Opinion
No. COA11–1029.
2012-04-17
STATE of North Carolina v. Billy Gray YOST.
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Alexandra Gruber, for the State. J. Edward Yeager, Jr., for Defendant.
Appeal by Defendant from judgment entered 21 February 2011 by Judge William Z. Wood, Jr. in Rowan County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 16 April 2012. Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Alexandra Gruber, for the State. J. Edward Yeager, Jr., for Defendant.
BEASLEY, Judge.
On 6 October 2007, Billy Gray Yost (Defendant) was arrested pursuant to a warrant for taking indecent liberties with a child. Following his arrest, Defendant was taken to the Rowan County Sheriff's department and placed in an interview room. Detective Clint Mauldin interviewed Defendant who made incriminating statements. Detective Mauldin wrote Defendant's statement and Defendant signed the written statement.
Prior to trial, Defendant moved to suppress the statement he made to Detective Mauldin. The trial court denied the motion. Defendant was convicted as charged and the trial court sentenced him to a term of twenty-one to twenty-six months imprisonment. Defendant appeals.
Defendant's sole argument on appeal is that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress. Defendant asserts that he was under arrest, subject to custodial interrogation, and was thus entitled to be apprised of his Miranda rights. Defendant further contends that his statement was taken in violation of his right to counsel.
Our review of a trial court's denial of a motion to suppress is “strictly limited to determining whether the trial judge's underlying findings of fact are supported by competent evidence, in which event they are conclusively binding on appeal, and whether those factual findings in turn support the judge's ultimate conclusions of law.” State v. Cooke, 306 N.C. 132, 134, 291 S.E.2d 618, 619 (1982). “The trial court's conclusions of law ... are fully reviewable on appeal.” State v. Hughes, 353 N.C. 200, 208, 539 S.E.2d 625, 631 (2000).
Here, Detective Mauldin testified that he gave Defendant his Miranda warnings prior to taking his statement. Defendant testified to the contrary, claiming Detective Mauldin “never read me my rights.” However, Defendant's initials appear on the Waiver of Rights form and Defendant admits that he initialed the form. The trial court, however, found Defendant was given his Miranda warnings, that he understood his rights, and he willingly waived his rights.
Detective Mauldin further testified that, after apprising Defendant of his Miranda rights, he asked Defendant, “[a]re you willing to talk with me without a lawyer present?” Defendant replied affirmatively. Defendant again testified to the contrary, claiming he told Detective Mauldin he “needed to talk to a lawyer.” Billy Smith, Defendant's roommate, testified that when Defendant was arrested, he asked Detective Mauldin if Defendant needed a lawyer, but Defendant never requested to speak to a lawyer. Smith further testified, however, that Defendant had always maintained that he asked for a lawyer. The trial court nevertheless found that Defendant did not ask for a lawyer. Because the trial court's findings of fact are supported by competent evidence, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Defendant's motion to suppress.
Although Defendant's testimony, and to some extent Smith's testimony as well, would support contrary findings, “we are bound by the trial court's determinations of credibility and the weight to be afforded the testimony, absent an abuse of discretion.” State v. Watkins, 120 N.C.App. 804, 808, 463 S.E.2d 802, 805 (1995) (citing State v. Cooke, 306 N.C. 132, 134, 291 S.E.2d 618, 619–20 (1982)). Detective Mauldin's testimony supports the trial court's findings that Defendant received and understood his Miranda rights and did not request counsel. Consequently, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion. Accordingly, we conclude the trial court properly denied Defendant's motion to suppress.
Affirmed. Judges CALABRIA and STROUD concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).