" Syl. pt. 1, State ex rel. Smith v. DeBerry, 146 W.Va. 534, 120 S.E.2d 504 (1961). Syl. Pt. 2, State v. Young, 167 W.Va. 312, 280 S.E.2d 104 (1981). As such, the term of court in which petitioner was indicted will not be considered in our analysis.
State ex rel. Sutton v. Keadle, 176 W. Va. 138, 342 S.E.2d 103 (1985)]." Syl. pt. 2, State ex rel. Brum v. Bradley, 214 W. Va. 493, 590 S.E.2d 686 (2003); syl. pt. 1, State v. Young, 167 W. Va. 312, 280 S.E.2d 104 (1981). Every person charged by presentment or indictment with a felony or misdemeanor, and remanded to a court of competent jurisdiction for trial, shall be forever discharged from prosecution for the offense, if there be three regular terms of such court, after the presentment is made or the indictment is found against him, without a trial, unless the failure to try him was caused by his insanity; or by the witnesses for the State being enticed or kept away, or prevented from attending by sickness or inevitable accident; or by a continuance granted on the motion of the accused; or by reason of his escaping from jail, or failing to appear according to his recognizance, or of the inability of the jury to agree in their verdict [.]
Other circumstances that may bar retrial after appeal include a finding of prosecutorial or judicial misconduct that causes a mistrial, see State v. Pennington, 179 W. Va. 139, 365 S.E.2d 803 (1987); Keller v. Ferguson, 177 W. Va. 616, 355 S.E.2d 405 (1987), and a finding the three-term rule, W. Va. Code, 62-3-21 (1959), has been violated. See State v. Young, 167 W. Va. 312, 280 S.E.2d 104 (1981). "Corresponding to the right of an accused to be given a fair trial is the societal interest in punishing one whose guilt is clear after he has obtained such a trial.
We have uniformly held that the failure to comply with the three-term rule under W. Va. Code, 62-3-21, bars further prosecution. State ex rel. Shorter v. Hey, 170 W. Va. 249, 294 S.E.2d 51 (1981); State v. Young, 167 W. Va. 312, 280 S.E.2d 104 (1981); State v. Lacy, 160 W. Va. 96, 232 S.E.2d 519 (1977); State ex rel. Parsons v. Cuppett, 155 W. Va. 469, 184 S.E.2d 616 (1971); State v. Underwood, supra. This same rule is applicable for a retrial if the case is not tried within three terms after the term of the remand, subject to the exceptions contained in W. Va. Code, 62-3-21.
"Whereas W. Va.Code, 62-3-1, provides a defendant with a statutory right to a trial in the term of his indictment, it is W. Va.Code, 62-3-21, rather than W. Va.Code, 62-3-1, which is the legislative adoption or declaration of what ordinarily constitutes a speedy trial within the meaning of U.S. Const., amend. VI and W. Va. Const., art. III, § 14. State ex rel. Smith v. DeBerry, 146 W. Va. 534, 538, 120 S.E.2d 504, 506 (1961) [ overruled on other grounds, State ex rel. Sutton v. Keadle, 176 W. Va. 138, 342 S.E.2d 103 (1985)]." See also State ex rel. Sutton v. Keadle, supra; State v. Young, 167 W. Va. 312, 280 S.E.2d 104 (1981); State v. Underwood, 130 W. Va. 166, 43 S.E.2d 61 (1947). While we alluded to the speedy trial right under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution in Syllabus Point 1 of Shorter, it is clear that our three-term rule is not the federal constitutional speedy trial standard, which was established by the United States Supreme Court in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972).
"[U]nless the failure to try him was caused by his insanity; or by the witnesses for the State being enticed or kept away, or prevented from attending by sickness or inevitable accident; or by a continuance granted on the motion of the accused; or by reason of his escaping from jail, or failing to appear according to his recognizance, or of the inability of the jury to agree in their verdict. . . ." We have often stated that the three-term rule statute is a legislative enactment which is designed to afford the defendant a speedy trial as mandated by Article III, Section 14 of the West Virginia Constitution and the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. See State ex rel. Shorter v. Hey, 170 W. Va. 249, 294 S.E.2d 51 (1981); State v. Young, 167 W. Va. 312, 280 S.E.2d 104 (1981); State v. Underwood, 130 W. Va. 166, 43 S.E.2d 61 (1947). We do not believe that where the State is diligently pursuing prosecution of the defendant in one county that the charges against the defendant in the other county are then subject to the three-term rule.
However, this Court has held that it is W. Va. Code § 62-3-21 (1977 Replacement Vol.) which establishes the outermost limit of what constitutes a speedy trial under the State Constitution. State ex rel. Workman v. Fury, ___ W. Va. ___, 283 S.E.2d 851 (1981); State v. Young, ___ W. Va. ___, 280 S.E.2d 104 (1981); State ex rel. Shorter v. Hey, ___ W. Va. ___, 294 S.E.2d 51 (1981); State v. Lacy, 160 W. Va. 96, 232 S.E.2d 519 (1977). W. Va. Code § 62-3-21 provides that a person must be forever discharged from prosecution if not tried within three terms after the return of the indictment unless certain enumerated causes for continuance are shown.