Opinion
2023-P-0033
12-29-2023
STATE OF OHIO, CITY OF RAVENNA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CALEB J. YOUNGBLOOD, Defendant-Appellee.
Victor V. Vigluicci, Portage County Prosecutor, and Theresa M. Scahill, Assistant Prosecutor, (For Plaintiff-Appellant). Joel A. Holt, Maguire, Schneckenburger Legal Group, (For Defendant-Appellee).
Criminal Appeal from the Municipal Court, Ravenna Division Trial Court No. 2022 TRC 11371 R.
Victor V. Vigluicci, Portage County Prosecutor, and Theresa M. Scahill, Assistant Prosecutor, (For Plaintiff-Appellant).
Joel A. Holt, Maguire, Schneckenburger Legal Group, (For Defendant-Appellee).
OPINION
EUGENE A. LUCCI, J.
{¶1} Appellant, the state of Ohio/city of Ravenna, appeals the judgment of the Portage County Court of Common Pleas, granting the motion to suppress evidence filed by appellee, Caleb J. Youngblood. At issue is whether the trial court erred in concluding that the arresting officer lacked reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigative stop of appellee's vehicle. We affirm.
{¶2} At approximately 2:15 a.m., on the Friday morning following Thanksgiving, 2022, Trooper Matt Langston was sitting near the Intersection of State Route 44 and Tallmadge Road when appellee approached the intersection driving a large Chevrolet pickup. The trooper noted appellee did not make a right turn on red but waited for the light to turn green. After the appellee turned, the trooper followed him traveling south on State Route 44. Trooper Langston noted the roadway was wet and, as he approached Bower Road, he observed tire marks on the roadway indicating a wide turn onto Bower Road. The trooper, however, did not observe appellee's vehicle create these marks or commit a traffic infraction.
{¶3} Upon turning onto Bower Road, the trooper noticed taillights in the distance. He proceeded, following the lights and observed appellee's truck. The trooper caught up to appellee and observed him turn onto Kline Road where he observed what he perceived as two marked lane violations. Trooper Langston testified that half of the driver's side truck's tires were on the centerline. The trooper's dash-cam video demonstrated that appellee's left rear tire touched upon the center line briefly after the turn. The video, however, does not show the truck weaving significantly or moving across the marked lanes.
{¶4} Moreover, the evidence demonstrated (and the trooper admitted) that Kline Road is narrow and that appellee's truck barely fit within the lane of travel. Appellee submitted an exhibit which depicted the width of his truck in relation to the narrowness of the lane of travel on Kline Road. The picture demonstrated that, even when the truck is squarely within the proper lane, its tires, on either side, are inches from the centerlines as well as the fog line.
{¶5} The trooper stopped appellee and charged him with a marked lanes violation and operating a vehicle while intoxicated. Appellee pleaded not guilty and filed a motion to suppress. After a hearing on the motion, the trial court granted the motion concluding that the trooper lacked reasonable suspicion to stop appellant and conduct an investigative search based upon the alleged marked lanes violation. The court further noted that appellee "committed no violation of law to justify the stop herein." The state now appeals assigning the following as error:
{¶6} "The trial court erred in granting Mr. Youngblood's motion to suppress based on its conclusion that he had not committed a violation of the law."
{¶7} Appellate review of a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress evidence presents a mixed question of law and fact. State v. Burnside, 100 Ohio St.3d 152, 2003-Ohio-5372, 797 N.E.2d 71, ¶ 8. During a hearing on a motion to suppress evidence, the trial judge acts as the trier of fact and, as such, is in the best position to resolve factual questions and assess the credibility of witnesses. State v. Mills, 62 Ohio St.3d 357, 366, 582 N.E.2d 972 (1992). An appellate court reviewing a motion to suppress is bound to accept the trial court's findings of fact where they are supported by competent, credible evidence. State v. Guysinger, 86 Ohio App.3d 592, 594, 621 N.E.2d 726 (4th Dist.1993). Accepting these facts as true, the appellate court independently reviews the trial court's legal determinations de novo. State v. Djisheff, 11th Dist. Trumbull No. 2005-T-0001, 2006-Ohio-6201, ¶ 19.
{¶8} An officer may constitutionally stop a motorist if the seizure is premised upon either a reasonable suspicion or probable cause. See, e.g., Ravenna v. Nethken, 11th Dist. Portage No. 2001-P-0040, 2002-Ohio-3129, ¶ 34. Probable cause is defined in terms of those facts and circumstances sufficient to warrant a prudent law enforcement officer in believing that a suspect committed or was committing an offense. See Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91, 85 S.Ct. 223, 13 L.Ed.2d 142 (1964). It is well-settled that an officer's observation of a traffic violation furnishes probable cause to stop a vehicle. See, e.g., State v. Korman, 11th Dist. Lake No. 2004-L-064, 2006-Ohio-1795.
{¶9} In this case, neither party argues that the trooper possessed probable cause to stop. And the evidence submitted at the suppression hearing established no traffic violation occurred prior to the trooper initiating the stop. Instead, at issue is whether the trooper's testimony, in conjunction with the video evidence, was sufficient to establish reasonable, articulable suspicion of impairment such that further investigation was warranted.
{¶10} Initially, the state takes issue with the trial court's statement that there was "no oncoming traffic" and the truck "barely fits within the lane of travel." (Sic). In the state's view, the trial court impermissibly considered whether appellee was operating the truck "as nearly as practicable" within the lane-a defense to the merits of the charge. See Kirtland Hills v. Metz, 11th Dist. Lake No. 2005-L-197, 2006-Ohio-3413, ¶ 24. We do not view the trial court's observations as considering a purported affirmative defense as a basis for granting appellee's motion. Rather, under the circumstances, we view the trial court's statements as factual considerations regarding whether the actions at issue might be considered unsafe or erratic for conditions at the time of the stop. The trial court did not impermissibly consider an affirmative defense as a basis for granting the motion.
{¶11} Next, although the argument is interrelated with the previous point, the state argues that the trial court erred by commingling standards for initiating a traffic stop. Specifically, the state argues the trial court erroneously equated reasonable suspicion to initiate a traffic stop with proof of an actual violation of the law which justifies such a stop. The state maintains that this error was premised upon the court's agreement that appellee presented a defense to the statute rather than arguments supporting the conclusion that the officer failed to establish reasonable suspicion of impaired driving such that the investigative stop was legal and permissible. In effect, the state argues the trial court applied the wrong legal standard in granting the underlying motion. We disagree with the state's construction of the trial court's judgment.
{¶12} In its judgment, the trial court made the following factual findings:
The Court finds that the basis to initially follow Defendant's vehicle was nothing more than a hunch. Defendant did nothing wrong by not turning right on red. The alleged lane violation in turning onto Bower Road was not observed by the Trooper. There were no violations on Bower Road and the alleged marked lane violation occurred on Kline Road with no oncoming traffic driving a truck that barely fits within the lane of travel.
{¶13} In light of these findings, the trial court drew the following legal conclusions:
The Court, having weighed the evidence, finds that the Trooper lacked reasonable suspicion to initiate a traffic stop of Defendant's vehicle. The Defendant committed no violation of the law to justify the stop herein. The Court having found that the Trooper lacked reasonable suspicion to initiate a traffic stop of Defendant's vehicle any evidence derived therefrom must be suppressed.
{¶14} Clearly, the state seizes on the trial court's conclusion that "[t]he Defendant committed no violation of the law to justify the stop herein." While the trial court's statement would appear to blur the distinction between legal standards (probable cause versus reasonable suspicion), we fail to see how the statement alone undercuts the trial court's ultimate conclusion; namely, that the state failed to establish that the trooper possessed reasonable suspicion to initiate a traffic stop. In light of the full context of the judgment, we agree that the trial court's statement regarding the lack of a "legal violation," equivocates the legal standards. Nevertheless, we conclude that the statement was likely an oversight as the conclusion upon which it based its judgment was premised upon the lack of reasonable suspicion to initiate a traffic stop.
{¶15} In Wickliffe v. Petway, 11th Dist. Lake Nos. 2011-L-101, 2011-L-102, 2012-Ohio-2439, this court was faced with a similar fact pattern. In Petway, the arresting officer was traveling in the center lane of a three-lane highway when a minivan in front of the cruiser veered slightly to the left onto the line dividing lanes. Id. at ¶ 2. The minivan, however, did not cross the line. Id. The van again weaved slightly left, prompting the officer to initiate a traffic stop. Id. The officer noticed an open container between the legs of the minivan's passenger. Id. at ¶ 3. The defendant in Petway was subsequently ordered out of his vehicle, where the officer detected an odor of alcoholic beverage. Id. at ¶ 4. The officer initiated field sobriety tests after which the officer deemed the defendant impaired. Id. The defendant was charged with, inter alia, OVI and a marked lanes violation. Id. at ¶ 5. The defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence, which was denied. Id. at ¶ 6-7.
{¶16} On appeal, this court initially determined that the video evidence did not corroborate the officer's first-hand testimony that the defendant left his lane of travel. Instead, it merely demonstrated that the vehicle's left tires briefly went onto the line dividing the lanes of travel without moving into the adjacent lane. Id. at ¶ 19. This court concluded that "[a]s there was no other testimony regarding the van's purportedly illicit movement, we hold, * * * there was no marked lane violation in this case as a matter of law. The officer therefore lacked probable cause to stop appellant on this basis." Id.
{¶17} After concluding the trial court erred in finding probable cause to stop, this court embarked upon an analysis of whether the facts supported the conclusion that the officer had reasonable suspicion to stop the minivan. This court determined the state failed to establish the officer possessed the requisite reasonable suspicion to initiate an investigative stop. Specifically, this court noted that "'there must be some indicia of erratic driving to warrant an investigative stop beyond some incident of modest or minimal weaving in one's lane alone.'" Id. at ¶ 20, quoting State v. Spikes, 11th Dist. Lake No. 94-L-187, 1995 WL 407357 (June 9, 1995) (abrogated on the basis that the holding indicated that a de minimis marked-lanes violation does not justify a stop). And, that an officer may have reasonable suspicion to stop a vehicle "so long as the weaving observed is 'substantial.'" Petway at ¶ 20, quoting Mentor v. Phillips, 11th Dist. Lake No. 99-L-119, 2001 WL 20736, *2 (Dec. 29, 2000).
{¶18} The court in Petway pointed out that "a review of the dash-cam video demonstrates that the minivan weaved slightly to the left of the lane and then back to the center twice within the span of ten to 15 seconds." Id. at ¶ 21. But that the defendant's weaving "could not be reasonably characterized as jerky or unsafe." Id. at ¶ 23, (compare Petway at ¶ 28, (Trapp, J., dissenting) ("testimony from the officer [indicated] the movements were made in an 'unsafe manner'"). Significantly, this court noted that "there was no testimony that appellant was speeding or driving in an otherwise suspicious manner" and, as a result, this court determined the defendant's driving was not erratic. Id. at ¶ 23. Thus, in Petway, the officer did not have reasonable suspicion to initiate an investigative stop. Id.
{¶19} Here, Trooper Langston testified to the basis for initiating the stop:
[I]t was Thanksgiving night, so it was a holiday. Typically, for work purposes it's essentially like - - almost like a weekend night, the way that traffic is operated. It was, you know, 2:16 in the morning. It was a marked lanes violation. Obviously, stopping at a red light, not turning right on red after being stopped for 30 seconds, and then making a wide right turn onto Bower Road where it's not necessary to do that.
{¶20} On cross-examination, however, the trooper acknowledged he did not witness the alleged "wide right turn," but merely inferred, based on tire tracks imprinted on wet pavement, that appellee's truck made the turn. And, a review of the dash-cam video fails to reveal any clear or obvious evidence that a purported wide turn even occurred. Moreover, the trooper admitted that it is completely legal to remain stopped at a red light even though a motorist intends on turning and the intersection permits the turn. In short, the trooper conceded he witnessed no traffic violations while trailing appellee.
{¶21} Moreover, recognizing the point underscored by the dissent in Petway, there was no testimony suggesting that appellee's movements were unsafe. It was not until appellee turned onto Kline Road, a thoroughfare admittedly narrower than most roads, that the trooper asserted half the driver's side tires were over the center line. See State v. Mays, 119 Ohio St.3d 406, 2008-Ohio-4539, 894 N.E.2d 1204, ¶ 16 ("When an officer observes a vehicle drifting back-and-forth across an edge line, the officer has a reasonable and articulable, suspicion that the driver has violated R.C. 4511.33." (Emphasis added.)). See also Phillips, 2001 WL 20736, at *2 ("Given that appellant was driving a large pick-up truck with no cars traveling in the lane next to him, appellant did not violate the marked lanes statue by momentarily touching the white broken line that divides the two eastbound lanes of Mentor avenue.").
{¶22} The evidence failed to show that appellee made any "back-and-forth" movements "across" the edge of the line. Indeed, the trooper unequivocally stated he observed no traffic violations prior to the singular act of, after turning, appellee allegedly committed the claimed marked lane violation. Furthermore, there was nothing to suggest that the trooper observed appellee's vehicle weaving at all, let alone any evidence of substantial weaving within the designated lane. In short, review of the dash-cam video reveals no evidence of erratic driving; to the contrary, but for the driver's side tires of the large truck touching upon the center lines of the narrow road, we discern nothing unusual or abnormal about appellee's driving. And, of significant import, according to the trooper's testimony, the only legitimate basis for the stop was appellee's tire moving onto, but not crossing, the center lane of Kline Road. This evidence, without more, is insufficient to support reasonable suspicion to initiate a traffic stop.
{¶23} In light of the evidence, we hold, as a matter of law, the trooper lacked reasonable suspicion, on these facts, to initiate an investigative stop to determine if appellant was impaired.
{¶24} The state's assignment of error lacks merit.
{¶25} For the reasons discussed in this opinion, the judgment of the Portage County Municipal Court, Ravenna Division, is affirmed.
MARY JANE TRAPP, J., MATT LYNCH, J., concur.