" Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 295, 93 S.Ct. 1038, 1046, 35 L.Ed.2d 297 (1973). In this case, the trial judge struck a fair and appropriate balance between the rights of confrontation and presenting a defense protected by the Sixth Amendment and the policy expressed in State v. Zaccardi, 280 Minn. 291, 159 N.W.2d 108 (1968), and implicit in Minn.Stat. § 609.347 (1978), of protecting the complaining witness from perhaps irrelevant and unnecessary "besmirching of her character for chastity * * *." 280 Minn. 295, 159 N.W.2d 110. In State v. Zaccardi, 280 Minn. 291, 295, 159 N.W.2d 108, 110 (1968), a rape prosecution, during the cross-examination of the complainant the trial court sustained the state's objection to defense counsel's question concerning her prior chastity, and the defendant did not pursue the matter or make an offer of proof with respect to the issue of chastity.
For these reasons we find the verdict to be clearly supported by the evidence. See, State v. Artez, 286 Minn. 545, 176 N.W.2d 81 (1970); State v. Weigold, 281 Minn. 73, 160 N.W.2d 577 (1968); State v. Zaccardi, 280 Minn. 291, 159 N.W.2d 108 (1968); State v. Brown, 278 Minn. 186, 153 N.W.2d 229 (1967). 2.
); State v. Scott, 493 N.W.2d 546, 547 (Minn.1992) (“[T]he admission of evidence of his separately-tried and nontestifying codefendant's extrajudicial confession to a mutual acquaintance in defendant's presence that defendant and he killed Yungk violated defendant's sixth amendment right of confrontation.” (emphasis added)); State v. Zaccardi, 280 Minn. 291, 294, 159 N.W.2d 108, 109–10 (1968) (characterizing statements made by the defendant to coworkers before the police investigation commenced as confessions). In State v. Koskela, 536 N.W.2d at 629, the defendant claimed the State presented insufficient evidence on the intent element of a burglary charge because the only evidence that he entered the apartment to rob the victim was his uncorroborated confessions to his acquaintances.
Moreover, courts have recognized that even where evidence of past sexual behavior might be otherwise probative of consent, strong evidence of force destroys the issue of consent sufficiently to render evidence of the complaining witness' sexual behavior irrelevant. McClean v. United States, 377 A.2d 74 (D.C. App. 1977); State v. Zaccardi, 280 Minn. 291, 159 N.W.2d 108 (1968); State v. Geer, 13 Wn. App. 71, 533 P.2d 389 (1975). In the present case, the complainant testified that she was violently struck by the defendant when she resisted his unwanted sexual advances.
In State v. Wulff, 194 Minn. 271, 274, 260 N.W. 515, 516 (1935), we adopted the rule that evidence of particular acts as well as evidence of general reputation is admissible to prove unchastity as it bears on the question of consent. In a more recent case, State v. Zaccardi, 280 Minn. 291, 159 N.W.2d 108 (1968), we held that the evidence of unchastity was not a proper subject of cross-examination but, if admissible at all, was a part of defendant's case in chief. Subsequently, in State v. Warford, 293 Minn. 339, 200 N.W.2d 301 (1973), we suggested in a footnote that there may be circumstances where such evidence is not admissible even as a part of defendant's case.
State v. Hamilton, 289 N.W.2d 470, 475 (Minn. 1979) (quoting State v. Zaccardi, 280 Minn. 291, 295, 159 N.W.2d 108, 110 (1968)). We conclude that the trial court's utilization of Rule 403 was appropriate.