Opinion
No. CV 01-0812540
May 20, 2003
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
The respondent, Peter D. Hirschl, was suspended from the practice of law by this court on January 16, 2002, pursuant to an application for reciprocal discipline arising out of his suspension in New York state. This case was continued until April 23, 2003 when Hirschl appeared at a hearing on a two-count presentment asking that appropriate discipline be imposed by the court.
Count one requests the imposition of discipline, pursuant to Practice Book § 2-25, because Hirschl did not notify the statewide grievance committee of disciplinary action taken against him by the Supreme Court of New York. The court finds that this failure was the unintentional result of ignorance of the rule and count one is accordingly dismissed.
Count two requests appropriate discipline with respect to Hirschl's criminal conviction for conspiracy to launder money. The facts are undisputed.
On September 23, 1999, Hirschl pleaded guilty to violation of title 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (h), conspiracy to money launder, in the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut. As a result of this plea he faced maximum penalties of ten years imprisonment, a fine of $250,000 and supervised release of up to three years. Additionally, the court could order restitution, the forfeiture of the property involved in the conspiracy, amounting to $230,000 and a special assessment of $100.
As part of the plea, Hirschl admitted that he, Paul Silvester and Christopher Stack knowingly and willfully entered into an unlawful agreement and conspiracy to engage in and did, in fact, engage in monetary transactions involving criminally derived property which had a value of over $10,000.
From July 1997 to January 6, 1999, Silvester, Hirschl's brother-in-law, was treasurer of the state of Connecticut and sole fiduciary for the state's pension fund. During that period, Silvester accepted a portion of the monies that Stack received as a consultant or placement agent on certain private equity funds in which the state of Connecticut pension fund had invested. In return for these payments, Silvester improperly directed two private equity consulting agreements to Stack.
There was no evidence that Hirschl was aware of this arrangement.
In approximately November of 1998, Hirschl and Silvester agreed that Stack would retain Hirschl to purportedly provide legal services. In fact, no material legal services were to be provided and it was agreed that the money paid by Stack to Hirschl would be for the benefit of and transferred to Silvester. There is no evidence that Hirschl was to benefit financially from this conspiracy.
On approximately December 31, 1998, Hirschl sent a letter to Stack in which he stated that he was to charge him $450 an hour and requested a $100,000 retention payment.
The hourly rate that was set forth in that agreement greatly exceeded the normal hourly rate Hirschl charged and was disguised in order to explain the substantial amount of money received from Stack, which ultimately totaled $230,000.
Hirschl sent no bills or work product to Stack. He, at the direction of Silvester, placed the money in various bank accounts and purchased Connecticut tax-free bonds. Hirschl was aware that the $230,000 received from Stack was criminally derived property, but did not know the nature of the specific unlawful activity involved, namely the corrupt solicitation and acceptance of cash payments by Silvester intended to influence him in connection with the business of the Connecticut treasurer's office.
Hirschl was sentenced on September 23, 2002. Between the time of his guilty plea on September 23, 1999, and the date of his sentencing, Hirschl did not practice law.
Hirschl was sentenced to serve five months of incarceration in a halfway house to be followed by five months of home confinement. The court imposed a term of supervised release of three years and required Hirschl to pay the costs of home confinement, including the cost of the voice monitoring verification equipment. During the first years of his supervised release, Hirschl is required to perform 200 hours of community service and pay a fine of $15,000 and a special assessment of $100.
The terms of the sentence resulted in part from a plea bargain and downward departures from the federal sentencing guidelines. The court, (Covello, J.) considered Hirschl's past acts of charity and kindness, community and civic activities, family circumstances, and the totality of the circumstances. Hirschl had no past trouble with the law, and he did not intend to nor did he benefit from the criminal activities.
The petitioner argues that Hirschl should be suspended from the practice of law for three years and ten months from the date of sentencing, which would be the completion of his sentences. The petitioner avers that, an attorney serving a sentence can neither vote nor serve as a juror on a state court proceeding and should not be deemed an attorney in good standing during that period.
Hirschl claims that his suspension should end on September 10, 2003, when the period of his home confinement ends. He points out that there was a long period (three years) between his guilty plea and the sentencing during which time he did not practice law.
Both sides direct the court to the American Bar Association (ABA) standards for imposing lawyer sanctions. Although not formally adopted in Connecticut, our courts consistently rely on them as a guide for determining appropriate disciplinary sanctions. Statewide Grievance Committee v. Spirer, 247 Conn. 762, 782 (1999); Statewide Grievance Committee v. Shluger, 230 Conn. 673 n. 10 (1994).
This court finds that the following aggravating factors set forth in the ABA standards apply in the instant case: (i) substantial experience in the practice of law (since 1995); (k) engaging in illegal conduct as reflected in his guilty plea; (c) a pattern of misconduct as he accepted money improperly from Stack on two occasions and issued a false retainer letter calling for a retainer fee in excess of his standard fee; and (h) vulnerability of the victim, since this is a crime against the community which would be difficult to discover. This court finds that the following aggravating factors do not apply: (a) prior disciplinary offenses; (b) dishonest or selfish motive (he acted to benefit a relative whom he perceived to be in need rather than himself); (d) multiple offenses; (e) bad faith obstruction of the disciplinary proceeding by intentionally failing to comply with rules or orders of the disciplinary agency; (f) submission of false evidence; (g) refusal to acknowledge wrongful nature of the conduct; and (j) indifference to making restitution.
This court finds that the following mitigating factors as set forth in the ABA guidelines apply: (a) absence of a prior disciplinary record; (b) absence of a dishonest or selfish motive; (d) timely good faith effort to make restitution or to rectify the consequences of misconduct; (e) free and full disclosure to disciplinary board; (g) his good character and reputation; (k) imposition of other penalties or sanctions; and (l) remorse.
I have reviewed the presentence report prepared for the sentencing judge, Hon. Alfred V. Covello, Chief Judge, United States District Court for the District of Connecticut. Like Judge Covello, I am very favorably impressed with the large number of testimonial letters written on Hirschl's behalf. These letters are from persons in all walks of life and speak from personal experience of Hirschl's commitment to the community, charities and individuals. These activities have been longstanding and were not calculated to gain recognition or acclaim. None were undertaken for recognition at sentencing or this presentment.
Viewing the totality of the circumstances and balancing the factors set forth in the ABA guidelines, it is ordered that Hirschl be suspended from the practice of law in Connecticut until January 1, 2005. If he has met all the conditions of his sentence he may be readmitted without application and without having to take the bar-related courses or examinations requested by the petitioner.
John J. Langenbach Superior Court Judge