Opinion
Case No. 02-4082-JAR
January 2, 2004
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR RULE 54(b) CERTIFICATION AND CLARIFYING THE IDENTITY OF STORMONT-VAIL DEFENDANTS
On November 5, 2002, this Court dismissed the claims against three defendants with prejudice and sua sponte dismissed defendant Clarkson Construction Co., "without prejudice, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(m) for Plaintiff's failure to effectuate service within 120 days." Plaintiff appealed the order.
On December 5, 2003, the Tenth Circuit issued a show cause order that directed plaintiff to file a copy of an order from this Court that either grants certification of the November 5, 2002, order of dismissal or explicitly adjudicates all remaining claims in the consolidated case. The Tenth Circuit further directed that, while the matter is before the Court on the Rule 54(b) issue, plaintiff should obtain a ruling clarifying the identity of the appropriate Stormont-Vail party.
On December 15, 2003, plaintiff moved for Rule 54(b) certification and for a ruling clarifying the identity of the appropriate Stormont-Vail party (Doc. 154). On December 31, 2003, Stormont-Vail filed a response (Doc. 155) and a motion for ruling (Doc. 156). Rule 54(b) certification
Rule 54(b) provides that when multiple claims or parties are involved in an action, "the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express determination that there is no just reason for delay and upon an express direction for the entry of judgment." Because "sound judicial administration does not require that Rule 54(b) requests be granted routinely," the power to grant such a request rests with the sole discretion of a district court. In analyzing a Rule 54(b) motion, "a district court must first determine that it is dealing with a 'final judgment.'" The court's disposition must have been a "'judgment' in the sense that it is a decision upon a cognizable claim for relief, and it must be 'final' in the sense that it is 'an ultimate disposition of an individual claim entered in the course of a multiple claims action.'" The Court finds that its November 5, 2002, order that granted motions to dismiss with prejudice in favor of three defendants constituted a "final judgment" for purposes of Rule 54(b), because it was an ultimate disposition of plaintiff's claims against those defendants.
Netwig v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 266 F. Supp.2d 1279, 1281 (D. Kan. 2003) (citation omitted).
Id. (citation omitted).
Id. (citation omitted).
After determining finality, the court must examine whether there is any just reason for delay. "In deciding whether there are no just reasons to delay the appeal of individual final judgments . . . a district court must take into account judicial administrative interests as well as the equities involved. Consideration of the former is necessary to assure that application of the Rule effectively 'preserves the historic federal policy against piecemeal appeals.'" In cases where multiple issues are presented in a single lawsuit, federal policy dictates that all claims be resolved in a single action and, if an appeal is necessary, that all claims be appealed together. Although his claim against Clarkson was dismissed without prejudice, more than a year has transpired since the Court's order and plaintiff has not refiled his action against that defendant. The Court determines that there is no just reason for delaying an appeal on these issues. Therefore, the Court finds that a Rule 54(b) certificate is appropriate, and the parties may proceed with the appellate process.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b); Netwig, 266 F. Supp.2d at 1282 (citation omitted).
Id. (quotation omitted).
The Court notes that as with the other defendants, plaintiff never alleges in his claim against Clarkson that he is a member of a protected class under Title VII and never alleges that he was harassed on the basis of race, color or national origin, nor that he exhausted his administrative remedies by filing a complaint with the EEOC, a jurisdictional requirement to filing a Title VII and ADA action.
Identity of Stormont-Vail defendants
On September 10, 2002, Stormont-Vail, Inc. ("SVI") filed an Objection to Improper Substitution of Party Defendant (Doc. 116). On October 3, 2002, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Amend Complaint purporting to change the identity of Stormont-Vail, Inc., to Stormont-Vail HealthCare, Inc. ("SVHC") (Doc. 125), and SVI responded (Doc. 131). On November 5, 2002, the Court issued its order granting the motions to dismiss by various defendants (Doc. 133) without ruling on these motions. The caption of the November 5, 2002, order lists SVHC as a defendant, but does not list SVI. The Court granted dismissal of SVHC for lack of diversity jurisdiction and supplemental claim jurisdiction.
It appears that Plaintiff intended SVHC as the defendant in this action, based on his claims arising out of the provision of health care services. However, Plaintiff originally designated SVI as the named defendant, and SVI is the entity that appeared in this action and filed the motion to dismiss. SVHC concedes that but for the Plaintiffs mistake as to which Stormont-Vail entity was involved in the provision of health care services, SVHC would have been named as the defendant, and the Stormont-Vail entities have agreed to be considered and treated as named defendants. Accordingly, the Court will grant Plaintiffs motion to amend the complaint and designate SVHC as a party defendant; SVI shall also remain a party defendant in order that all of Plaintiff's claims against the Stormont-Vail entities may be resolved in a single action. Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(c), this amendment shall relate back to the original date of filing.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED BY THE COURT that Plaintiff's motion for Rule 54(b) certification (Doc. 154) is GRANTED;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff's motion to amend complaint (Doc. 125) and Stormont-Vail's motion for ruling (Doc. 156) are GRANTED and that Stormont-Vail HealthCare, Inc. shall be designated as a party defendant; Stormont-Vail, Inc. shall also remain a party defendant. The objection to improper substitution of party defendant (Doc. 116) is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.