Summary
In Stauffer, 410 A.2d 972, the claimant worked for the Stackpole Carbon Company for 46 years and concurrently for a second employer, Industrial Steel and Pipe Company, for 26 years.
Summary of this case from Earnest v. Unemp. Comp. Bd. of Rev.Opinion
Argued December 3, 1979
February 8, 1980.
Unemployment compensation — Purging disqualification — Unemployment Compensation Law, Act 1936, December 5, P.L. (1937) 2897 — Layoff from second job.
1. Provisions of the Unemployment Compensation Law, Act 1936, December 5, P.L. (1937) 2897, permitting a claimant to purge a previous disqualification by working at a new job for a particular period, dictate that benefits be denied in such circumstances when the claimant does not work the required period in the new job, but such provisions were not intended to apply where a claimant quits one of two jobs held for a long time without knowledge that he would subsequently be laid off from his second job. [286]
Argued December 3, 1979, before Judges WILKINSON, JR., MENCER and ROGERS, sitting as a panel of three.
Appeal, No. 2535 C.D. 1978, from the Order of the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review in case of In Re: Claim of Louis Stauffer, No. B-165004.
Application to the Bureau of Employment Security for unemployment compensation benefits. Benefits denied. Applicant appealed to the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review. Denial affirmed as modified. Applicant appealed to the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania. Held: Reversed and remanded.
Thomas G. Wagner, for petitioner.
Charles G. Hasson, Assistant Attorney General, with him Richard Wagner, Chief Counsel, and Edward G. Biester, Jr., Attorney General, for respondent.
Louis Stauffer (claimant) appeals from an order of the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review (Board), which denied him benefits pursuant to Section 401(f) of the Unemployment Compensation Law, which provides in pertinent part:
Act of December 5, 1936, Second Ex. Sess., P.L. (1937) 2897, as amended, 43 P. S. § 801(f).
Compensation shall be payable to any employe who is or becomes unemployed, and who —
. . . .
(f) Has earned, subsequent to his separation from work under circumstances which are disqualifying under the provisions of subsections 402(b) [voluntary termination], 402(e) [willful misconduct] and 402(h) [self-employment] of this act, remuneration for services in an amount equal to or in excess of six (6) times his weekly benefit rate. . . .
We reverse.
Claimant was employed full time, for 46 1/2 years, with Stackpole Carbon Company (Stackpole) and part time, for 26 years, with Industrial Steel and Pipe Company (Industrial). In October 1977, claimant decided to retire voluntarily from Stackpole, effective December 30, 1977, and became eligible for a pension. Claimant continued to work for Industrial, however, until he was laid off on January 2, 1978. The Board, relying on Section 401(f), denied unemployment benefits, and claimant appeals the denial of benefits to this court.
Claimant averaged 25 hours a week in this part-time job.
We believe that the Board misapplied Section 401(f). This section enables a potential claimant to purge his previous disqualification for benefits by working at a new job long enough to earn six times his weekly benefit rate. Miller v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 29 Pa. Commw. 541, 372 A.2d 35 (1977). We have consistently denied benefits under this section only in those situations where the claimant has lost one job under disqualifying circumstances, gained another, and then was laid off the new job before he could earn six times his weekly benefit rate. See Richards v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 42 Pa. Commw. 425, 400 A.2d 1345 (1979); Miller v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, supra; Daniels v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 10 Pa. Commw. 241, 309 A.2d 738 (1973). We do not believe that the legislature intended this purging section to be applied to the peculiar facts of this case, wherein the claimant had maintained two jobs for a long period of time, had voluntarily quit one of them without knowledge that he would be laid off from his second job, and had been subsequently laid off from his second job. Accordingly, we must remand this case to the Board for a computation of benefits.
ORDER
AND NOW, this 8th day of February, 1980, the decision of the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, No. B-165004, dated October 13, 1978, is hereby reversed, and this case is remanded to the Board for a determination of benefits.
Judge DiSALLE did not participate in the decision in this case.