] [such a finding." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Murphy v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 254 Conn. 333, 344-45, 757 A.2d 561 (2000).
Evaluating this evidence under the correct standard, there is sufficient evidence of probable cause. The hearing officer logically found that the police officer appeared at the scene moments after the accident, found the plaintiff to be the likely operator, observed the plaintiff as having signs of intoxication, and administered sobriety tests, which the plaintiff failed. The court concludes that the hearing officer was correct in his determination. See also Finley v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 113 Conn.App. 417, 425, 966 A.2d 773 (2009) (substantial evidence of operation where police officer arrived on scene and properly excluded possibility of other operators).
The administrative appeal is therefore dismissed.