The State also cites State v. Rising, 15 Wash.App. 693, 695, 552 P.2d 1056 (1976), State v. Rolax, 7 Wash.App. 937, 940, 503 P.2d 1093 (1972), and State v. Johnson, 79 Wash.2d 173, 176, 483 P.2d 1261 (1971), for the proposition, “ ‘A defendant's formal request is a prerequisite to the commencement of the running of the 120–day time period.’ ” Suppl. Br. of Pet'r at 8. And the State cites State v. Young, 16 Wash.App. 838, 840, 561 P.2d 204 (1977) for the notion, “Compliance with the requirements of RCW 9.98.010 is required in order to claim the benefit of the 120–day time period resulting in dismissal under RCW 9.98.020.” Id. These propositions are certainly correct.
In addition, even assuming the availability of the RCW 9.98.010(1) procedure, petitioner failed to make formal written demands upon the Thurston County prosecutor and Superior Court. Although petitioner claims he made several inquiries to prison officials concerning his probation status, it is well settled that only those individuals who have complied with the statute and have submitted a written request for disposition of the pending action may claim the benefit of the 120-day time period. State v. Young, 16 Wn. App. 838, 561 P.2d 204 (1977); State v. Rising, 15 Wn. App. 693, 552 P.2d 1056 (1976). Petitioner's reliance on the statute is unwarranted.