Opinion
No. AN-402.
February 16, 1983. Rehearing Denied March 9, 1983.
Appeal from the Circuit Court for Alachua County, Nath C. Doughtie, Acting Circuit Judge.
Charles G. Brackins, Gainesville, and Gerald M. Haskins, Gainesville, for appellant.
W. Crit Smith and Joseph R. Boyd of Boyd Smith, and Chriss Walker, Tallahassee, for appellees.
ON MOTION TO DISMISS APPEAL
This cause is before us on appellees' motion to dismiss the appeal as untimely. The question presented is whether, in a suit to determine paternity and child support, an order awarding child support, entered subsequent to a final judgment of paternity, extends the time for an appeal challenging the final judgment of paternity. We hold it does not.
The final judgment of paternity, retaining jurisdiction over the parties to consider the issue of child support and costs, was rendered April 22, 1982. Some months later, on July 16, 1982, the trial court entered an order awarding child support. Notice of appeal was filed August 4, 1982, raising no points in connection with the award of child support but attempting to challenge the final judgment of paternity. Appellee moved to dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, and this court issued an order to show cause, to which appellant has not responded.
On consideration of the question presented, we hold that reservation of jurisdiction to determine child support does not render a final judgment of paternity interlocutory in nature and that the notice of appeal directed to that judgment is untimely when filed more than 30 days after entry of the judgment. Fla.R.App.P. 9.110(b).
The appeal is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
BOOTH and THOMPSON, JJ., concur.
WENTWORTH, J., dissents with written opinion.
While I agree that a reservation of jurisdiction should not render a judgment non-final if it is otherwise dispositive of an independent claim, I would conclude in this case that the judgment of paternity was not final because the complaint on which it was rendered expressly placed in issue defendant's liability for past (and future) support payments by the state. Such sums were alleged to "constitute a debt owed by the Defendant." In these circumstances the judgment (termed final only as to paternity) did not in my opinion complete the judicial labor on an independent claim between the parties for appeal purposes, even if, absent such allegations, a paternity judgment might be considered final and appealable in spite of a reservation of jurisdiction under the statutory provision for determination of periodic support payments.