Opinion
2 CA-CV 2023-0115
07-25-2024
The State of Arizona, Appellee, v. Ron Ellis Young, Appellant.
Ron Ellis Young, Peoria In Propria Persona
Not for Publication - Rule 111(c), Rules of the Arizona Supreme Court
Appeal from the Superior Court in Gila County No. CV202200308 The Honorable David E. Wolak, Judge Pro Tempore APPEAL DISMISSED
Ron Ellis Young, Peoria
In Propria Persona
Vice Chief Judge Eppich authored the decision of the Court, in which Presiding Judge Sklar and Judge Brearcliffe concurred.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
EPPICH, VICE CHIEF JUDGE:
¶1 Ron Young appeals from the superior court's ruling affirming the justice court's civil traffic judgment against him. Because we lack jurisdiction, we dismiss this appeal.
Factual and Procedural Background
¶2 In 2022, the justice court entered a judgment against Young for several civil traffic violations. Young appealed to the superior court. On April 6, 2023, the superior court entered its ruling affirming the justice court's judgment. The superior court did not sign the ruling or include finality language.
¶3 On May 22-approximately one and a half months after the superior court's ruling-Young filed a notice of appeal. Although the notice states that his appeal is from a judgment entered in the superior court on April 26, no such judgment appears in the record, and we interpret the notice as referring to the superior court's April 6 ruling. We ordered Young to "show cause why this appeal should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction," noting that our jurisdiction is governed by A.R.S. § 22-375 because this matter originated in justice court. Young responded, and we nevertheless determine we lack jurisdiction.
The state has not filed an answering brief or otherwise appeared on appeal in this matter.
Discussion
¶4 We are required to independently assess our jurisdiction. Robinson v. Kay, 225 Ariz. 191, ¶ 4 (App. 2010). We conclude we lack jurisdiction to consider Young's appeal because it is untimely; we therefore need not reach the separate question of whether this case "involves the validity of a tax, impost, assessment, toll, municipal fine or statute" as required to be appealable under § 22-375.
¶5 Young filed his notice of appeal more than thirty days after the ruling he appeals from. See Ariz. R. Civ. App. P. 9(a) ("To appeal a judgment, a party must file a notice of appeal . . . no later than 30 days after entry of the judgment from which the appeal is taken ...."). But, because the ruling lacks a signature, see Ariz. R. Civ. P. 58(b)(1), and finality language, see Ariz. R. Civ. P. 54(c), we must determine if the ruling became appealable on April 6 or if it suffers from an unresolved ministerial defect rendering the appeal premature, see Ariz. R. Civ. App. P. 9(c) (notice of appeal filed after announcement of decision but before appealable judgment treated as filed on date of judgment's entry).
¶6 Usually, our authority to determine an appeal from a superior court's judgment comes from A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(1), which provides that "[a]n appeal may be taken to the court of appeals . . . [f]rom a final judgment entered in an action or special proceeding commenced in a superior court, or brought into a superior court from any other court." When appellate jurisdiction is premised on § 12-2101(A)(1), the underlying judgment must be certified as final under Rule 54(c). Brumett v. MGA Home Healthcare, L.L.C., 240 Ariz. 420, ¶ 6 (App. 2016). The judgment must also be signed pursuant to Rule 58(b)(1). Haywood Secs., Inc. v. Ehrlich, 214 Ariz. 114, ¶ 9 (2007).
¶7 Here, our jurisdiction is instead governed by § 22-375(A), which-under certain circumstances-allows for an appeal "from a final judgment of the superior court in an action appealed from a justice of the peace or municipal court." Although § 22-375(A) uses the same "final judgment" language as § 12-2101(A)(1), we have previously determined that finality language is not required to appeal the "decision" of the superior court on an appeal from a lower court. See City of Tucson v. Sensibar, 243 Ariz. 527, ¶ 11 (App. 2018).
¶8 In Sensibar, we noted that Rule 12(c), Ariz. Super. Ct. R. App. P.-Civ., permits the superior court to render an appellate ruling as a "decision," requiring only that it be "in writing" and transmitted to the trial court and parties. Sensibar, 243 Ariz. 527, ¶ 8. Alternatively, Rule 12(d), Ariz. Super. Ct. R. App. P.-Civ., separately provides for the superior court's entry of a "[j]udgment" in an appeal from a lower court. This authority to enter a judgment in lieu of a decision presumably accounts for the superior court's ability to conduct a de novo trial on appeal. See Ariz. Super. Ct. R. App. P.-Civ. 7(e) (superior court may reset matter for new trial "[i]f it appears . . . that the record is insufficient for an appeal on the record"). In cases where the superior court enters a "judgment" on appeal, Rule 12(d) specifically requires compliance with Rule 58, Ariz. R. Civ. P. Such a requirement does not exist for a "decision" under Rule 12(c), Ariz. Super. Ct. R. App. P.-Civ.
¶9 Based on this distinction, we determined in Sensibar that the Rules of Civil Procedure do not apply to a superior court's appellate decision under Rule 12(c). 243 Ariz. 527, ¶ 9. Therefore, finality language under Rule 54(c), Ariz. R. Civ. P., is not required for a decision entered under Rule 12(c), Ariz. Super. Ct. R. App. P.-Civ. Such a decision is an appealable, final judgment upon entry under § 22-375. Sensibar, 243 Ariz. 527, ¶ 10.
¶10 Although not explicitly stated in Sensibar, we conclude this logic extends to the general requirement that judgments be signed. See Ariz. R. Civ. P. 58(b)(1). Our conclusion is further supported by the contrast between Rule 12(d), Ariz. Super. Ct. R. App. P.-Civ., which explicitly requires that "judgments shall be entered as provided in Rule 58, Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure" and Rule 12(c), Ariz. Super. Ct. R. App. P.-Civ., which is silent on the issue.
¶11 Here, the superior court entered a written ruling in the form of a decision under Rule 12(c). The court was not required to sign that decision nor certify it as final, and it became appealable when it was entered on April 6. See Ariz. R. Civ. App. P. 9(a) (time to file notice of appeal runs from the "entry of the judgment from which the appeal is taken"). Young's appeal on May 22 is therefore untimely, and we lack jurisdiction. See Jurju v. Ile, 255 Ariz. 558, ¶ 10 (App. 2023).
Disposition
¶12 For the foregoing reason, we dismiss this appeal.