State Water Commission v. Norwich

19 Citing cases

  1. Derby v. Water Resources Commission

    172 A.2d 907 (Conn. 1961)   Cited 12 times

    The case, however, involves a matter of great public interest and we will consider the claims made in the plaintiff's brief in this court. State Water Commission v. Norwich, 141 Conn. 442, 444, 107 A.2d 270. The committee's finding concerning the proceedings in this matter may be stated in summary as follows: During 1956, the plaintiff, a municipal corporation, was discharging daily into the Naugatuck and Housatonic Rivers, through its sewage system, a million gallons of untreated sewage.

  2. Jeanne Rivers v. City of New Britain

    288 Conn. 1 (Conn. 2008)   Cited 77 times
    Construing a statute with an otherwise plain meaning in order to avoid an "unworkable" result

    Id., 406. As a final illustration of the concept of impracticability, in State Water Commission v. Norwich, 141 Conn. 442, 107 A.2d 270 (1954), the question before us was whether a statute that empowered the water commission to enforce any of its orders issued to a municipality by bringing an action in the Superior Court, and also authorized the court subsequently to issue an "`appropriate decree or process'"; id., 443; included a grant of authority to the court, not only to enforce such orders, but also to modify an order to permit enforcement where the date of compliance already had passed. Id., 444.

  3. Friedson v. Westport

    181 Conn. 230 (Conn. 1980)   Cited 40 times
    In Friedson v. Westport, 181 Conn. 230, 435 A.2d 17 (1980), the plaintiff challenged the constitutionality of the zoning regulations relating to advertising as infringing upon his freedom of speech, an issue that could not readily have been raised in an appeal from the denial of his application for a variance.

    "We have frequently held that when a party has a statutory right of appeal from the decision of an administrative officer or agency, he may not, instead of appealing, bring an independent action to test the very issue which the appeal was designed to test. McNish v. American Brass Co., 139 Conn. 44, 53, 89 A.2d 566; State Water Commissioner v. Norwich, 141 Conn. 442, 447, 107 A.2d 270." Country Lands, Inc. v. Swinnerton, 151 Conn. 27, 33, 193 A.2d 483 (1963); Blum v. Lisbon Leasing Corporation, 173 Conn. 175, 179, 377 A.2d 280 (1977).

  4. Connecticut Mobile Home Assn. v. Jensen's, Inc.

    178 Conn. 586 (Conn. 1979)   Cited 75 times

    To allow a party seeking a declaratory judgment to bypass the entire process . . . would be to interject an unnecessary and potentially confusing element into an otherwise well-defined area of the law." Id., 358-59; see also Country Lands, Inc. v. Swinnerton, 151 Conn. 27, 33, 193 A.2d 483 (1963); State Water Commission v. Norwich, 141 Conn. 442, 447, 107 A.2d 270 (1954); McNish v. American Brass Co., 139 Conn. 44, 53, 89 A.2d 566 (1952). As in the Connecticut Life case, some stronger justification than that urged by the present plaintiffs is required for us to create an exception to submitting to the administrative process.

  5. Carpenter v. Planning Zoning Commission

    176 Conn. 581 (Conn. 1979)   Cited 167 times
    Holding that conditional approvals of subdivision applications are inconsistent with the statutory mandate, and thus unlawful

    We have frequently stated that when a party has a statutory right of appeal from the decision of an administrative agency, he may not, instead of appealing, bring an independent action to test the very issue which the appeal was designed to test. Country Lands, Inc. v. Swinnerton, 151 Conn. 27, 33, 193 A.2d 483 (1963); State Water Commission v. Norwich, 141 Conn. 442, 447, 107 A.2d 270 (1954); McNish v. American Brass Co., 139 Conn. 44, 53, 89 A.2d 566 (1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 913, 73 S.Ct. 336, 97 L.Ed. 704 (1953); cf. Connecticut Light Health Ins. Guaranty Assn. v. Jackson, 173 Conn. 352, 357, 377 A.2d 1099 (1977); Boucher Agency, Inc. v. Zimmer, 160 Conn. 404, 410, 279 A.2d 540 (1971). The only relevant exception to this rule is where the administrative action is void. Smith v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 142 Conn. 88, 93, 111 A.2d 552 (1955).

  6. Connecticut Life Health Ins. Guaranty v. Jackson

    173 Conn. 352 (Conn. 1977)   Cited 117 times
    In Connecticut Life Health Ins. Guaranty Ass'n. v. Jackson, supra, 173 Conn. 352, the plaintiff brought an action for a declaratory judgment in the Superior Court seeking an interpretation of an insurance statute which did not include an explicit provision requiring resort to administrative remedies.

    We conclude that CLHIGA has an administrative remedy. CLHIGA contends that even if an administrative remedy is available to it under the UAPA, the remedy is not exclusive. This court, however, has repeatedly affirmed the principle that when an adequate administrative remedy is provided by law, it should be exhausted. Country Lands, Inc. v. Swinnerton, 151 Conn. 27, 33, 193 A.2d 483; State Water Commission v. Norwich, 141 Conn. 442, 447, 107 A.2d 270; McNish v. American Brass Co., 139 Conn. 44, 53, 89 A.2d 566. The UAPA provides a completely adequate method of resolving the questions presented by this case. The real issue in this case, therefore, becomes whether the method provided in the UAPA is exclusive and assumes precedence over any other form of relief. Though the UAPA contains no provisions for exclusivity, the legislature did indicate its intention that the agencies and the Court of Common Pleas be the principal forums for deciding such questions, by stating that the UAPA applies to all agencies and agency proceedings not specifically exempted ( 4-185); by expressly charging the Court of Common Pleas with responsibility for reviewing administrative actions and rendering declaratory judgments after the agency has passed on the validity or applicability of a regulation or order or has declined to do so ( 4-183 [b], 4-175); by granting the Court of Common Pleas the power to stay agency orders ( 4-183 [c]); and by repealing a

  7. Blum v. Lisbon Leasing Corporation

    173 Conn. 175 (Conn. 1977)   Cited 69 times
    Affirming grant of injunctive relief for conditions "which tended to destroy the plaintiffs' use and enjoyment of their properties"

    The defendants cite the many decisions of this court wherein we have held that "when a party has a statutory right of appeal from the decision of an administrative officer or agency, he may not, instead of appealing, bring an independent action to test the very issue which the appeal was designed to test." Country Lands, Inc. v. Swinnerton, 151 Conn. 27, 33, 193 A.2d 483; State Water Commission v. Norwich, 141 Conn. 442, 447, 107 A.2d 270; McNish v. American Brass Co., 139 Conn. 44, 53, 89 A.2d 566. "This power [to review] is vested in a zoning board of appeals, both to provide aggrieved persons with full and adequate administrative relief and to give the reviewing court the benefit of the local board's judgment." Country Lands, Inc. v. Swinnerton, supra, 33, 34; see 2 Rathkopf, Zoning and Planning (3d Ed.) p. 37-6, 1.

  8. Water Resources Comm. v. Conn. Sand Stone Corp.

    170 Conn. 27 (Conn. 1975)   Cited 29 times
    In Water Resources Commission, the plaintiff commission found, in three companion cases, that the defendant company was polluting state waters.

    See Chicago v. O'Connell, 278 Ill. 591, 608, 116 N.E. 210; 42 Am.Jur. 671, 580, 573." State Water Commission v. Norwich, 141 Conn. 442, 447, 107 A.2d 270; cf. Vaill v. Sewer Commission, 168 Conn. 514, 518-19, 362 A.2d 885. The second issue presented is whether the trial court erred in concluding that an injunction is mandated under 25-54n of the General Statutes.

  9. Astarita v. Liquor Control Commission

    165 Conn. 185 (Conn. 1973)   Cited 25 times
    In Astarita, the local zoning enforcement officer denied the plaintiff's application for a certification that the local zoning regulations did not prohibit a grocery store beer permit at the plaintiff's grocery store premises.

    "We have frequently held that when a party has a statutory right of appeal from the decision of an administrative officer or agency, he may not, instead of appealing, bring an independent action to test the very issue which the appeal was designed to test. McNish v. American Brass Co., 139 Conn. 44, 53, 89 A.2d 566; State Water Commission v. Norwich, 141 Conn. 442, 447, 107 A.2d 270. The essential purpose of a zoning board of appeals, so far as its power to grant variances under 8-6 (3) of the General Statutes is concerned, is to furnish some elasticity in the application of regulatory measures so that they do not operate in an arbitrary, unreasonable or confiscatory manner, or in any manner which would be unconstitutional. Florentine v. Darien, 142 Conn. 415, 425, 115 A.2d 328, and authorities cited.

  10. Bianco v. Darien

    157 Conn. 548 (Conn. 1969)   Cited 170 times
    In Bianco, the plaintiffs claimed that by taking action against them and failing to enforce its zoning regulations against other violators, the defendant town violated the plaintiffs' right to equal protection under the law.

    "We have frequently held that when a party has a statutory right of appeal from the decision of an administrative officer or agency, he may not, instead of appealing, bring an independent action to test the very issue which the appeal was designed to test. McNish v. American Brass Co., 139 Conn. 44, 53, 89 A.2d 566; State Water Commission v. Norwich, 141 Conn. 442, 447, 107 A.2d 270." Country Lands, Inc. v. Swinnerton, 151 Conn. 27, 33, 193 A.2d 483; Florentine v. Darien, 142 Conn. 415, 431, 115 A.2d 328; 2 Rathkopf, Law of Zoning and Planning (3d Ed.), p. 35-10; 2 Yokley, Zoning Law and Practice (3d Ed.) 18-11, p. 399; 8A McQuillin, Municipal Corporations (3d Ed. Rev.) 25.283, p. 298.