Opinion
No. 05-15-00507-CR
01-19-2016
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellant v. JONATHAN PRESTON YATES, Appellee
On Appeal from the County Criminal Court No. 6 Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. M13-15306
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Fillmore, Myers, and Whitehill
Opinion by Justice Fillmore
The trial court granted Jonathan Preston Yates's motion to suppress evidence obtained from his arrest. The State of Texas challenges the trial court's ruling, arguing the trial court erred by determining Yates was arrested and, even if Yates was arrested, the police officer had probable cause to believe Yates could have committed an offense. We reverse the trial court's order and remand this case for further proceedings.
Background
Yates and Julio Cisneros were in a motor vehicle that collided with a guardrail on September 22, 2013. On October 4, 2013, a warrant was issued for Yates's arrest on a charge of driving while intoxicated. Although the sheriff's return on the warrant is not completed, the record reflects that, on January 2, 2014, Yates, who is identified as the "arrested person," was admonished by a magistrate as to his right to counsel.
Yates filed an omnibus pretrial motion requesting, as relevant to this appeal, that the trial court suppress any "physical evidence recovered during the investigation of this case" if the trial court determined the evidence was obtained in violation of the United States or Texas Constitutions or of federal or state law. At the hearing on the motion to suppress, Yates's counsel opened the hearing by arguing Yates's arrest "lacked probable cause," and requested "the arrest be suppressed on the basis that Mr. Yates was not the driver of the vehicle." The trial court then instructed the State to call its first witness. The State proceeded to do so without informing the trial court that a warrant had been issued for Yates's arrest on October 4, 2013, and without providing either the warrant or the affidavit supporting the warrant to the trial court.
Coppell police officer Aaron Sparks testified that, on September 22, 2013, at approximately 5:00 a.m., he and his partner, Chris Cobb, were dispatched to the scene of a one-car accident on Interstate 635 at Royal Lane. When the officers arrived at the scene of the accident, they saw the car had collided with the guardrail. The entire front of the vehicle and the windshield were "smashed in pretty good." Both the driver's and passenger's side air bags had deployed.
Sparks met with an officer from the Grapevine police department who was already at the scene. In the recording of the scene that was made from Sparks's patrol car, the Grapevine police officer can be heard saying "orange shirt said he was driving" and "they're conspiring stories right now." Sparks and Cobb approached the two men standing beside the car.
Sparks spoke to Yates while Cobb spoke to Cisneros. According to Sparks, Yates was wearing an orange shirt or hoodie. Sparks asked Yates questions about the accident, such as what happened, how they got there, and where they were headed. Although Yates gave Sparks "short answers," he failed to give answers that were responsive to Sparks's questions. In the recording, Yates can be heard to say that he was dizzy and light-headed. According to Sparks, Yates was "potentially" confused. In Sparks's opinion, Yates was intoxicated.
Cobb testified he asked Cisneros who was driving. Cisneros initially did not answer the question and looked over Cobb's shoulder. Cobb thought Cisneros was attempting to listen to Sparks and Yates's conversation. Cobb again asked Cisneros who was driving. Cisneros pointed at Yates and said that he was the driver. Cisneros never said that he was driving the car.
Yates had blood on his forehead and in his mouth and was examined by Monty Moon, a paramedic. Moon noted that Yates had swelling on the left side of his face, facial abrasions, and blood on his chin. Moon asked Yates about his injuries and where he had been in the vehicle. Yates told Moon that he had been driving the car. Moon then asked Yates if he had been wearing his seatbelt. Yates did not respond to that question, but said he had not been driving the car. According to Moon, Yates did not appear to be confused about any question other than whether he was the driver of the car. In Moon's opinion, Yates was intoxicated. Further, based on Yates's injuries to the left side of his face and Yates saying he was the driver, Moon believed Yates was driving the car. Yates was transported to the hospital in an ambulance.
Moon asked Cisneros if he had been driving the car. Cisneros said that Yates was the driver. Although Cisneros complained that his right elbow hurt from hitting the window, he refused medical treatment. Sparks took pictures of the car, Cisneros's hands, and the front of Cisneros's body. Sparks took the picture of Cisneros's hands because, in Sparks's experience, the driver of a vehicle involved in an accident will often have cuts or abrasions on his hands from the air bag or the windshield. Cisneros did not have any cuts or abrasions on his hands. Sparks took the picture of the front of Cisneros's body to document the clothes he was wearing and to show the lack of injuries. On the front of Cisneros's shirt was a dirt or burn mark. Sparks believed this mark was similar to one made by an air bag deploying and that the location of the mark was more consistent with the passenger-side air bag deploying. Cisneros told Sparks that his cellphone was still in the car and was in the passenger area of the vehicle. Sparks did not find Cisneros's cell phone.
In Sparks's opinion, Yates was driving the car. He described the bases for this opinion as Yates not answering the question of whether he was the driver, Cisneros saying Yates was the driver, Cisneros complaining his right elbow hurt, Cisneros stating his cell phone was in the passenger side of the car, the marks on Cisneros's shirt, Yates's injuries being more consistent with being the driver of the vehicle, and Yates telling Moon that he was the driver of the car.
Yates testified that he and his brother went to the horse races on September 21, 2013, and then attended a party at the stables. Yates's brother was the designated driver, and Yates was drinking alcohol. After Yates and his brother left the race grounds, they went to a strip club in the Rockwall area. Yates's brother met a girl and indicated he was leaving with her. Yates's brother offered to leave his car with Yates, but Yates declined.
According to Yates, he and Cisneros were coworkers, and Cisneros, knowing Yates was planning on attending the horse races, had offered the previous Friday to give Yates a ride if he got "too trashed or anything like that." Yates called Cisneros at approximately 3:00 a.m. and asked Cisneros to pick him up. Cisneros lived in Fort Worth, and it took him a while to get to the club. Yates continued drinking while he waited for Cisneros. When Cisneros arrived, Yates got into the passenger seat of the car and set his GPS to direct them to his home in Arlington. At the hearing, Yates recognized the pictures taken after the accident showed a case of beer in the floorboard of the passenger side of the car, but did not remember the beer being at his feet. Yates also did not remember the accident. Yates testified he remembered "coming to" in the passenger seat and seeing that both air bags had deployed and Cisneros was no longer in the car. Yates did not remember getting out of the car, but remembered standing by the car with Cisneros.
Yates denied he told the first police officer who arrived at the scene that he was the driver of the car. He remembered "very small pieces" of being checked by the paramedic. According to Yates, he told personnel at the hospital that he was the passenger in the car, and he would be surprised if his medical records reflected he was the driver of the car. Yates recalled being rolled out of the hospital in a wheelchair.
Yates denied he owned the car and testified he found out later it belonged to Cisneros's mother-in-law. According to Yates, Cisneros told him that Cisneros would let "them" know that he was driving and "filled out a paper that he was driving." The prosecutor represented she had not seen anything in writing, but that, when she spoke to Cisneros before the hearing, he told her that he was the driver of the car.
Trial Court's Ruling
The trial court made written findings of fact and conclusions of law in which it stated Yates moved to suppress "the evidence obtained from the arrest" and granted Yates's "motion to suppress." In support of its ruling, the trial court found:
• On September 22, 2013, at approximately 5 a.m., Sparks responded to the accident scene. Sparks testified there were two subjects outside the vehicle when he arrived.
• Sparks testified the car sustained extensive damage and could not be driven from the scene.
• The front windshield was smashed with the majority of the damage appearing to be in the middle of the windshield, making it difficult to determine who, if anyone, hit the windshield in the crash.
• A Grapevine police officer informed Sparks that he thought Yates was the driver of the car. Sparks made contact with Yates while Cobb made contact with the alleged passenger, Cisneros. Yates provided short answer responses that were not answering Sparks's questions.
• Yates had blood on his forehead and possibly his mouth. Yates also had cuts on his forehead, was holding the left side of his face, had swelling on the left side of his face, blood on his chin, and cuts on the tops of his hands. In Sparks's opinion, Yates's injuries were consistent with being the driver of the car.
• Yates initially admitted driving, but failed to respond to being asked if he was wearing a seatbelt. Yates then "changed his story to Officer Sparks and said he wasn't driving."
• Cisneros told Cobb that Yates was driving. Cisneros had a type of marking on the sternum area of his shirt. Sparks testified the marking was not blood, but probably from the seatbelt or air bag deploying.
• The officers did not run a vehicle registration check, and it was admitted during the hearing that the vehicle was registered to "the passenger Cisneros' mother-in-law." Cisneros later admitted he completed an affidavit of non-prosecution at the courthouse, swearing he was driving. However, this affidavit could not be found as of the date of the hearing.
The trial court then set out the factual sufficiency standard of review and stated:
This Court finds Officer Sparks and Cobb did not exercise due diligence and reconstruct the accident. They didn't determine which seatbelts were worn and by whom. And they didn't run a vehicle registration check to try and determine ownership of the vehicle. This Court further finds that the passenger's later admittance of driving the vehicle that his mother-in-law owned lends credibility to [Yates's] claim he was not driving the vehicle. This Court also finds the Officers did not provide credible testimony regarding some critical facts in dispute that could have been revealed had they initially conducted a more detailed investigation and not relied on the Grapevine Police to tell them who was the driver.
Standard of Review
We review a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress under a bifurcated standard of review. Turrubiate v. State, 399 S.W.3d 147, 150 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). We review the trial court's factual findings for an abuse of discretion, but review the trial court's application of the law to the facts de novo. Id. We give almost total deference to the trial court's determination of historical facts. Valtierra v. State, 310 S.W.3d 442, 447 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). We give the same deference to the trial court's conclusions with respect to mixed questions of law and fact that turn on credibility or demeanor. State v. Ortiz, 382 S.W.3d 367, 372 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). We review mixed questions of law and fact that do not turn on credibility and demeanor as well as purely legal questions de novo. State v. Woodard, 341 S.W.3d 404, 410, (Tex. Crim. App. 2011).
The trial court is the sole trier of fact and judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony. Valtierra, 310 S.W.3d at 447. When the trial court makes explicit findings of fact, we determine whether the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling, supports the fact findings. State v. Kelly, 204 S.W.3d 808, 818 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). If the trial court fails to make a particular finding, we imply a fact finding to support the trial court's ruling when the evidence supports the implied finding. See Gutierrez v. State, 221 S.W.3d 680, 687 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). We afford the prevailing party the strongest legitimate view of the evidence and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from that evidence. State v. Duran, 396 S.W.3d 563, 571 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). We will uphold the trial court's ruling if it is reasonably supported by the record and is correct on any theory of law applicable to the case. State v. Story, 445 S.W.3d 729, 732 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014).
See also Lowery v. State, No. 07-13-00195-CR, 2015 WL 410696, at *3 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Jan. 29, 2015, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (Even though trial court made written findings of fact following the hearing on the defendant's motion to suppress, "[o]mitted findings of fact are implied in favor of the trial court's ruling if the evidence supports the implied findings.").
Yates's Arrest
In its first issue, the State asserts the trial court erred by finding that Yates was arrested at the scene of the accident. Yates did not specifically address this issue in his brief. However, during oral argument, Yates's counsel represented that Yates was not contending he was arrested on the morning of the accident, but the trial court operated under the belief he was arrested.
The trial court did not make a finding as to when Yates was arrested. Further, although the trial court granted Yates's motion to "suppress the evidence obtained from the arrest," the order does not state what evidence was being suppressed. However, the suppression hearing focused solely on the events that occurred on the morning of the accident, and there was no testimony concerning any evidence collected after Yates was taken into custody following issuance of the warrant for his arrest. Accordingly, the only evidence the trial court could have suppressed based on this record are the statements made by Yates at the scene of the accident. Further, based on the issues raised in the trial court, the trial court could have suppressed those statements only on the basis Yates was arrested without probable cause on the morning of the accident. It is undisputed there was no warrant for Yates's arrest on September 20, 2013. We, therefore, must determine whether the trial court erred by impliedly finding Yates was subject to a warrantless arrest on the morning of the accident.
As noted above, Yates filed a written motion to suppress evidence found during the investigation of the case if that evidence was discovered in violation of his constitutional rights or applicable law. This general motion failed to state any specific grounds for the suppression of the evidence or to specify what evidence Yates sought to have suppressed. At the hearing, Yates orally requested his "arrest" be suppressed because there was no probable cause to effect the arrest. In its findings of fact and conclusions of law, the trial court granted Yates's motion to suppress evidence. In addressing the State's first issue, we have attempted to construe Yates's arguments below and the trial court's ruling as consistently as possible.
The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and seizures by government officials. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. However, not every interaction between a police officer and citizen implicates the Fourth Amendment. Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434 (1991); Hunter v. State, 955 S.W.2d 102, 104 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). As the court of criminal appeals has explained:
There are three distinct types of police-citizen interactions: (1) consensual encounters that do not implicate the Fourth Amendment; (2) investigative detentions that are Fourth Amendment seizures of limited scope and duration that must be supported by a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity; and (3) arrests, the most intrusive of Fourth Amendment seizures, that are reasonable only if supported by probable cause.Wade v. State, 422 S.W.3d 661, 667 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013).
The primary question in determining whether an interaction between a law enforcement officer and a citizen is a Fourth Amendment seizure is, based on the totality of the circumstances, whether "a reasonable person in the defendant's shoes would have felt free to ignore the request or terminate the interaction." Woodard, 341 S.W.3d at 411; see also TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. art. 15.22 (West 2015) (setting out when person has been arrested); Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434. Although there is no bright-line rule governing when a person is seized by a law enforcement officer, a Fourth Amendment seizure generally occurs when a law enforcement officer restrains a citizen's liberty through force or a show of authority. Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434; Woodard, 341 S.W.3d at 411. If ignoring the request or terminating the encounter is an option, then no Fourth Amendment seizure has occurred. Wade, 422 S.W.3d at 667. Although we consider the time, place, and surrounding circumstances of the interaction, the officer's conduct is the most important factor when deciding whether an interaction is a Fourth Amendment seizure. Woodard, 341 S.W.3d at 411. Determining whether a given set of facts amounts to a consensual police-citizen encounter or a seizure under the Fourth Amendment is an issue of law subject to de novo review. Johnson v. State, 414 S.W.3d 184, 192 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013).
In this case, the encounter between Sparks and Yates occurred after Sparks responded to the scene of a one-car accident in which Yates was involved. Although Sparks attempted to question Yates about the accident, Yates gave nonresponsive answers and complained he was injured. Yates was then examined by Moon, a paramedic, and transported to the hospital. After treatment, Yates was discharged from the hospital. Because Yates was free to terminate, and did terminate, the encounter with Sparks, he was not arrested on the morning of the accident.
Because Yates was not arrested the morning of the accident, the trial court erred by suppressing the statements he made to the Grapevine police officer and to Moon on the ground there was no probable cause to arrest Yates. Accordingly, we resolve the State's first point of error in its favor.
Probable Cause
In its second point of error, the State argues that, even if Yates was under arrest on the morning of the accident, there was probable cause to make that arrest. Yates responds a warrant was issued for his arrest on October 4, 2013, but the State failed to provide the warrant or the affidavit supporting it to the trial court, and failed to meet its burden to introduce sufficient evidence or testimony to permit the trial court to determine the existence of probable cause to effect the arrest.
The disjunction between the parties' arguments appears to be based on the difference between Yates's written motion to suppress "evidence" and his oral motion to suppress his "arrest." However, the trial court stated in its findings of fact that Yates moved to suppress "the evidence obtained from the arrest" and granted the motion to suppress. As previously noted, on this record, the only possible evidence suppressed was Yates's statements on the morning of the accident. Accordingly, Yates's argument that there was not sufficient evidence or testimony to permit the trial court to determine whether there was probable cause to effect his arrest following the issuance of the warrant on October 4, 2013, misses the mark.
We have already concluded Yates was not under arrest on the date of the accident. However, even if we assume Yates was arrested on the date of the accident, we conclude, based on the proper standard of review, that there was probable cause for the officers to believe Yates was driving the car.
"Generally, a warrantless arrest is, pursuant to the Fourth Amendment, unreasonable per se unless the arrest fits into one of a 'few specifically defined and well delineated exceptions.'" Torres v. State, 182 S.W.3d 899, 901 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (quoting Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 372 (1993)). However, a law enforcement officer may arrest an individual without a warrant if probable cause exists with respect to the individual in question and the arrest falls within one of the exceptions set out in the code of criminal procedure. Torres, 182 S.W.3d at 901; see also TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. arts. 14.01-.02, 14.03-04 (West 2015 & Supp. 2015); Amador v. State, 275 S.W.3d 872, 878 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) ("[A] warrantless arrest for an offense committed in the officer's presence is reasonable if the officer has probable cause.") (citing United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 418 (1976)).
As relevant to this case, a law enforcement officer may arrest a person without a warrant for any offense committed in the officer's presence or within his view. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 14.01(b). A law enforcement officer may make a warrantless arrest under article 14.01(b) of the code of criminal procedure based on the officer's personal knowledge or "information from reasonably trustworthy sources that an offense was or is being committed." Torres, 182 S.W.3d at 901-02.
"'Probable cause' for a warrantless arrest exists if, at the moment the arrest is made, the facts and circumstances within the arresting officer's knowledge and of which he has reasonably trustworthy information are sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that the person arrested had committed or was committing an offense." Amador, 275 S.W.3d at 878 (citing Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964)). The arresting officer need not personally observe all the facts relating to probable cause but may rely on reasonably trustworthy information. See Torres, 182 S.W.3d at 902.
Probable cause is not itself a fact required to be proven by the evidence, it is a conclusion that may or may not be reasonably drawn from the facts and circumstances of a particular case. Segura v. State, 826 S.W.2d 178, 182 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1992, pet. ref'd). The test for probable cause is objective; it is "unrelated to the subjective beliefs of the arresting officer," and "it requires a consideration of the totality of the circumstances facing the arresting officer." Amador, 275 S.W.3d at 878 (citing Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371 (2003); Beck, 379 U.S. at 97). "[P]robable cause must be based on facts, not opinions." Torres, 182 S.W.3d at 902. A finding of probable cause requires "more than bare suspicion" but "less than" evidence that would justify conviction. Amador, 275 S.W.3d at 878 ((quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949)). We review de novo the trial court's determination of whether probable cause exists. Baldwin v. State, 278 S.W.3d 367, 371 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009).
The trial court, using a factual sufficiency standard, determined the officers failed to conduct a sufficient investigation and there was evidence to support Yates's testimony that he was not driving. However, it was not the trial court's role to determine whether the evidence offered at the suppression hearing was sufficient to support a conviction. Rather, the trial court was required to determine whether the State met its burden to show the officers had probable cause to believe Yates was driving the vehicle.
We note the factual sufficiency standard for a review of evidence to support a conviction has not been applicable in criminal cases in Texas since 2010. Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 894-95 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (plurality op.); Bell v. State, 326 S.W.3d 716, 720 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2010, pet. dism'd).
A person commits the offense of driving while intoxicated if the person is intoxicated while operating a motor vehicle in a public place. See TEX. PENAL CODE Ann. § 49.04(a) (West Supp. 2015). Yates stipulated for purposes of the hearing on his motion to suppress that he was intoxicated at the time of the accident. He argued only that the officers did not have probable cause to believe he was driving the vehicle.
The trial court found the Grapevine police officer informed Sparks that Yates was the driver of the vehicle. Further, although our review of the record indicates the conversation was between Yates and Moon, the trial court found Yates told Sparks that he was the driver of the vehicle and then retracted that statement. The trial court found Sparks testified that, in his opinion, Yates's injuries were consistent with being the driver of the vehicle. The trial court also found that Cisneros told Cobb that Yates was driving the vehicle, but retracted that statement shortly before the hearing on Yates's motion to suppress. Finally, the trial court found the officers failed to run a check on the registration of the vehicle, but it was later determined the car was registered to Cisneros's mother-in-law.
After reviewing de novo the determination of probable cause for a warrantless arrest in this case, we conclude that, even if Yates was arrested on the morning of the accident, the State carried its burden to justify the warrantless arrest. The evidence at the hearing established, and the trial court found, that Yates and Cisneros both made statements at the scene of the accident that Yates was the driver of the car; Yates, but not Cisneros, stated at the scene of the accident that Cisneros was the driver; Sparks obtained information from the Grapevine police officer that Yates was the driver of the car; Yates's and Cisneros's injuries were consistent with Yates being the driver of the car; and Cisneros stated his cell phone was in the passenger side of the car. Based on the totality of the evidence presented, we conclude the facts and circumstances within Sparks's knowledge, and of which he had reasonably trustworthy information, were sufficient to warrant a prudent person to believe that, on the morning of the accident, Yates had committed the offense of driving while intoxicated. See Amador, 275 S.W.3d at 878. Thus, even if Yates was arrested on the morning of the accident, the State met its burden at the suppression hearing to show Sparks had probable cause to arrest Yates, and the trial court erred by granting Yates's motion to suppress evidence obtained from the arrest. We resolve the State's second point of error in its favor.
We recognize that, shortly before the hearing, Cisneros told the prosecutor he was driving the car. However, this was not information that was known to Sparks when Yates was purportedly arrested at the scene of the accident. See Segura, 826 S.W.2d at 182 ("To justify a warrantless arrest, the State has the burden to prove probable cause existed when the officer made the arrest."). --------
We reverse the trial court's order granting Yates's motion to suppress evidence and remand this case for further proceedings. Do Not Publish
TEX. R. APP. P. 47
150507F.U05
/Robert M. Fillmore/
ROBERT M. FILLMORE
JUSTICE
JUDGMENT
On Appeal from the County Criminal Court No. 6, Dallas County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. M13-15306.
Opinion delivered by Justice Fillmore, Justices Myers and Whitehill participating.
Based on the Court's opinion of this date, the order of the trial court suppressing evidence obtained from Jonathan Preston Yates's arrest is REVERSED and the cause REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Judgment entered January 19, 2016.