We have adjudicated county election disputes in the past. See Murchie v. Clifford, 76 N.H. 99, 100 (1911) (challenge to election results for county solicitor office); Stearns v. O'Dowd, 78 N.H. 358, 359 (1917) (challenge to election results for county sheriff office). Furthermore, the form of the petition to this court is irrelevant to our review of McDonough's legal claims, because "[t]he superintending power of the court over inferior tribunals does not depend upon, and is not limited by, the technical accuracy of designation of legal forms of action."

Stickney v. Salem, 96 N.H. 500, 78 A.2d 921. The present case is distinguishable from Stickney v. Salem, supra, however, since plaintiff is contesting the actions of the Board of Recount rather than the conduct of the election itself and the present appeal is brought under a statute rather than the general equity power of the court. Stearns v. O'Dowd, 78 N.H. 358, 101 A. 31. Although the requirements of RSA ch. 59 regarding the request for and notice of the recount were not strictly followed, the finding, "that the plaintiff and other candidates had notice of the recount and were not prejudiced by the failure of the clerk to follow the specific requirements of the statute relating thereto," is amply supported by the record.

In that case the petition was properly dismissed because there is an adequate remedy at law to accomplish this purpose, viz: quo warranto. Stearns v. O'Dowd, 78 N.H. 358; Attorney General v. Gates, 80 N.H. 280; Attorney General v. Caldwell, 92 N.H. 216. The plaintiff maintains, however, that the matter in issue is the proper method of conducting the election in question and not the right of any individual to hold a public office.

"The superior court shall issue a certificate of election to the candidate who is found on such proceeding to be elected." This relates to elections and not to primaries and has been so construed. Stearns v. O'Dowd, 78 N.H. 358; Eastman v. McCarten, 70 N.H. 23. That is why although R. L., c. 34-A, s. 4 II and s. 11 provide for an appeal from the Ballot-Law Commission in case of an election recount for certain offices, no reference is made to county offices. R. L., c. 45, s. 6, has no application to the present proceeding.

Laws 1897, c. 78, s. 18. It has been held in several cases that the requirement of the statute, that where a cross has been made in the circle at the head of the column the ballot shall be counted for all names in the column not canceled or erased to the exclusion of all others, cannot be followed in a judicial inquiry as to the result of the election. Stearns v. O'Dowd, 78 N.H. 358; Dinsmore v. Mayor, 76 N.H. 187; Murchie v. Clifford, 76 N.H. 99. But the rule of the statute would not help either of the parties, because the name of neither appears in the column beneath the marked circle. The ballot also contains crosses in each of the squares opposite all the names in the column except Gingras and Gould. It is claimed the failure to make crosses opposite the names of Gingras and Gould indicates an intention not to vote for them, so that the ballot should be counted for Baker, Gingras and Barr. This cannot be done except by rejecting the cross at the head of the column, which the statute makes a vote for all the names therein not canceled or erased.

But the authorities are not uniform on that proposition. Howard v. Harrington, 114 Me. 443, 96 A. 769, L.R.A. 1917A, 211; Atty. Gen. v. Bartlett, 75 N.H. 388, 74 A. 877; Stearns v. O'Dowd, 78 N.H. 358, 101 A. 31. Cf. Voorhees v. Arnold, 108 Iowa, 77, 78 N.W. 795. A painstaking study of the ballots in question in this case constrains the court to the conclusion that they were intended as votes for Thompson, and that the seventeen ballots should be counted for him.