Opinion
No. COA11–807.
2012-05-1
STATE of North Carolina v. Michael Anthony YORK.
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Special Deputy Attorney General Elizabeth N. Strickland, for the State. Gilda C. Rodriguez, for defendant.
Defendant appeals, pursuant to a petition for writ of certiorari allowed by this Court on 24 February 2012, from judgment entered 1 February 2011 by Judge Anderson Cromer in Forsyth County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 23 February 2012. Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Special Deputy Attorney General Elizabeth N. Strickland, for the State. Gilda C. Rodriguez, for defendant.
ELMORE, Judge.
Michael Anthony York (defendant) was found guilty by a jury of felony larceny of a motor vehicle. Following his conviction, defendant pled guilty to being a habitual felon. He now appeals, arguing that the trial court erred by denying his motion to dismiss for insufficient evidence. We agree and reverse the judgment of the trial court. We vacate the felony conviction and the habitual felon conviction, but we remand for entry of a judgment of guilty of misdemeanor larceny and for re-sentencing.
At trial, the State presented evidence that defendant had stolen a 1998 Dodge Durango, which he wrecked before being apprehended. The vehicle's owner testified that she had purchased it three or four years earlier for $5,500.00. She also testified that the vehicle had air conditioning, power steering, and four-wheel drive. The State also presented photographs of the vehicle after it had been wrecked. On appeal, defendant argues that the State failed to present evidence that the vehicle was worth more than $1,000.00 at the time it was stolen.
“When a defendant moves for dismissal, the trial court must determine whether the State has presented substantial evidence of each essential element of the offense charged and substantial evidence that the defendant is the perpetrator.” State v. Cross, 345 N.C. 713, 716–17, 483 S.E.2d 432, 434 (1997) (citation omitted). “If substantial evidence of each element is presented, the motion for dismissal is properly denied.” Id. at 717, 483 S.E.2d at 434. “Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” State v. Smith, 300 N.C. 71, 78–79, 265 S.E.2d 164, 169 (1980) (citations omitted). “In considering the motion, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, giving the State the benefit of every reasonable inference to be drawn from the evidence, and resolving any contradictions in favor of the State.” State v. Anderson, 181 N.C.App. 655, 659, 640 S.E.2d 797, 801 (2007) (citation omitted).
The only element at issue here is that the stolen property must have a value greater than $1,000.00. SeeN.C. Gen.Stat. § 14–72(a) (2011).
“The fair market value of stolen property at the time of the theft must exceed the sum of [$1,000.00] for the possession to be felonious.” State v. Holland, 318 N.C. 602, 610, 350 S.E.2d 56, 61 (1986), overruled on other grounds, State v. Childress, 321 N .C. 226, 362 S.E.2d 263 (1987). Stolen property's fair market value is the item's reasonable selling price[ ] at the time and place of the theft, and in the condition in which it was when [stolen]. The State is not required to produce “direct evidence of ... value” to support the conclusion that the stolen property was worth over $1,000.00, provided that the jury is not left to “speculate as to the value” of the item. Holland, 318 N.C. at 610, 350 S.E.2d at 61.
State v. Davis, 198 N.C.App. 146, 151–52, 678 S.E.2d 709, 714 (2008) (additional quotations and citation omitted; alterations in original).
Here, the State did not produce sufficient evidence that the vehicle was worth more than $1,000.00. The State elicited testimony that the vehicle's owner had purchased the vehicle three or four years earlier for $5,500.00, and that the vehicle had four-wheel drive, air conditioning, and power steering. However, the State presented no evidence about the condition of the vehicle on the day of the crime as compared to when it was purchased. See, e.g., Davis, 198 N.C.App. at 152, 350 S.E.2d at 714 (holding that testimony that a stolen DVD player was in “like-new condition” and retailed new for $1,300.00 was sufficient evidence of the DVD player's value). Moreover, the photographs that the State introduced only showed the vehicle after it had been wrecked, and thus they were not indicative of the vehicle's value at the time it was stolen.
Accordingly, we hold that the trial court erred by denying defendant's motion to dismiss, and we vacate both the felony larceny conviction and the habitual felon conviction. However, because the State presented sufficient evidence of misdemeanor larceny, we remand for entry of a judgment of guilty of misdemeanor larceny and for re-sentencing. See State v. Parker, 146 N.C.App. 715, 718, 555 S.E.2d 609, 611 (2001).
Vacated and remanded. Judges STEELMAN and STROUD concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).